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Abstract
Researched in this thesis is the financial impact of employee involvement and performance- 
related pay systems in UK manufacturing and retail settings. The test questions are introduced 
in Chapter 1 along with some micro- and macro-level factors which may make it efficient to 
involve employees in decision-making and to pay basis performance. Chapter 2 discusses 
theoretical issues associated with involving employees in decision-making and using group-based 
incentives. There is support from both the theoretical and empirical literature that employee 
involvement and performance-related pay are more efficient when used in combination. Chapter 
3 evaluates methodological issues associated with the examination of these questions, including 
methods used to attribute for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity in the econometric 
analysis. In Chapter 4 case study evidence is gathered from the retail sector on the adoption of, 
and associated performance trends with the use of, an All Employee Stock Option Programme 
(AESOP) and extensive employee communication programmes. Sources at the company indicate 
that the use of these practices are thought to result in greater employee effort and efficient 
information sharing. Performance trends, since the adoption of these programmes, indicate 
improved performance within the company and relative to competitors which do not offer an 
AESOP. Econometric analysis is used in Chapter 5 to examine the financial impact of 
individual, team and group pay systems in UK manufacturing establishments where there is work 
task ‘interdependence*. Evidence is found that in team production settings group payments 
systems are the most efficient pay system. Chapter 6 examines the impact of two forms of 
employee involvement, decentralized decision-making and two-way information sharing, on 
establishment performance. These practices are examined both including and excluding 
incentives. A statistically significant impact on establishment performance is found when 
performance-based incentives are included: this result disappears when the incentives are 
excluded. A second econometric analysis is conducted in Chapter 6, evaluating the independent 
and interactive effects of decentralized decision-making and group incentives in team production 
settings. Evidence is found that sub-optimal performance results in establishments which use 
only decentralized decision-making or only group incentives. Establishments that use the 
practices in combination have the best performance. Chapter 7 is the summary and conclusion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Globalisation, reduction in communication and transportation costs, technological change, 
international trade, product market competition, the growth of service and ‘weightless’1 
industries are all having an enormous impact on the workplace and the employment relationship. 
On the micro-level, information technology, greater individual training and higher levels of 
educational attainment may be putting greater amounts of potentially productivity-enhancing 
information at the disposal of employees. One result of these macro- and micro-level changes, 
in the manufacturing sector, is that the production process is changing from a primarily 
individually oriented ‘hierarchical' division of labour, to a much more team-based approach 
where there is a high degree of ‘interdependence ’ among work areas (Piore, 1989). Additionally, 
due to an increase in human capital and information technology ‘efficiency-enhancing 
information’, which resides with employees, may be more prevalent than ever. In order to gain 
access to this information companies are increasingly developing and putting in place formal 
mechanisms and programmes such as employee involvement programmes, decentralized 
decision-making and two-way communication programmes. An implication associated with an 
increase in private information is it may become more difficult and expensive for companies to 
monitor employees to ensure that they are acting on this information in a way that maximizes the 
companies’ performance or profits. Additionally, without incentives, there may be little 
motivation for employees to communicate this information to those who may find it valuable.
1 See Quah (1998) for a more thorough description of the ‘weightless’ economy and industries.
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A cost-effective substitute for formal monitors may be incentives based on some measure of 
output such as performance rather than input such as time spent on the job.2 There is an increase 
in the usage of these forms of performance-related pay systems such as individual merit pay, 
individual bonuses, team-based pay and various forms of group-based incentives including 
profit-sharing and share ownership schemes that may further suggest companies are attempting 
to access private information cost efficiently.
Given these factors, companies are faced with the question, what is the most efficient way in 
which to structure the employment relationship? Two core practices that are becoming more 
prevalent, and the subjects of this thesis, are employee involvement programmes and 
performance-related pay. The general question evaluated and tested in this thesis is - In team 
production settings, where employees may have information from which the company could 
benefit, what are the most effective ways to structure human resource practices? More 
specifically, the following questions are evaluated:
v
i. From the perspective of the company, why would they choose to use profit- 
sharing and employee involvement programmes? What would they hope to gain and 
does the firms’ performance change after the introduction of these programmes? How 
well are they performing in relation to firms which do not use these programmes?
ii. What form of pay system promotes optimal establishment outcomes? In team production 
settings, are individual, team or group incentives most effective?
•y
The substitutability of incentives for formal monitors is discussed in both the theoretical Chapter 2 
and the empirical Chapters.
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iii. In settings where the product produced or the service given are dependent on team 
production or interdependent work processes, is it efficient for establishments to invest 
in decentralized decision-making and information-sharing? Is it efficient to use employee 
involvement and performance-related pay on their own or in combination?
Focussing on pay systems, primarily group-based performance-related schemes and on employee 
involvement programmes, in particular decentralized decision-making and employee 
communication programmes, this thesis explores these questions theoretically, practically and 
empirically.
1.1.1 Chapter Plans
To explore these questions this thesis will move from the general to the specific using both case 
study and econometric analysis. Starting in the introduction, some key concepts and the trends 
affecting employee involvement and group-based performance-related pay will be presented. In 
Chapter 2 a broad overview of theoretical concepts related to these questions and an empirical 
review of the research that has explored these issues is considered. Chapter 3 evaluates some 
methodological issues associated with an examination of the questions explored in this thesis. 
Within Chapters 4, 5 and 6 specific theoretical and empirical considerations will be evaluated. 
Chapter 4 presents a case study of one of the first firms in the UK to offer executive style stock 
options for all employees. Also examined in Chapter 4 is the extensive use of two-way employee 
communication programmes in the same firm. The intention of this case study is to obtain 
information on one firms’ experience with group incentives and programmes designed to give 
both employees and management access to useful information. The questions examined in
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Chapter 4 are, why would a company choose to put these practices in place, and is there any 
evidence that they may be having a positive effect on the company’s performance? The 
evaluation draws upon both the theoretical considerations and interviews conducted with 
management at the case study company as to why they choose to place these programmes in 
place and what they hope to gain. Changing from the service sector to the manufacturing sector, 
and from the firm level to the establishment level, the econometric work begins in Chapter 5. 
Narrowing the focus specifically to the evaluation of pay systems in production settings in which 
the production process is largely interdependent, Chapter 5 evaluates the impact differing forms 
of performance-related pay systems have on establishment performance. First evaluated in 
Chapter 6 is the question, do two-way communication programmes or decentralized decision­
making have an impact on performance? Initially, decision-making and financial participation 
are not isolated. The second set of regressions does eliminate the use of financial participation 
with employee participation. This is followed with an isolation of the impact establishments 
which use i) only a high degree of decentralized decision-making ii) only use group incentives 
and iii) only those establishments which use the two practices in combination. This separation 
of the various types of practices by establishment will enable an evaluation to determine both the 
independent and interactive effects of decentralized decision-making and group incentives on 
establishment performance. Chapter 7 is a review and conclusion of the thesis and Chapter 8 is 
the references.
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1.2 Terminology and Concepts
1.2.1 Principals and Agents - Residual Return and Control Rights 
Principal and Agents or Owner and Non-owners
Throughout this thesis I will be referring to 'principals ’ and 'agents '. The principal is the 
‘owner’ of capital able to exercise decision-making rights regarding any residual profits and the 
right to decide how the assets are to be used. The ‘agent’ is the ‘non-owner’ and is employed by 
the principal to carry out some service or economic activity. However, the line between ‘owners’ 
and ‘non-owners’ is becoming increasingly blurred. More non-owners are becoming 
shareholders and becoming increasingly involved in organisational decision-making. Within the 
context of this thesis, non-owners, are those who have access to information that could improve 
efficiency, but who do not have access to the two rights of ownership, i.e. ‘residual return' and 
‘residual control ’?
Residual Return and Residual Control Rights
There are two principal rights of ownership: the right of residual return, which is the right to any 
residual profits after all obligations have been met, and the right of residual control, which is the 
right to control what is done with an asset. Examples of sharing residual return rights with ‘non- 
owners’ are profit-sharing plans, share ownership or stock-option plans. Sharing residual control 
rights may consist of granting ‘non-owners’ a high degree of autonomy over the work process 
or employee involvement programmes such as information-sharing programmes.
3 The concept and definition of ‘residual return’ and ‘control rights’ are the same ones largely used by 
Milgrom and Roberson (1992) and Ben-Ner and Jones (1995).
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This thesis will focus on certain forms of residual control and return sharing practices that will 
be more thoroughly discussed in the theoretical chapter and tested in the empirical work. The 
definition of ‘non-owner’ is broad and may include both senior management and shopfloor 
workers. However, it is unlikely, that senior management would not have access to residual 
return rights, for example in the form of stock option or some form of performance-related pay. 
‘Owners’ are those who have the right to residual return and residual control and ‘non-owners’ 
are those who do not share in these rights.
1.2.2 New Economics of Personnel or the Strategic Choice Literature
The relatively recently coined terms the ‘New Economics ofPersonnel’4orthe ‘Strategic Choice’ 
literature recognize that firms have a choice regarding which management practices they put in 
place. Economists and industrial relations professionals have increasingly become interested in 
what goes on inside the ‘black box’, i.e. the firm. This interest has largely been focussed on the 
impact different compensation or remuneration programmes have on a firm’s performance. 
Recently this has extended to other human resource practices including the impact of 
‘combinations’ (Huseslid, 1995; Ichniowski, 1990) or ‘systems’. This view suggests that firms 
make choices regarding how they structure their human resource policies, some of which work, 
some of which do not. Theory can tell us much about how the world works, however, not 
everyone acts in that way, so there is a role for economists and industrial relations professionals 
to steer firms in the right direction. This does not mean the ‘one size fits all’ mentality is being 
advocated; in fact, exactly the opposite view is supported in this thesis. There may be certain
4 See the October 1987 issue of the Journal of Labor Economics for an overview of the ‘New 
Economics o f Personnel’.
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firms or establishments with certain types of employees which may benefit from using a 
particular set of practices. This would mean those firms with a different set of characteristics and 
a different set of employees may benefit from a completely different set of practices.
1.2.3 The Economic Impact of Human Resource Practices
There is increasing evidence that human resource practices, such as pay systems, have an impact 
on the performance of the firm (Hueslid, 1995; Ichniowski 1990). In many companies the labour 
costs comprise a substantial portion of business costs. The impact on the success of an enterprise 
of efficiently organising a firm’s human capital may be substantial. Take for example a fairly 
labour-intensive business where 80 per cent of the costs of doing business is associated with 
labour costs and 20 per cent is the cost of capital. If it were possible to make labour ten per cent 
more efficient and what was accomplished in 66 minutes could be accomplished in 60 minutes, 
there would be an increase in output of eight per cent. Assuming there were no, or little, set-up 
costs, even if five per cent of those gains went to employees, owners would be three per cent 
better off. The cost of labour and capital vary enormously by firm, industry and sector. In those 
firms which have a high level of labour costs and where inputs from labour are crucial for the 
product or service provided, the gains from increasing the efficiency of the workforce may be 
very substantial.
In order to explore the impact of human resource practices on firm performance both the retail 
and manufacturing sectors are evaluated. A case study will be conducted in a service sector 
retailer which uses an executive like stock options for all employees and also invests heavily in 
obtaining information from front-line employees. The econometric analysis of this thesis will
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be conducted using data on shopfloor workers in manufacturing establishments which are mostly 
small-to-medium sized and hire skilled employees. These two settings are ideal for addressing 
the questions which are examined in this thesis. In the manufacturing setting, given the high skill 
levels and technological sophistication of the workplaces, there may be considerable scope for 
the shopfloor workers to influence performance. Additionally, manufacturing settings provide 
tangible measures of output which allow better performance measures. In the retail setting, while 
the employees may be considered low skill, they are in a position where, given their proximity 
to the customers, they may have access to highly useful information, for example, on customer 
preferences. It is more difficult to find viable performance measures in the service sector: 
however, comparison to performance measures prior to and after the programmes of interest are 
put in place, and comparison to firms in the same industry which do not offer these programmes, 
may provide information on their effects.
1.3 Changes in the Macro and Micro Economic Environment
Increased Levels o f *Information Capital, due to Information Technology 
One fundamental change in organisations with enormous implications for both coordination and 
incentive mechanisms is the advent, and continued development of, information technology. The 
impact of the personal computer on the way in which work is carried out is enormous. Word 
processing and spreadsheets are part of most people’s working lives. Local area networks 
(LANs), groupware, intranets and ISDN lines are tools which aid communication and 
information -sharing and all are becoming increasingly common in the workplace. Additionally, 
there are automated work flow process systems which carry out simple tasks as well as 
autonomous and intelligent agents which are capable of mining data for pertinent information
and also capable of conducting analysis of that data. The internet and corresponding search 
engines are putting individuals closer to ever increasing amount of information. The internet will 
continue to have the effect of increasing the level and type of information at the disposal of 
individuals and teams. Graph 1.1 shows the percentage increase in computer usage between the 
years 1986 and 1997. There has been a substantial increase in the level of computer usage in the 
UK between the 1986 survey and the 1997 survey.
Increased ‘Human' Capital
While technology is increasing the information which individuals have access to, individual 
human capital is also increasing. This is evident due to an increase in the educational attainment 
which is taking place (graph 1.2) and the amount of firm-specific and general training which is 
taking place (graph 1.3). Regarding educational attainment, we see in graph 1.4 that there is an 
increase from 22.5 per cent in 1986 to 28.5 per cent in 1997 of the workforce with qualifications.
Work Organisation Change from Division ofLabour to Team-Based Approach
Piore (1989) shows that there are a number of changes occurring in manufacturing settings which 
have a considerable impact on the way in which work is carried out. Piore contends that there 
is a change from hierarchy based on division of labour to team-based organisations. This is 
largely associated with the advent and proliferation of Japanese style ‘ Just-in-Time’ management. 
This form of management is characterised as being associated with a reduction in ‘in process 
inventory'. According to Piore, the movement towards this form of workplace design has had 
important implications for the relationship among workers and work stations. The change, 
according to Piore, is from ‘isolated\ independent operations to intense interaction between 
adjacent operations. This change in manufacturing settings is also reflected in the adoption of
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‘flexible ’ work practices such as contingent pay, multi-skilling and a high level of employee 
involvement (Osterman, 1994).
Private Information
Another change in the economy which has been taking place for five decades in the developed 
world, and at a significant but slower rate in developing economies, is the rapid expansion of the 
service economy. There has been much concern about the loss of higher paying manufacturing 
jobs to the low wage service sector (Machin, 1996); these jobs often require a low skill level and 
pay a low wage. Typical low wage service sector jobs are till operators at fast food restaurants, 
check out clerks at supermarkets or telephonists at call centres. In the case of the service sector, 
many jobs put the workers in direct contact with customers; this should put them in the position 
where they may have access to information regarding customer preferences or other information 
concerning how to best serve the customer. The same information trends also apply to the 
manufacturing sector. Again, given employee’s proximity to the work process they may have 
keen insights into how to make the production process more efficient. As workplace technology, 
work processes and practices such as multi-skilling and autonomous work practices become more 
common in manufacturing establishments the same information trends may apply.
Reduced Presence o f Unions
While employees continue to have access to private information, there is also a reduction in the 
institution which had previously promoted information-sharing in the organisation: there is a 
sizable reduction in union membership. Graph 1.5 shows there has been a decrease in 
unionization from a high of 53 per cent membership in 1980 to 32 per cent in 1994. One of the 
principal benefits associated with unionization is the voice component. Medoff and Freeman
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(1984) indicate that one of the primary benefits of unionization is that it acts as a mechanism to 
communicate employee preferences and information to management. With the reduction of the 
presence of unions, management are looking for other ways in which to access the potential 
productivity-enhancing information which employees harbour. One way in which this is done 
is through the implementation of employee involvement programmes.
1.4 Residual Control Rights - Employee Involvement
1.4.1 Type of Employee Involvement Evaluated
One of the principal ways in which firms have attempted to access information is via employee 
involvement programmes and employee communication programmes (Cotton, 1993). One of 
the fundamental issues of economic organisation, the coordination function, is closely related to 
how employees are deployed, organized and involved. The use of these forms of programmes 
are on the increase in both developed and developing economies. Firms or owners of capital 
have for a long time recognized that individual employees have access to information from which 
they (the ‘owners’) could benefit. Accordingly, over the years, there has developed many 
different types and forms and means of accessing this private information. These include 
programmes such as quality circles, teams, autonomous and semi-autonomous work groups and 
decentralized decision-making. In addition, in parts of Europe, there is a tradition of co­
determination and board level employee representation. While there are many different types and 
forms of employee involvement, this thesis will be focussing on programmes designed to access 
information which employees have and the decentralization to employees of decisions previously 
taken by management.
1.4.2 Trends for Employee Involvement
From the view of the ‘Positive Economist’ the fact that certain practices are being used may 
signal that its use is efficient. From this point of view we see that employee involvement 
programmes are being used more frequently so companies are evidently finding them efficient. 
One source of information on frequency of practices is the ‘Work Place Industrial Relations 
Survey’ (WIRS) which was administered in 1980,1984 and 1990. According to Brown (1995), 
the WIRS indicates that 45 per cent of the establishments initiated some form of employee 
involvement between 1987 and 1990. This shows an increase in the adoption rate of employee 
involvement programmes which between 1981 and 1984 stood at 35 per cent. Milward et al. 
(1992) determined that while the overall portion of establishments using employee involvement 
and communication programmes remained constant at 89 per cent of the establishment, the 
methods of communication increased from 2 in 1984 to 2.4 in 1990. In the US a survey 
conducted by Osterman (1994a) found that 45.6 per cent of manufacturing establishments used 
quality circles and 50.1 per cent used teams. This result in the US was broadly supported by 
Lawler et al. (1992) who found quality circles in 66 per cent of the top 1,000 firms and work 
teams in 47 per cent. The 1998 ‘Workplace Employee Relations Survey’ (WERS) in the UK 
found 65 per cent of the workplaces worked in teams, 61 per cent used team briefings for 
employees, 42 per cent conducted problem solving groups and 37 per cent had information- 
sharing sessions for the entire workforce.5
5 For more information on incidence of human resource practices see ‘The 1998 Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey, First Findings’. These findings are based on responses from 1,926 managers in UK 
establishments with 25 or more employees.
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1.5 Residual Return Rights - Group Based Incentives
There are many different types and forms of pay for performance systems: included are piece 
rates which pay directly for output, individually based programmes such as merit pay and 
bonuses, which reward individual effort. There are also team-based pay systems which reward 
the efforts of small teams. In addition, there are pay systems which reward group performance, 
such as gain-sharing and profit-sharing and share schemes which place shares in the hands of a 
broad range of employees.
It has been argued that pay systems other than a flat time-rate may elicit increased incentive 
effects. According to Lazear (1995), if someone was building an economy from scratch it is 
doubtful that they would put in a pay system which paid for time spent on the j ob or input, rather 
than some measure of output. Chapter 5 will evaluate the economic impact which some of these 
pay systems have on the performance of the establishment. However, the principal focus of this 
thesis will be on one form of pay for performance, specifically group-wide incentive schemes.
Three types of group incentive schemes are recognized by the Inland Revenue in the UK. These 
are: profit-sharing, share schemes and stock option programmes. A summary of these 
programmes are found in table 1.1.
Profit-Sharing
Special tax treatment for profit-sharing plans started in 1979. In order to gain approval for a 
share scheme a company must establish a trust fund and issue the payments to it directly. 
Employees do not pay income tax on shares when they are given by the trust. They must agree
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to leave the funds in the trust for at least two years. If the shares are sold in the third year there 
is an income tax of 100 per cent of their value. If they are sold during the fourth year after 
appropriation, there is no income tax, although there may be capital gains tax.
The schemes are open to all employees of the company for at least five years, whether they are 
part- or full-time. The value of the shares issued to an employee in any tax year cannot exceed 
£3,000 or 10 per cent of the employee’s earnings.
Savings-Related Share Option Schemes
The present tax relief was introduced in 1980. The employees are given the option (right) to buy 
shares, at some future date, at a price fixed when the right is given: it cannot be less than 80 per 
cent of the market price of the share at the time of the purchase. Those participating in the plan 
need to save between £5 and £250 per month within a saving contract (SAYE) either at a bank 
or building society: the contract lasts between five years and seven years. After five years the 
participant can elect to leave the proceeds for another two years. If the choice to leave for another 
two years is taken the interest accrued over that period is tax free and can be used to buy 
additional shares. Employees do not have to exercise their options and indeed may not want to 
if the share price is less than the option price at which they have the right to purchase. If they 
choose not to exercise the option they will receive the proceeds of the money in the trust plus 
interest.
An employee does not pay income tax on the bonus, or interest received under the SAYE 
contract or the increase in value of shares between when the option was granted and the date it 
is exercised however, capital gains tax maybe payable when the shares are sold. SAYE schemes
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are open to any employee who has been with the company for at least five years. Other 
employees may also be included, but all employees who are included must do so on similar terms.
Discretionary Share Option Schemes
Discretionary share option schemes were abolished in 1996. Prior to 1996 employees were given 
the right to buy options at a future date at a price fixed when the option was granted. The 
company could decide who was eligible to participate and it was not tied to any saving scheme. 
The value of the options held by an employee was limited to the greater of £100,000 or four 
times the person’s salary. The option price could be set as low as 85 per cent of market value at 
the time the option was granted. The employee did not pay income tax on any increase in the 
market value of the shares when the option was exercised. To qualify for this tax treatment the 
option could not be exercised less than three years and not more than ten years from when the 
option was granted. Capital gains tax could apply when the options were exercised.
Company Share Option Plans
Discretionary share option plans were replaced by company share option plans in 1996. While 
the company is still free to decide who participates in these plans, there is a limit of £30,000 on 
tax relief. The value of the share cannot be granted below the market price and the tax treatment 
remains the same as was in effect for Discretionary Schemes.
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Table 1.1
Summary of Inland Revenue Approved Share-Based Group Pay Plans
Profit-Sharing SAYE Company Stock 
Options
Tenure with Company: Tenure with Company: Tenure with Company:
Company Determined. Company Determined. Company Determined.
Open to: Open to: Open to:
All full- and part-time All full- and part-time Company decides who
employees. employees. participates.
Tax Treatment: Tax Treatment: Tax Treatment:
No income tax paid on No income tax paid on No income tax paid
shares. shares. if less than £30,000.
Holding Obligations: Holding Obligations: Holding Obligations:
Two years. Five or seven year contracts. The option must not be 
exercised less than three yrs. 
or more than ten yrs.
Limits: Limits: Limits:
Maximum payment of Maximum monthly £30,000 exercised at any
£3,000 or 10 per cent of contribution £250; one time.
employees earning. minimum £5.
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1.5.1 Trends for Share-Based Schemes in the UK
In graph 1.6, while the number of plans being approved in any one year has decreased the number 
of individuals receiving shares in any one year has increased four fold since 1979/1980. This 
largely reflects the fact that most companies require a vesting period which does not allow a 
cash- out. The same trend applies in graph 1.7 where the number of newly approved plans has 
stayed constant at about 100. However, the number of options granted doubles approximately 
every two years.
Graph 1.8 details the number of profit-related live schemes by industry. There is a considerable 
take-up in both the manufacturing and the service sectors. In 1991 the number of live plans in 
both sectors was approximately 1,000. By 1996 the number had grown to approximately 4,000 
in manufacturing and over 5,000 in the service sector. The same trend is illustrated in graph 1.9 
where the total number of individuals is indicated. Graph 1.10 shows the total number of full­
time employees taking up profit-related plans by industry, and graph 1.11 outlines the take-up of 
part-time employees. While full-time employee take-up is increasing at a fairly constant rate we 
see that there is a sizable take-up in 1994/1995 by part-time employees. This reflects a new law 
which made it illegal not to include part-time employees. Finally, in graph 1.12 we see the 
number of approved ‘discretionary’ share option schemes. Overall there is a reduction in the 
take-up of these programmes and a fairly constant rate of granting of the options. Most of the 
reduction in the take-up of these programmes is attributed to the tax savings being withdrawn and 
these programmes are largely used as a component of executive compensation.
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1.6 Chapter Summary
This introductory chapter outlines the main aim of this thesis, that is, to evaluate if it is efficient 
for companies to invest in employee involvement programmes and group-based incentives. 
These practices will be evaluated both independently and interactively. In order to evaluate these 
questions both the theoretical and empirical literature is evaluated and case study and 
econometric analysis are used.
Covered in this introduction has been the definitions of some key concepts including ‘principal’, 
‘agent’, ‘owner’, ‘non-owners’. Also discussed is the notion of the ‘New Economics of 
Personnel’ which recognizes that companies make decisions about how to structure their human 
resource practices which may or may not be efficient. An overview of the broad macro- and 
micro- level trends which are making it increasingly advantageous for companies to invest in 
employee involvement and pay based on performance are presented. These trends include a 
greater level of information residing with employees due to greater human capital and more 
access to information as a result of information technology. In addition, unions which have 
provided a conduit for information between management and employees, are becoming less 
prevalent. There is also a change from specialized division of labour in production settings to 
a much more ‘team’ production process approach that is interdependent on other work areas. 
These trends may be making it increasingly advisable for companies to invest in employee 
involvement programmes and pay based on performance. We see that there is a trend towards 
the greater use of employee involvement programmes and group-based performance-related pay.
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Graph 1.1
Percentage Increase in Computer Usage and Level of Use 
in the Workplace Between 1986 - 1997 in the UK
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Source: Social Change and Economic Life Initiative, 1986 and Skills Survey, 1997
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Graph 1.2
Percentage of Workers in Jobs Where a Qualification 
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Graph 1.3
Length of Training Required to Perform the Job Duties Adequately
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Graph 1.4
Percentage of Workers with a Degree and with No Qualifications
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Graph 1.5
Trade Union Membership as a Percentage of Workforce in the UK
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Source: Social Trends, Office of National Statistics, 1997
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Graph 1.6
Number of Approved Profit-Sharing Schemes and Number of Participants
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Graph 1.7
Number of Savings-Related Share Option Schemes and Number of Employees
to Whom Options were Granted
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Graph 1.8
Total Number of Profit-Related Pay Live Schemes by Industry
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Graph 1.9
Total Employees in Profit-Related Pay by Industry
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Graph 1.10
Number of Full-time Employees in Profit-Related Pay Plans by Industry
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Graph 1.11
Number of Part-time Employees in Profit-Related Pay Schemes by Industry
manuf 
> other serv
91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97
Source: Inland Revenue Statistics 1997 Number in (0000)
41
Graph 1.12
Discretionary Share Options Schemes Approved by Year and Number of
Employees Granted Options
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical and Empirical Overview
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 sets out to provide an overview of the theoretical issues and the previous empirical 
research which have a bearing on the questions asked in the introductory Chapter 1. That is, 
what are the independent and interactive effects of employee involvement and group incentives? 
While it is difficult to find an unambiguous prediction from theory, and this is the case in my 
assessment, an overview of the theoretical literature illustrates part of the dynamics present and 
what we might expect to see. The theoretical overview is taken largely from economic theory, 
although some psychological theory is discussed. Evaluated in this chapter are both potentially 
positive and potentially negative performance effects associated with group-based pay systems, 
employee involvement programmes, and the two used in combination.
Chapter 4,5 and 6 will contain a theoretical summary, although the theoretical concepts will not 
be covered in detail in these chapters. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will also contain some theoretical 
issues not covered in here but which are related to the specific empirical question addressed in 
the respective chapter. While I could not locate any empirical studies which specifically address 
the issue of employee involvement and incentive systems in team production settings, there are 
studies which examine the performance effects of these practices in a variety of settings. The 
empirical studies evaluated will include empirical research into the performance effects of 
employee involvement, group incentives and the combination of the two practices. Similar to 
the theoretical review, specific chapters will include additional empirical literature associated
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with issues covered in the particular chapter.
2.2 Theoretical Overview
2.2.1 Agency Theory
One fundamental theory associated with questions of efficiency in organizations is the principal- 
agent theory. In part, principal-agent theory addresses the incentive effects of ownership (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Principal-agent theory states that in order to develop an asset, owners need 
to delegate some of their decision-making rights and claims to part of the residual profits to 
agents (or managers). Principal-agent theory recognizes that the interests of owners and non- 
owners are not necessarily the same. The principal needs to incur costs in order to align the 
interests of the agent with that of the principal. The costs associated with developing these 
incentive schemes are agency costs. These costs include developing incentive programmes 
which create an incentive for agents to use their knowledge to benefit the owner’s interests.
Agency theory was developed from information economics in order to explain the relationship 
between the owner of capital, the principal, and those whom they delegate work to, i.e. the agents 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It was then extended to organisational 
control literature (Ouchi and Maguire, 1975) which has developed into a focus on incentive 
contracts or performance-based pay, risk and the issue of effectively monitoring (Eisenhardt 
1985, 1989).
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According to Eisenhardt (1988), agency theory presents a theoretical framework for thinking 
about which compensation plan to use in different organisational settings. It allows a trade-off 
between determining when to pay based on observable behaviours, such as paying for time spent 
on the job, and, when it is more difficult to observe behaviour, to pay based on outcomes. The 
theory emphasizes the need to measure performance and the need for pay choice to be partially 
determined by the ease of measuring performance. Agency theory takes into consideration 
difficulty in observing behaviours and also the risk-reward relationship (Eisenhardt, 1988). For 
example, in the instance where the principal is able to observe perfectly the work that the agent 
has carried out monitoring costs would be zero, making payment based on output rather than 
behaviour the most efficient payment system. Paying basis output based on some measure of 
performance rather than identifiable behaviour, such as time spent on the job, means a number 
of other factors need to be taken into consideration when determining the most efficient payment 
contract. Factors which need to be taken into consideration when determining the most efficient 
contract include: the possibility of self-interested misbehaviour or moral hazard; the difficulty 
and cost of monitoring; the effects on effort associated with paying basis performance and the 
risk tolerance of the agent.
2.2.2 Incentive Contracts - Individual verses Team Performance
As previously discussed, principal-agent theory states that because there may exist differing 
interests between principals and their agents, the principal needs to develop and bear the costs 
of incentive contracts in order to align the efforts of the agents with the interests of the principal. 
There are numerous different contracts which employers can choose from and some have more 
efficient outcomes than others. In order to provide an efficient response to the principal-agent
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problem, firms attempt to develop incentive systems which better align the interest of the agent 
with those of the principal. Work by Femie and Metcalf (1996) and work by Ehrenberg and 
Bognanno (1990) indicates that paying for performance does produce greater individual 
performance outcomes. Ehrenberg and Bognanno use data from the 1984 European Professional 
Golf Association (PGA) to examine the tournament effects of compensation practices. They 
determine that where compensation is placed at risk there is a higher level of performance. 
Their work also supports the contention that a tournament structure of remuneration is conducive 
to greater levels of performance. A similar study conducted in the United Kingdom, looking at 
the horse racing industry, was carried out by Femie and Metcalf (1996). In Femie and Metcalfs 
work they look at the incentive effects associated with having compensation at risk versus fixed 
pay systems. They find that race jockeys who are paid relative to performance perform better 
than those riders paid a retainer or a fixed payment. These two studies support the theoretical 
position that more efficient individual level outcomes are associated with incentive contracts 
based on performance. While the work by Femie and Metcalf and Bognanno and Ehrenberg 
clearly shows there is better performance where pay for performance is found, horse racing and 
golf are individual pursuits. What is the most efficient incentive contract in team production 
settings?
There is some support that in team production settings where output is achieved basis an 
‘interdependent production process’, group or team-based compensation systems will provide 
optimal performance outcomes (MacLeod, 1988; Nalbantian, 1988). Support for this comes 
from Schmitt (1981) who found that group incentives were much more effective than individual- 
based rewards in settings where there was a high degree of interdependence of tasks. They 
found that when tasks could be measured individually, individual rewards worked best, but when
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individual contributions to group output were difficult to measure, group incentive worked best. 
Another factor which may favour the use of group, rather than individual, incentives is the trend 
discussed in the introduction that private information is increasing which may result in very high 
monitoring costs. In situations where monitoring costs are very high, it may be to efficient to 
share profits which may act as a substitute for formal monitors (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
For example, a partnership structure is often used when it is difficult or expensive to monitor 
others’ work. Law firms and management consultancies are normally established as partnerships 
because in these settings the employees have a high degree of human capital and it would be very 
expensive for an outsider to effectively monitor their work. Professionals which have the same 
sort of educational background and experience are in a better position to monitor the work of 
each other. The fact that the partnership normally shares profits acts as an additional incentive 
for the other partners to monitor the work of each other to verify that no one is shirking their 
duties.
2.2.3 Contract Incompleteness and Implicit Contracts
Incentive contracts are in part established in order to align the incentives of the principal and 
the agent. It is, however, impossible to develop a contract which is entirely complete (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992). This would entail determining all the possible eventualities of any 
particular relationship and making explicit exactly what could be done as various contingent 
situations arose. For example, a complete contract would specify what would happen if an 
individual shirked their duties. The contract would specify that their pay would be reduced by 
a determined level. Alternatively, if the employee were to come up with an idea which saved 
the company money, this would also be dealt with in the contract. Attempts to formalize
conditions of the employment relationship, and to specify within the contract actions to be taken 
in particular circumstances, often leads to inefficiencies.1 For example, narrowly defined job 
descriptions which attempt to identify all activities a person can perform may impose restrictions 
on a person’s activities which may result in lower output.
The fact that complete contracts do not exist is due to some of the following limitations. Because 
of bounded rationality it is impossible to account for all possible contingencies. In complicated 
relationships many contingencies arise which are not planned for so the parties must find ways 
to adapt. This opens the door for opportunistic behaviour, moral hazard, including not 
following the original precepts of the contract. It may also be possible that one of the two parties 
has private information which stands in the way of a value maximizing solution. This also opens 
the door for self-interested misbehaviour (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).
One way in which this incomplete contracting has been addressed is through the notion of 
implicit contracts (MacLeod, 1988). These are implicit rather than explicit contracts which may 
consist of a firm attempting to achieve a high level of loyalty, team spirit and high morale. 
According to Alchian and Demsetz (1992) implicit contracts may help to better align the interests 
of the principal and the agent. It may be that combinations of explicit and implicit contracts 
produce more efficient outcomes than the use of ‘only’ explicit incentives.
In psychology, it is largely within psychological contracts that the notions of loyalty, co­
1 One form of explicit contracting which has been in decline is formally negotiated union contracts (Lewin, 
1994). However, according to Lewin (1994) other forms of explicit contracts, which he refers to as ‘employment 
contracts’ are increasing. These are formal agreements which spell-out part o f the conditions of employment such 
as hours worked, holiday entitlement, pay, confidentiality, property rights etc.
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operative corporate culture, high employee morale and commitment are dealt with. According 
to Schein (1980), the notion of a psychological contract between employees and employer 
consists of the expectations, beliefs and attitudes which each party holds for the other.2 It is 
asserted that a strong organisational culture is a prerequisite for the success of teams and other 
forms of employee participation programmes (Lawler, 1986; Levine and Tyson, 1990; Lewin, 
1994; Siehl and Martin, 1990).
Kandal and Lazear (1992) evaluate the necessity of this added ‘organisational culture’ component 
using the concepts of shame and guilt. Essentially they suggest that there may be occasions when 
it is efficient for organisations to develop these two responses in their workforce. They 
characterise a ‘shame-based* culture as being one in which work is monitored and if  workers are 
shirking their duties pressure is placed on them to ‘pull their weight*. Alternatively, in a ‘guilt- 
based* corporate culture workers feel internal discomfort when they shirk their duties because 
they are letting their peers down. Consequently, Kandal and Lazear suggest that it may be 
advantageous for firms to develop a ‘shame-based’ culture, or mutual monitoring, where output 
and effort is easy to monitor and a ‘guilt-based’ culture, or loyalty, where effort and output is 
harder to observe. They go on to say a necessary element associated with these two types of 
culture is some form of profit-sharing. This sharing in returns provides the group-based gains 
which would provide individuals with the incentive to not shirk their duties, which would have 
the effect of negatively impacting their peers.
2
An example would be ‘realistic job previews’, Wanous (1992) which emphasizes a realistic review of 
both positives and negatives associated with conveying information about the job. Wanous found that where 
expectations were more closely aligned with the reality of a situation, there was a greater likelihood of positive 
individual and firm performance.
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2.2.4 Sharing Residual Control and Residual Return Rights as an Efficient 
Combination of Explicit and Implicit Contracting
One possible combination of an explicit contract combined with an implicit contract which may 
promote greater efficiency in a team where monitoring costs could be high is the combination 
of group incentives with a high degree of employee involvement.3 According to Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992) it is these two fundamental rights of ownership, residual return and residual 
control, combined with statutory property rights that provide the framework necessary to create 
and develop an asset. Residual control rights being the ownership rights to decide what is done 
with an asset, after honouring any other contractual obligations and residual return rights being 
the rights to residual profits once all obligations have been met. It is recognized that there are 
occasions, for efficiency reasons, when it is best to transfer these rights of ownership to the best 
person to be in charge (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). It is also speculated that these two rights 
of ownership will work best when transferred in combination rather than independently (Ben-Ner 
and Jones, 1995).
2.3 Incentive Effects of Residual Control: Theoretical Review
2.3.1 Private Information
At the heart of much of the theorized productivity effects of employee involvement is the
The idea of efficient internal organization as a combination of explicit and implicit contracts is developed 
by Rozen (1991), in the notion of implicit contracts plus. This notion suggests die interests o f both employee and 
employer are best served in an organisational culture comprised of trust and co-operation. His ideal organisational 
form is the labour-managed firm.
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recognition that employees have access to information which may improve the production 
process or improve customer service (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Cooke, 1993; Femie and Metcalf, 
1995). While the principal normally has access to information which agents do not have access 
to, such as financial and strategic information, agents have information regarding the production 
process, customer preferences, information which comes with their own human capital, such as 
skill and knowledge, or the information associated with information sources due to information 
technology. As shown in the introduction, increased levels of human capital, information 
technology and an increase in the service sector have increased the information to which 
employees have access. An issue faced by firms is how to gain access to this information.
Part of the reason firms put employee involvement programmes in place may be to gain access 
to this private information (Levine and Tyson, 1990). Initiatives such as quality circles, 
autonomous work groups and a wide array of possible employee involvement programmes are 
all at least partially attempts to access information which employees have. Whether employees 
are in close proximity to customers or are close to the production process, employers want to 
access this information. Two forms of employee involvement programmes include the 
decentralization of decision-making and two-way information-sharing sessions.
The increase in the specialized knowledge of employees puts pressure on employers to push 
decisions, which they had previously taken, to lower levels in the organization and/or to put in 
place communication programmes which access this information. A question which arises is, 
when is it efficient to push decisions down to lower levels in the organization and when is it 
rather more efficient to place communication mechanisms in place which allow access to 
potentially productivity-enhancing information? According to Lazear (1995), the decision
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regarding which form of employee involvement programme is used takes into consideration three 
factors: analytical ability of those close to the information, value of this information and the cost 
of communicating this information. If the value of the information is high but the cost of 
communicating this information is also high this may argue for a decentralization of tasks to 
employees. If information costs are low and the information is valuable, this may justify the 
development and use of information-sharing sessions.
2.3.2 Psychological Mechanisms Associated with the Incentive 
Effects of Employee Involvement
The psychological mechanisms which support increased performance when employee 
participation is present include cognitive theory and affective theory. Cognitive theory recognizes 
employees have private information and holds that employees have more knowledge about the 
work process than do supervisors or management. Consequently, if workers participate in 
decisions about the work process, greater worker efficiencies will result because those with the 
most knowledge are in a position to make changes which increase efficiency (Anthony, 1978; 
Frost, Wakely, and Ruh, 1974). Additionally, if employees make suggestions for changes in the 
workplace, they will be more likely to put the changes into practice (Maier, 1963; Melcher, 
1976). Cognitive theory holds that increased performance is associated with specific workplace 
changes, due to suggestions or actions of employees, which increase efficiency. For example, 
due to a shopfloor worker’s proximity to the production line she/he may have information or 
knowledge of the line operations which could increase efficiency. The identification, 
implementation and increased output due to suggestions from a person who has private 
information on the job process would reflect the potential benefits of cognitive theory.
A problem with cognitive theory is it assumes that employees have the necessary incentive to act 
on or communicate these productivity-enhancing ideas to someone who can act on them. It is 
largely because of this assumption, that employees will automatically share what they know, that 
cognitive theory is not viewed as the primary mechanism responsible for productivity gains 
associated with participation (Miller and Monge, 1986). While this theory does contain a 
fundamental performance-enhancing property, that those performing the job function are in the 
best position to make changes, in order for employees to share their knowledge, they may need 
an incentive.
Affective theory supports the view that in a participatory environment individuals will increase 
their effort simply because the act of participation itself is enough to motivate people to put-forth 
more effort. Affective theory holds that participatory programmes work because involvement 
in the work process appeals to higher order needs such as self-expression, respect, independence 
and equality, resulting in an increase in morale and satisfaction (Ritchie and Miles, 1970). By 
fulfilling these needs, participation will in turn lead to greater levels of satisfaction which leads 
to more effort and greater performance (French, Kay and As, 1960). In a meta-analytical review 
of much of the research associated with participation and satisfaction Miller and Monge (1986) 
support the view that participation has a positive effect on both satisfaction and performance. 
An example of the application of affective theory in the workplace could be the use of 
information-sharing sessions or quality circles without the inclusion of incentives. Affective 
theory would suggest that the act of requesting input from employees would appeal to their higher 
order needs and result in greater involvement.
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One issue concerning affective theory is that it focuses on the act of participation itself as the 
crucial element. According to this theory it is not the information itself but rather the process 
which leads to increases in performance. This is a very different conclusion from cognitive 
theory of participation which states that it is the suggestions which result in better performance. 
Consequently, the job content or the participatory activities themselves do not necessarily need 
to be performance-enhancing. It is thus possible within affective theory that employees are 
reducing overall organisational performance rather then enhancing it. It is conceivable that you 
have highly motivated individuals who are working to minimize their own efforts or that efforts 
are not directed in a way which is of benefit to the organisation (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995). 
While addressing individual higher order needs may increase an individual’s effort, the effort 
may not be in a direction which maximizes the firm’s utility but rather maximizes the 
individual’s. If a person has control over their work practices, the incentive would be to design 
the job in a way which is most satisfying for the employee. Consequently, organisational 
performance will only be a result of how closely the firm’s maximum efficiency is aligned with 
what acts as an incentive for the individual. However, this also assumes the employee has no 
rights to any returns or additional incentives. Given that control has been taken from shifted from 
management to employees, monitoring by management is reduced or eliminated.
2.3.3 Organisational Efficiency Associated with Employee Involvement
Some view the principal-agent problem as enough in itself to argue against there being any 
positive effects associated with participation or sharing the residual rights of decision-making. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1979) profits will be reduced because as you increase the 
number of decision-makers you increase monitoring costs and subsequent inefficiencies. The
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same conclusion was also reached by Williamson (1975) who stressed the greater transaction 
costs when many people are making decisions. Both Jensen and Meckling and Williamson’s 
implied definition of participation is that an increased level of information-sharing will result in 
a corresponding increase in decision-makers. They further assume that with employee 
participation, the decision-making process will slow down, resulting in greater transaction costs 
and thus causing inefficiencies. Inherent in this assumption is that any gain associated with more 
efficient decisions would be negatively offset by the increased time these decisions took, resulting 
in an overall negative net impact on performance. Jensen and Meckling and Williamson’s 
assumptions may hold true only in the case of a limited set of participation programmes. In the 
case where the residual rights of control are transferred to non-owner employees in the form of 
decentralizing decisions to lower levels in the organization there is, consequently, a reduction in 
the number of decision makers. From the vantage point of Jensen, Meckling and Williamson, 
this reduction in decision makers and subsequent reduction in layers may reduce transaction 
costs and increase efficiency.
Using this same agency theory framework, participatory programmes can result in improved firm 
performance (Levine and Tyson, 1990). Participatory programmes which give employees greater 
control will allow them to make efficiency-enhancing job changes, or communicate needed 
changes to management. In addition, according to Levine and Tyson, by combining a share in 
the returns with participation in decision-making rights, owners’ and employees’ interests are 
aligned and owners are able to take advantage of employees information.
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2.3.4 Moral Hazard
One very fundamental problem associated with the efficiency effects of employee involvement 
is the problem of moral hazard, or shirking. The term originated in the insurance industry and 
refers to the tendency to change behaviour in order to maximize gain from a given claim. An 
example would be the tendency of individuals to use healthcare facilities much more frequently 
when there is no cost to themselves.
This problem surfaces in organisations when those with critical information have interests 
divergent from owners. It may be in a person’s self interest to withhold information which may 
be of considerable value to decision makers. The moral hazard issue is the tendency for 
individuals to engage in self-interested, opportunistic, ‘misbehaviour’.
It is possible to view the moral hazard problem from the principal-agent perspective. The agent 
is employed to further the interests of the principal. Moral hazard surfaces in situations where 
the agent and principal have different objectives and it is difficult for the principal to closely 
monitor the actions of the agent. This is evident because many organisations use various types 
and forms of incentive contracts. While these payments reduce the residual profits it is also true 
that this sharing in the residual profits may well represent one of the most efficient contracts. The 
sharing in the residual profits may actually better align the interests of employees with 
management, which may result in overall greater efficiency (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).
While Milgrom and Roberts (1992) believe that it is possible to engage in communication 
procedures which enhance the efficiency within organisations the key is explicit incentives.
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Conflict of interest will always arise in the situation of moral hazard. There are a number of 
conditions which must exist if the problem is to arise in the first place. First there has to be the 
possibility of differences in interest between parties. While interests may often be well aligned, 
there will definitely be conflict for reasons such as scarcity of resources. Second, there needs to 
be some basis for co-operation between individuals, a reason for people to work together for a 
common goal. Third, there must be some difficulty in determining if the contract has been kept. 
This is especially the situation when it is difficult to monitor the activities of employees closely.
2.4 Efficiency Effects of Residual Return Rights: Theoretical Review
2.4.1 Impact of Sharing in Returns on Effort
Principal support for the productivity effects of profit-sharing within economic theory is 
associated with the effect profit-sharing may have on effort. According to Weitzman and Kruse
(1990) in the prototype example a person produces a single output from a single input. The input 
is ideally thought of as a combination of hours of work and effort. While it is easy to measure 
hours it is more difficult to measure or observe effort. According to Weitzman and Kruse, effort 
may consist of working hard and working intelligently including the use of private information. 
Under a wage system, a worker is paid a fixed rate dependent on the number of hours worked. 
This results in some level of output. If, however, it is inexpensive and easy to verify if the output 
level is efficient, a wage system often results in too little output relative to how much is socially 
optimal.
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The solution is to pay the worker for a level of output which is easily observable: this would 
mean an efficient outcome whereby the worker is paid for what he or she produces and would 
automatically adjust her/his effort to an optimal level. Consequently, all else being equal, profit- 
sharing would be more likely to produce greater productivity than a wage system.
The impact of having rights to residual profits on effort is modelled by Lazear (1995) in his book 
Personnel Economics. In his analysis he determines that the optimal incentive contract makes 
the worker or the employee the residual claimant of all residual profits.
According to Lazear the payment scheme consists of the following:
Pay = a+bq, (2.1)
where q is output and a and b are remuneration parameters. Here output will depend on both 
effort and some random element, y:
q = e + y.
We assume that the employee likes income, but does not like work, C(e). Both C’ and C” are 
positive which means the solution has a finite level of effort. At some point the employee will 
reach exhaustion and the costs of producing another unit will become infinite.
The solution to the employee’s labour function is:
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max E[a + b(e + y)] - C(e), (2.2)
the first order condition would be:
C’(e) = b. (2.3)
Equation (2.4) is the employee’s labour supply function which is what the firm takes as given 
when it maximizes profits by choosing a and b. Given C” > 0 and risk neutral, effort increases 
in b. Higher wages correspondingly induce greater effort, so labour supply functions are 
positively sloped.
According to Lazear the profit maximizing firm faces the following issue:
max E(q) - (a + be). (2.4)
This is subject to the employee being willing to take the job in the first place shown in 2.5:
a + be > C(e). (2.5)
Equation (2.5) is just saying that the employee needs to earn enough to cover his distaste for 
work.
max e - C(e), (2.6)
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with the first-order condition.
da de
.... =[1-C’(e)] —  = 0. (2.7)
db db
( de/da= 0, so the second condition is the same.)
Equation 2.7 assumes the firm will choose b in order to bring about maximum efficiency. In 
order to maximize profits the firm wants the employee to set the maximum cost of effort equal 
to the marginal social value of effort. This implies that taken together (2.3) and (2.7) b = 1. After 
b is chosen, optimal effort is chosen by (2.3); (2.5) then dictates the size of a in order to attract 
employees to the firm. Also, b = 1 implies that the employees should receive the entire residual 
profit..
2.4.2 Efficiency Wage
The model of efficiency wage is largely developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Essentially 
the argument suggests that employees who are paid at an above market rate are more likely to 
exert a greater level of effort in an attempt to remain in the good favour of their employer and 
remain employed. Given the wage premium they are paid they do not wish to risk losing their 
job. This rationale is conveyed in the following equation found in Milgrom and Roberts (1992).
G>P( W- W* ) N (2.8)
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W (£30,000) equals the wage in the current job and W* (£25,000) represents the wage which the 
employee would get at the other firms. G represents any gain that the employee may receive 
from cheating on the job (£1,000) and P is the probability that the employee’s cheating will be 
detected (.5). N, (1 in our example) represents the long-term multiplier of the employment 
relationship. If the employee is on a short-term contract which requires them to reapply 
frequently the multiplier is considerably less than if there is a potentially long-term advantageous 
relationship. It will be profitable to cheat if G is greater than the solution to P(W-W*)N.
Inserting the values in equation 2.9, .5(£30,000 - £25,000)1 = £2,500. £2,500 is greater than 
£1,000 so in the example cheating is not profitable. In order to provide a disincentive for 
employees to cheat employers must make G sufficiently low and P sufficiently high so as to 
discourage cheating.
2.4.3 Sorting and Risk Aversion
Another issue associated with the increased productivity effects of profit-sharing maybe the fact 
that more productive employees sort to firms which offer some degree of compensation at risk. 
A crucial issue in this line of research is whether profit-sharing or other group incentives actually 
increase the productivity of individual workers or whether more productive workers sort to firms 
which have group incentive programmes. This question is important because if there is only a 
shift of more productive employees from one firm to the other, society as a whole does not 
benefit. From a ‘benefit to society’ view it is better that these forms of compensation 
programmes actually increase employee productivity because then the pie is getting bigger rather 
than just being redistributed. However, at the level of the individual firm, the sorting issue may
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work to their advantage because pay at risk may attract higher ability employees so these firms 
may attract more productive employees than their ‘fixed’ rate paying competitors. This, coupled 
with the potential for a greater effort level, may result in greater productivity than at firms or 
establishments which do not put remuneration at risk.
While there may be some benefits to the firm or establishment, there may also be a disincentive 
to employees associated with transferring risk from the employer to the employee. Employees 
are thought to be risk-averse and this is largely borne out by the way in which employees sort to 
positions where their exposure to risk is kept to a minimum. Depending on the risk tolerance 
level of the employee, this transferal of risk may also result in a higher turnover and overall 
reduced employee motivation.
2.4.4 The Free-Rider Problem and Adding Monitors as a Solution to Free Riding
The free-rider problem is often used as a criticism against group-based remuneration schemes 
such as profit-sharing. The free-rider problem is the tendency for individuals to ‘free ride’ on 
the work of others. If an individual is associated with a group-based incentive scheme, such as 
profit-sharing, where withholding effort will have a negligible impact on the overall results as 
long as everyone else continues to work hard, then there is an incentive for the individual to shirk 
their duties. This is sometimes also referred to as the 1/n problem, as n or the number of 
employees gets larger the results of one’s efforts may be less apparent. While there is a tendency 
to shirk duties in so far as monitoring will allow, it is also true that everyone will be better off if 
everyone works hard and profits are increased. Consequently, there is a possibility for both a 
non-co-operative and co-operative solution. The non-co-operative solution is associated with
free-riding on the efforts of others and the co-operative solution is based on everyone putting in 
their best effort, thus increasing profits to be shared. In an environment where group financial 
incentives exist, participation may help provide the mechanism needed to develop this co­
operative solution. In the case of team-based participation programmes that are coupled with 
team-based incentive programmes, team member’s actions are observable by other team members 
leading to group peer pressure or monitoring that may help eliminate individual shirking. If any 
individual’s incentive pay is partially or wholly related to the performance of the team, there will 
be incentive to make certain all team members are doing their share.
Weitzman has done much work into both the productivity and employment effects of profit- 
sharing (Weitzman 1984,1995). While much of his work and the work of others supports the 
premise that profit-sharing increases productivity, he also recognizes that there is an added 
element which impacts upon the success of profit-sharing.
"To get the productivity-enhancing effects, something more may be needed ... 
something akin to developing a corporate culture that emphasises company 
spirit, promotes group cooperation, encourages social enforcement mechanisms, 
and so forth" (Weitzman 1995, p. 57).
This is further supported by Lewin (1994) who recognizes that one of the major problems with 
group-based incentives is the possibility of the free-rider problem. He suggests that one of the 
primary ways in which this is addressed is through the use of employee involvement programmes.
“One answer is that the individual may know his or her co-workers w ell... or 
may feel a sense of altruism towards or identification with them. Programs of 
team-based employee involvement and participation in decision-making are 
intended to strengthen such mutual identification with them”
(Levine 1994, p. 403).
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Taking both the principal-agent issue and the free-rider problem, we see how participation in 
decisions and sharing in returns may prompted employees with superior job knowledge to use 
their knowledge to increase organisational efficiency and may also leads to increased peer 
monitoring. The combination of these two elements could result in greater organisational 
performance.
2.4.5 Impact of Unionization on Employee Involvement
In the situation where unions are present there will also be effects which are negatively and 
positively related to performance. Freeman and Medoff (1984) state unions provide a ‘voice* 
mechanism which promotes dialogue between management and employees and increases 
efficiency. According to Cooke (1994), where unions are present the positive effects of 
participation may be amplified due to the existence of this communication channel. However, 
it may also be the case that the presence of a union has a negative impact on performance where 
hostile relations result in a lack of management - employee co-operation, (Freeman and Medoff, 
1984). In the case of the effect of unionization on financial participation, given that union 
officials were involved in the negotiated settlement of this incentive scheme, they have a strong 
incentive to encourage employees to look for performance enhancements (Cooke, 1994). 
However, on the negative side, union leaders would be expected to discourage employees from 
reporting on shirking employees and employees disciplining other workers.
2.4.6 The Co-operative Solution as a Response to the Free-Rider Problem
One way in which the free-rider problem is addressed is taken from game theory and indicates
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that two parties can be better off if they decide to co-operate. This is best illustrated by the 
prisoners' dilemma:
two prisoners are arrested and charged with a crime. The police do not have enough evidence 
to convict either of them unless the other confesses. The two prisoners have two choices, they 
can either confess or not confess. The matrix in table 2.1 portrays the various implications 
associated with their choices. If both prisoners choose to confess they both will get six months 
for their crime. If, however, either prisoner 1 or prisoner 2 chooses to fink on the other, the 
prisoner who finks will get off free and the other will get six months for the crime and three 
months for obstructing justice. If they both choose not to confess they will be guilty of a minor 
crime and spend one month in jail.
Clearly the optimal choice for either prisoner is to fink on the other, however, this is true for both 
parties. This will be the prisoners’ first choice and both end up in jail for six months. This is the 
result predicted in the first iteration of the nash equilibrium,4 which would state that the choice 
either party would take would be the one which is their optimal solution. However, it is clear that 
if they both keep quiet both parties are better off. As the prisoners are repeatedly arrested for 
their crime, eventually they will determine that they are better off if they co-operate (Gibbon, 
1992). This co-operative solution is important because one of the principal objections to group 
incentive schemes is the free-rider problem.
4 An example of this can be found in Levine (1995, Chapter 6) where he shows how bargaining problems 
can lead to a sub-optimal outcome. This is more formally modelled in an article by Freeman and Lazear (1994).
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Table 2.1 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Prisoner 1 
Confess Not Confess
Prisoner 2 Confess
-6, -6 -9, 0
0,-9 11
Not Confess
2.5 Combining Residual Control and Return Rights: Theoretical Review
General theoretical support for the use of complimentary practices is found in the work Milgrom 
andRoberts (1990) Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) and Milgrom and Roberts (1995). Milgrom 
and Roberts (1990) discuss the implications of the movement from the traditional assembly line 
model with its emphasis on quantity to the current model of flexibility with a focus on quality and 
customization. They argue that it is efficient to evaluate work practices relative to the work 
technology which is in place. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) argue that it is important to 
evaluate a firm’s work practices as a part of a larger ‘incentive system’. Additional support is 
found in Migrom and Roberts (1995) who evaluate features of the Lincoln Electric Company and 
find support for their notion of complementarity and work ‘systems’.
Principal support for a combination of these two rights and the sharing with ‘non-owners’ comes 
from Ben-Ner and Jones (1995). Ben-Ner and Jones developed a theoretical framework which 
combines these two aspects of ownership, control and return, and suggest possible firm-level
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performance outcomes associated with various levels of the two rights. Ben-Ner and Jones 
discuss the impact these rights have on individual employee motivation and on structural 
organisational outcomes. They argue that return rights work best when used in conjunction with 
one another but can be detrimental if either of the rights are used in isolation. In the instance 
where employees are assigned only return rights with no control rights, those who retain the 
rights to the residual returns have less of an incentive to effectively direct the work of employees 
given they are in a position where they have to ‘share’ the returns. If, conversely, employees find 
themselves in a position where they have control rights with no right to returns, the incentive will 
be for them to shirk or exert as little effort as possible (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995). When the two 
rights are combined, the incentives are aligned so the employee can use their superior job 
knowledge to carry out the job most efficiently and effectively and is rewarded for doing so.
According to Ben-Ner and Jones, in the instance where residual returns are going to employees 
fewer of these returns may be going to managers, which may result in management having less 
incentive to direct and control employees in a way which has a positive impact on the firm. This 
is based on the traditional neo-classical view of the firm in which capital monitors labour and in 
turn capital is entitled to all the residual returns (Alchian and Demsetz, 1992). Return rights in 
themselves may have a positive impact on structural variables which in turn may have a positive 
impact on co-operation among individuals and various parts of the organisation. The rationale 
would be that the greater alignment of interests between the principal and their agents could lead 
to maximizing the performance of the firm. One problem with this is that many incentive 
programmes are anchored in individual or small team objectives, and consequently there is often 
little incentive to share information which may be of use to other parts of the organisation.
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There are mixed effects of control rights or employee participation on performance when used 
without return rights. According to Ben-Ner and Jones, the impact which participation has will 
depend largely on the type of participation instituted. If the form of participation is limited to 
making suggestions, which management may or may not implement, the impact on performance 
is unlikely to be significant. However, if employees can give input into major organisational 
strategic planning and have control over their job task, Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) would argue, 
that this form of participation has scope for improving performance.
Ben-Ner and Jones (1995) suggest that three conditions need to be present in order to see a 
positive impact on control rights. These are:
i. participation is meaningful enough to enhance employee’s autonomy and their 
ability to choose some aspects of their working conditions.
ii. There are ways to ensure that employees do not make decisions that trade off 
organisational productivity in favour of their individual welfare via working 
conditions and reduced effort.
iii. The net benefit of participation to individual employees is positive.
According to Ben-Ner and Jones, in the situation where control and return rights are combined, 
and shared with employees, the agency issue is largely resolved. Combining the claim to residual 
profits with control over work processes creates an environment in which employees have the 
authority to use their superior job knowledge to enhance efficiency, and the incentive to ensure 
they align their efforts with the best interests of the owners.
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Psychological Theory Support for a Combination o f  the Two Rights 
While there is support in cognitive theory for the increase in productivity due to employees 
sharing their increased job knowledge, workers may be less likely to do this if there is not a clear 
benefit to them. While there is also support for an increase in productivity in affective theory, 
this theory states that it is the act of participation which increases productivity and not the 
content. This means employees could well be engaged in participatory activities which are 
having negative effects on organisational outcomes. Cognitive theory recognizes that employees 
may have valuable information, however, the theory assumes that they have the necessary 
incentive to act on this information, or communicate it to those who have the authority to act.
The issue not addressed in these theories is: where does the incentive to share the employee’s 
superior job knowledge, or for him/her to put in greater effort, come from? This missing link is 
provided from psychological expectancy theory.
One problem with the previous psychological theories discussed is that they do not include the 
necessary incentive to employees for sharing their superior job knowledge. It is within 
expectancy theory that a rationale for employees to share in returns is provided. Expectancy 
theory asks the question, ‘what is in it for me?’. Expectancy theory was developed by Vroom 
(1964) and is referred to as VIE or instrumentality theory. The theory is used to describe how 
people choose from several possible courses of actions. The three components which make up 
expectancy theory are:
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Expectancy: Does the employee have the necessary skills to perform the task
which has been asked of her/him?
Instrumentality: Would the employee be rewarded for performing the task?
Valence: Would the reward be something which the employee valued?
Expectancy theory gives a psychological framework for ensuring that employees are presented 
with incentives to perform their jobs in a way which aligns their interests with those of the firm. 
Therefore, expectancy theory provides the recognition that incentives are necessary in order to 
motivate desired behaviours.
Incentive Contracts Address the Moral Hazard Problem
An issue with a high degree of employee involvement, without incentives, is the potential for 
moral hazard. While psychologists argue that involvement in itself provides enough incentive 
to promote involvement, without incentives, a high degree of worker involvement may result in 
shirking. This may occur when the agent has a high degree of control over their job, however 
without rights to returns. In this situation the agent may choose to reduce effort, in so far as 
monitoring and their ‘span of control’ will allow, and shirk. One way to resolve this problem is 
by including incentives which help to align the interests of the agent with that of the principal.
2.6 Empirical Review of the Performance Effects of Employee Involvement and 
Group Incentives
There are no studies I could locate which examine the impact of employee involvement 
programmes and group incentives in team production settings, however, there are a number of
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studies which evaluate the impact in unspecified settings. The following is a review of a number 
of those studies. The individual empirical chapters will include additional empirical work 
related to the questions addressed in the respective chapter.
2.6.1 Residual Control: Empirical Review
Table 2.2 presents a summary of select articles on the economic impact of employee participation 
programmes. Using meta-analysis Doucouliagos (1995) carried out a survey on the effects 
financial and decision-making participation have on company performance. He finds that there 
is a negative association with co-determination laws, but positive associations with profit-sharing, 
worker ownership and worker participation in decision-making. He also finds that all 
relationships are stronger in firms owned and controlled by workers and in firms adopting more 
than one employee involvement scheme.
2.6.2 Residual Return: Empirical Review
While a broad econometric analysis of the productivity effects of profit-sharing and case study 
evidence focussed on profit-sharing is presented in Table 2.3, there is very little research on the 
profitability effects of profit-sharing in the UK. Some of the most recent work is conducted by 
Bhargava (1994). Using a panel dataset he examines the impact of the introduction of profit- 
sharing on the financial performance of British manufacturing firms. Controlling both for 
unobserved firm-specific fixed effects and controlling for potential endogeneity, he finds there 
to be both a short-run association with higher profitability and evidence that there is higher 
profitability in firms which use profit-sharing. The same was found by both Estrin and Wilson
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(1987) and Cable and Wilson (1989) who discovered that the average return on capital is higher 
in profit-sharing than in non-profit-sharing firms. Richardson and Nejad (1986) examine UK 
firms and use share price as a proxy for profitability and find there to be evidence of improved 
financial performance in firms which use profit-sharing. However, Blanchflower and Oswald
(1988) do not find there to be any evidence of an impact of profit-related pay on UK firms.
2.6.3 Residual Control and Return Combined: Empirical Review
There are five studies which I was able to identify, summarized in Table 2.4, which explore the 
relationship between combining control and return rights and the impact they have on company 
performance. Conte and Svejnar (1988) found that employee participation (EP) and profit- 
sharing each had significant effects. Mitchell et al. (1990) found that employee participation and 
group-based incentives were significant independently but not combined. Kruse (1993) found 
positive effects of profit-sharing but no combined effects or independent effects of EP. Cooke
(1994) found that the combination of EP and group-based compensation schemes had fairly 
substantial effects on firm performance. These effects were also considerably amplified in 
unionized firms. Femie and Metcalf (1995) found that workplaces with employee involvement 
characteristics, such as employee-management communication channels and incentive schemes, 
have higher productivity than other types of workplaces.
The two studies most similar to the work in this thesis are those of Femie and Metcalf (1995) 
and Cooke (1994). While Femie and Metcalf evaluate links between employee involvement, 
contingent pay and different forms of collective representation I focus on only employee 
involvement and contingent pay. They examine the impact these practices have on six outcomes,
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including productivity levels, productivity growth, change in employment, industrial relations 
climate, quit rate and absenteeism. They found that employee involvement and contingent pay 
were more likely to be associated with positive economic outcomes. In addition, the best 
performance outcomes were found when these two practices were used in combination. The 
same finding was discovered by Cooke (1994) who evaluated the impact of employee 
involvement and group incentives, independently and interactively, on productivity and financial 
performance. He found that firms which used employee involvement and group incentives had 
greater performance outcomes and that these results were more pronounced when the two 
practices were used in combination. Cooke also found these results were stronger in unionized 
firms.
Arthur (1992) evaluates the how industrial relations practices vary in relation to different business 
strategies. He evaluates business strategy in U.S. steel minimills of either high volume lowest 
possible cost or high customization and more flexible manufacturing processes. The industrial 
relation systems evaluated consist of either an emphasis on cost reduction or employee 
commitment. He finds there to be a strong relationship between an industrial relations system 
which promotes employee commitment and a highly flexible manufacturing process. MacDuffie 
(1995) finds that ‘bundles’ of HR practices which are internally consistent with the business 
strategy produce better performance than ‘non-bundled’ practices. For instance, plants which use 
flexible production techniques perform better if they also use ‘high-commitment’ work practices 
consisting of teams, contingent compensation and extensive training. This ‘systems’ approach 
is further supported by the work of Huselid (1995), Becker and Huselid (1998) and by the work 
of Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) and Ichniowski and Shaw (1999).
73
2.7 Chapter Summary
In Chapter 2 we see conflicting views from the theory and from the empirical evidence regarding 
employee involvement and group incentives. Starting from principal-agent theory we see that 
the goals of owners and agents are not necessarily the same. The agent has access to information 
which will be advantageous to the principal. In order to better align the interests of the agent with 
those of the principal the principal incurs costs. A portion of these costs are associated with 
incentive contracts which help to align the interests of the two parties. Incentive contracts may 
consist of both explicit and implicit contracts; explicit contracts being the formal compensation 
structure and implicit contracts being corporate culture, fostering team spirit or loyalty.
In settings where there is private information, a high degree of employee involvement or 
decentralized decision-making may be effective in gaining access to this private information. 
Also, in settings where there is an integrated production process, group-based incentives may 
work better than individual or team-based compensation systems.
A problem with a high degree of employee involvement is the possibility of moral hazard or self- 
interested mis-behaviour. To reduce the opportunity for moral hazard the inclusion of incentives 
is advisable in order to better align the interest of the principal and the agent and reduce the 
chance of shirking. There is, however, a problem with group incentives which is the issue of the 
free-rider or 1/n problem. One way in which to reduce the free-rider problem is to add monitors 
and foster a ‘co-operative’ culture which may encourage mutual monitoring, reducing the need 
for formal supervision.
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In summary, there is some support from theory that in a team production setting, where there is 
a high degree of ‘interdependence’ among tasks and the employees have private information, an 
efficient labour contract may consist of a combination or both explicit and implicit incentives, 
specifically group incentives and employee involvement. To some degree this is borne out in the 
empirical literature where there is some evidence that when group incentives are combined with 
employee involvement there is a greater performance outcome than when one or the other is used 
in isolation. Group incentives or profit-sharing has been shown to have a small but positive 
impact on performance, but the evidence on employee involvement is largely mixed, often 
depending on the type of employee involvement used.
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Table 2.2
Summary of Research on Employee Participation and Company Performance
Research Data Measure Summary of Results
Berman and Berman 7 Co-ops Physical Output
(1989) 19 Traditional Firms
(1958 - 1977)
Significant negative 
association.
Cutcher-
Gershenfield
(1991)
25 Work Areas 
(1984- 1987)
Scrap Rates 
Value Added
Positive association 
with higher levels of 
participation.
Defoumey, Estrin 
Jones(1985)
550 French Co-ops 
(1978 & 1979)
Value Added Employee participation 
has a positive association 
with the dependent variable.
Doucouliagos
(1995)
Meta-analysis of 
43 studies
Various Productivity Positive association with 
Measures employee decision-making,
worker ownership, profit- 
sharing, but negative 
association with co­
determination.
Fitzroy and Kraft
(1992)
62 West 
German Firms
Value Added Significant negative 
association with 
productivity.
Levine and
Tyson
(1990)
Review of 47 
studies
Productivity
Measures
Mixed results of impact 
of employee participation 
on outcomes. Participation 
more likely to have 
positive impact when 
employees are given real 
responsibility.
Rosenberg and
Rosenstein
(1980)
68 Five week periods Plant Output 
(1969 - 1975) Measures
Very strong association 
between level of 
involvement and 
productivity.
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Table 2.3
Summary of Research of Impact of Profit-sharing on Performance
Research
Estrin, Jones and 
Svejnar (1987)
Fitzroy and Kraft
(1987)
Jones(1982)
Jones(1987)
Kraft (1991)
Kruse(1988)
Kruse(1993)
Wadhwani and Wall
(1990)
Data Measure Summary of Results
550 French Co-ops 
(1978 & 1979)
150 Italian Co-ops 
(1976- 1980)
50 British Co-ops 
(1948- 68), 5 year 
Intervals
Value Added Robust association 
between profit-sharing 
and productivity.
61 W. German firms 
in 1977; 62 W. 
German firms in 1979
Total Factor 
Productivity
Very robust association 
between productivity and 
extent of PS.
46 to 30 British 
Co-operatives 
(1948 - 1968)
Value Added Positive association.
50 British Gross Margin
Co-operatives in Retail
Sector
Positive association.
79 German firms 
(1977 and 1978)
Total Factor 
Productivity
PS a positive impact on 
productivity.
2,976 U.S. firms 
(1971 - 1985)
Sales per EE PS associated with 
between 2.8 per cent - 4.2 
per cent
increase in productivity.
500 companies 
with public stock
Value Added PS adoption is associated 
with 3.5 per cent to 5 per 
c e n t  i n c r e a s e  in 
productivity.
101 U.K. Firms 
(1972 - 1982)
Labour Productivity Positive impact but not 
statistically significant
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Table 2.4
Summary of Research Associated with Combined Practices
Research
Black and Lynch 
(1997)
Cable and Fitzroy 
(1980)
Cooke (1994)
Conte and Svejnar
(1988)
Femie and Metcalf
(1995)
Michell, Lewin and 
Lawler (1990)
Data Measure
627 US Sales per EE
Establishments
(1987 - 1993)
43 German Firms Value Added 
(1974 - 1976)
841 US Firms Value Added
(1989)
40 US Frims Value Added
(Unbalanced Panel 
2 to 8 years)
2061 UK Measures of
Establishments Productivity
(1990) Growth and
Change
495 U.S. Business Sales per EE
Units (1983 - 1985) (ROI) and
(ROA)
Summary of Results
Establishments which 
use participation in 
decision-making and 
use PS are more 
productive.
Whole sample PS effect 
positive but not 
statistically significant. 
Split sample for 
high, low participatory 
firm in decision-making 
resulted in positive sig. 
result for ‘high* firms.
Employee participation 
had a positive impact on 
performance, as did profit- 
sharing. The combination 
resulted in significant 
positive association. The 
positive effects were 
amplified if the firm was 
unionized.
Positive impact of 
involvement in decision­
making. Impact of PS 
depends on regression 
specification.
Combination of El and 
Profit-sharing results in 
best performance for 
unionized workplaces.
PS associated with higher 
productivity and firm 
performance.
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Chapter 3 
Research Methods and Issues
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in the introduction, the general question explored in this thesis is, in a team 
production setting, where employees may have useful private information, what is that the most 
efficient way in which to structure the employment relationship? To address this question, I have 
chosen to focus on employee involvement and group incentives programmes. Chapter 1 
introduced the question and in Chapter 2 the theoretical considerations were discussed and the 
empirical work evaluated. Chapter 3 will overview how the question will be evaluated 
empirically and explore methodological issues.
In order to evaluate the questions discussed, both econometric and case study analysis will be 
conducted. The econometric evidence will, within the limitation which will be discussed, allow 
an evaluation of the extent to which there is an association or even ‘causal’ relationship between 
the practices of interest and outcomes. The case study will allow for an evaluation of what is 
taking place from the perspective of those interviewed at the firm and also overview practical 
issues, such as legal and taxation issues associated with sharing residual control and return rights 
with employees.
With respect to the econometric analysis, in order to determine if there is a relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables, there are three major issues which need to be addressed. 
The first issue is measurement error. Measurement error is a problem if we have not accurately
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identified and ‘measured* what we plan to test. As will be further discussed, measurement error 
is a particular problem with research associated with employee participation. The second issue 
is the issue of omitted variable bias or heterogeneity. Omitted variable bias is bias to the 
dependent variable associated with an unidentified variable or variables. The third issue is the 
issue of endogeneity, or the problem of reverse causality. For example, in research associated 
with profit-sharing, does profit-sharing cause profitability or does profitability cause profit- 
sharing? Discussed in Chapter 3 will be how each of these and other issues will be dealt with.
3.2 Research Methodologies
Four forms of research methodology will be used in this thesis in order to evaluate the questions 
discussed. These include the use of case study evidence, descriptive statistics, correlations 
coefficients, and regression analysis. The following is a brief overview of each of the four 
methodologies.
Case Study
In order to determine how these practices actually work in a company, a case study on a firm, 
which is one of the first in the UK to implement an AESOP is conducted. The case study 
includes interviewing those responsible for implementing an AESOP scheme and abroad range 
of employee involvement programmes. The intent of the interviews was to determine why such 
programmes are being used in their firm, how they are structured and administered and what they 
expect to gain from these programmes? In addition, company performance trends before and 
after the introduction of the AESOP and a comparison of the performance of firms in the same 
industry which do not have the same programme will be conducted.
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Descriptive Statistics - Means and Standard Deviations
In Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 the mean values associated with the variables of interest will be 
evaluated. Mean and standard deviation analysis will allow an examination of the variables of 
interest by the establishment characteristic groupings. For example, evaluating the mean return 
on asset (ROA) performance of establishments which have a high degree of employee 
involvement with either the overall average ROA or in comparison with establishments which 
have a low degree of employee involvement.
Correlation Coefficients
Another type of analysis conducted is the correlation of the independent, control and dependent 
variables. Whether there is a statistically significant relationship between the variables will also 
be determined. This type of analysis will allow us to determine the relationship which exists 
between these variables; to establish if there is a positive, negative or no relationship at all.
Multiple Regression Analysis
The use of multi-variate analysis will allow a more thorough evaluation, which should enable a 
stronger argument related to determining whether there is a strong association, or causal 
relationship, between the independent and dependent variables.
3.3 Data-set
This section gives an overview of the corporate performance data-set. (More detail on the 
establishment, employment practices and worker characteristics can be found in Chapter 5).
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3.3.1 Corporate Performance Project Database
The Corporate Performance Project is a longitudinal research project being carried out jointly by 
the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics and the Institute of 
Work Psychology at the University of Sheffield. One of the principal aims of the project is to 
research how management practices impact the performance of establishments. The project 
obtains information from manufacturing establishments located in the UK. The establishments 
have between 61 -3,496 employees and all are manufacturing establishments. The project started 
in 1990 and will be completed in the year 2000. Currently, two sets of data are available. The 
first period of data collection was conducted between 1992-1994. The second period of 
collection was between 1994-1996. The data was gathered using on-site structured interviews 
speaking with each establishment* s human resource manager, plant manager, or other production 
manager. The database contains information on 118 establishments gathered during the first 
period, from 1992 through to 1994. The second period survey conducted in 1994-1996 obtained 
information from 60 establishments, 45 of which participated in the first round of data collection.
The data-set contains very detailed information on the types of management practices, the 
structure of the establishment, the market they operate in, work practices and organisational 
designs, establishment performance outcomes and human resource policies and practices. 
Establishment performance outcomes include establishment profits and sales turnover. The 
questionnaire was designed by both economists and organisational psychologists, and care was 
taken to find valid and reliable measures of management and establishment performance 
indicators. Also included in the data-set is information on product market, technological 
sophistication and management practices which may influence outcomes.
3.3.2 Corporate Performance Data-Set Information Categories
Exhibit 3.1 below lists the information categories found in the Corporate Performance data-set.
Exhibit 3.1 
Establishment Information Categories
A. Organisational Overview (Performance Measures)
B. Organisational Structure
C. Market Environment
D. Competitive Strategies
E. Production Technology
F. Work Design
G. Quality
H. Just-in-Time Manufacturing Process
I. Human Resource Management
J. Industrial Relations
K. Equal Opportunity
L. Records
M. Research and Development
N. Organisational Strategy
3.4 Data-set Construct and Issues
3.4.1 Establishment Versus Firm Based Level of Observation
In research associated with employee involvement there is an advantage in using establishment 
level data over firm-level data. Firm-level data is much more prone to measurement error,
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because, for example, the type and success of employee involvement programmes will vary 
considerably from one establishment to another. Firm-level surveys, for practices such as 
employee involvement, assume that the practices are the same across all establishments within 
the firm. This is very unlikely to be the situation, therefore establishment level information is 
more likely to be accurate.
3.4.2 Extrapolation of Variables in Corporate Performance Data-set
As previously indicated, two periods of data are currently available from the Corporate 
Performance data-set. This includes the first round of 118 interviews which were conducted in 
1992 through 1994; a second round of 60 interviews then took place in 1995 and 1996. Of those 
establishments interviewed in the second round information was gathered from 45 in both time 
periods. In examining the control (with the exception of number of employees and assets) and 
the independent variables there are no variations in these practices between the two periods. 
Given that there is no change in these practices this disallows for first difference or change over 
time analysis in the panel data set of 45.
Given that there is no change in the practices during the two periods, it is possible to extend the 
data-set to include information on the presence of the control and independent variables in future 
years. That is, if the remuneration practice was in place during the first round of interviews in 
1993, and was also in place in the second round of interviews in say 1995,1 presume the practices 
were not discontinued and restarted during the one year in between so there is information on 93 
through 95 for that establishment. Given that in 45 of the 118 establishments there were no 
changes in these practices, I also assume that the same holds true for the other establishments and
hold constant the status of the practices in future periods.1
3.4.3 Cross-Sectional Data versus Panel Data
Cross-sectional data is a sample which represents a particular ‘slice* of time, the data is gathered 
at one particular point in time. Panel data, on the other hand, is data gathered time period after 
time period, allowing researchers to evaluate the impact of change over time.
Panel data which includes variation in the variables of interest allows for ‘fixed* effects to be 
attributed for. Fixed effects may include the impact of difficult to measure factors which remain 
constant over time and may have an impact on the dependent variable. For example, in the case 
of examining the economic impact that employee involvement has on performance, if we have, 
say, a panel set on one thousand establishments over a ten year period we would be able to 
examine the impact which the start, or ‘initiation’, of a certain type or form of employee 
involvement has on performance. It would be possible to conduct a ‘before and after’ analysis 
allowing a study of the impact the initiation of a programme has on the performance of the firm 
or establishment. Provided variables affecting performance, which are not identified, remain 
constant, having more than one time period allows for the effects of these variables to be 
controlled and attributed for.
1 The surveys conducted do not ask when a pay system or human resource practice went into effect so I 
am not able to conduct a ‘before and after’ analysis. There is, however, information on performance measures dating 
back to 1982 for some of the establishments. In order to conduct an analysis which will better control for fixed 
effects I have recently sent-out a follow-up survey in order to find-out what date the practices of interest were started. 
While that information is not yet available for analysis, and included in this thesis, none o f the establishments which
I currently have replies from (approximately 30) have discontinued these practice once they were put in place. This 
provides supports for my assumption allowing me to extend the data-set.
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While the Corporate Performance data-set does contain a ‘panel’ element, the fact the practices 
I am interested in examining were not introduced during the time period the panel data-set covers, 
means I am not able to conduct a ‘before and after’ analysis. However, there is another means 
of attributing for omitted variable bias or heterogeneity which I will cover in section 3.5.3 and 
3.5.4.
3.4.4 Balanced Panel Data versus Unbalanced Panel Data
To reiterate, panel data is data over time for the same observations over a given time period. A 
balanced panel consists of the data for the same observation over a particular time period. An 
unbalanced panel is data over time, but there will either be missing data for some time periods 
or observations.
3.5 Validity and Reliability
3.5.1 Internal and External Validity
The ideal study would incorporate both internal and external validity. A high level of internal 
validity would allow us to rule out alternative explanations of what is causing the association we 
are testing. For example, if we are testing the impact a particular set of practices has on firm 
performance we would need to rule out the effect any recently introduced technological 
innovations would have on the outcomes we are measuring. In order to arrive at this type of 
design you ideally need to have a random sample of establishments. What random assignment 
does, is guarantee, on average, that other factors influencing performance, such as the quality of
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management or cultural work ethic, do not differ between the treatment and control group. This 
random element should result in the mean difference in performance between the groups 
reflecting only the effects of the work practices which are being examined.
The second type of validity is that of external validity. This type of validity is primarily 
concerned with how well we are to generalise our findings. If we are attempting to determine the 
impact management practices have on some element of establishment performance we would 
ideally want to be able to have a random sample of firms which have these types of practices (and 
those which do not) in a single industry. This would allow us to be the most declarative about 
the impact these practices have on the performance outcomes within this particular industry.
External validity is partially addressed because most of the establishments included in the 
Corporate Performance data-set are manufacturing establishments. While there is some variety 
in the types of manufacturing establishments,2 the majority are engineering establishments. They 
are also mostly manufacturing establishments which use advanced production technology and a 
skilled workforce.
3.5.2 Selectivity or Response Bias
Selectivity bias is the tendency for respondents to either reply, or not, based on some mediating 
factor such as profitability.3 That is, more profitable establishments may be more prone to reply 
to questionnaires. Again, the alternative could also be true and less profitable firms may tend to
See Chapter 5 for a more detail description of the types of establishments represented in the data-set.
3 See the work of Hausman (1979) for a thorough treatment of selectivity bias.
87
respond to surveys. This would also have the effect of positively skewing the results. However, 
without knowing the direction of this bias prior to the analysis, it is impossible to gauge the 
impact on performance.
The Corporate Performance data-set has scope for selectivity bias. Fewer than five per cent of 
the establishments approached agreed to participate in this survey. The reason for this was 
primarily attributed to the fact that the survey was very extensive and took up a considerable 
amount of time of the senior management within the establishment. While some element of this 
bias may be present in this analysis, as mentioned, without knowing the direction of the bias there 
is little that can be done to control for it. However, in evaluating the data-set it is apparent that 
both profitable and non-profitable establishments are participating in the survey. This may 
indicate that selectivity bias may not be a substantial problem.
3.5.3 Heterogeneity
One of the principal problems with cross-sectional analysis is unobserved heterogeneity, or 
omitted variable bias. Heterogeneity bias is the bias caused to coefficients due to factors which 
are not included in the model which maybe correlated with the dependent variable. Leaving out 
these factors may have the effect of biassing the coefficients. One way to address this issue is 
by identifying and including as many of the variables as possible which may have an impact on 
the dependent variable.
In this line of research, which is associated with factors which influence company performance, 
one of the principal factors often left out is a measure of management quality. The idea being,
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if they chose the most efficient human resource practice, they are probably making correct 
choices in other functional areas. If the omitted variables do not change over time than 
longitudinal data and the use of first difference, should attribute for these omitted variables. 
However, according to Huselid and Becker (1995) longitudinal data may well accentuate 
measurement error, if error is present. Also, if the omitted variables are not stable over time than 
the only way to eliminate their effects is to identify, measure and control for them statistically.
One way of addressing the issue of heterogeneity is by identifying as many factors as possible 
which influence performance, and by including them in the model and subsequent regression 
analysis. I have attempted to do this by including a measure of management quality which I 
believe will pick-up, and attribute for, management quality.4
Due to the extensive nature of the interviews which were conducted it will be possible to include 
a number of variables which are normally not included in this type of analysis, including a 
measure of management quality. In addition, the use of random effects specification should 
further attribute for unobserved heterogeneity.
3.5.4 Fixed versus Random Effects
The fixed effect model is the appropriate model when looking at a specific set of establishments 
as any inferences are related only to those establishments. This is due to the fact that the 
population mean for the sample is assumed to be a fixed parameter which can be estimated and 
the remaining disturbances are stochastic (i.e. subject to change with the remaining independent
4 See the appendix for Chapter 5, (Strategy) to see how I define this variable.
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variables). The random effects model is assumed to be random and is the correct model if you 
are drawing (n) number of establishments and you wish to draw inferences to the entire sphere 
of establishments.
It is generally agreed5 that the fixed effects model is appropriate when inference is to be made 
only in relation to the sample examined. Fixed effects would be the suitable model to be used 
when a researcher is attempting to examine one particular firm or one particular set of countries. 
Random effects is more appropriate when the intent is to generalise the conclusions outside of 
the sample. It is apparent that the more appropriate model is the random effects model because 
the intent is clearly to generalise the findings outside the sample.
3.5.5 Measurement Error
Measurement error is error associated with not actually measuring the concept you are 
attempting to test. This is very often a problem when attempting to measure employee 
involvement. Most surveys are firm-based and ask each organisation if it has a high degree of 
employee involvement. Firm level questionnaires tell us virtually nothing about what is actually 
taking place regarding participation in establishments.
The Corporate Performance data-set questionnaire is establishment level and contains questions 
which allow for an accurate read on the actual level of control and involvement in job tasks. This 
should help eliminate the effects of measurement error.
5 See Green (1993) Hsiao (1986) and Baltagi (1995).
90
3.6 Chapter Summary
As discussed in the introduction, the three primary methodological issues which I address in order 
to prove as conclusively as possible that the variables of interest are causing the results seen 
include: measurement error, heterogeneity and endogeneity. Given that the data-set is 
establishment rather than firm-based, this will allow for a more accurate read on the existence 
of the independent variables of interest. Measurement error will also be reduced due to the 
choice of independent variable (i.e. decentralization of tasks). Unlike other forms of employee 
involvement, decentralization of tasks is a concrete and identifiable form of employee 
involvement, either the shopfloor workers have authority to act or they do not. The second issue 
is of omitted variable bias or unobserved heterogeneity. In order to directly control for omitted 
variable bias a measure of ‘management quality* is taken and included in the regressions. Firms 
which correctly choose the most efficient human resource policies may also choose the correct 
marketing, operational and financial strategy. This should control, in part, for one of the primary 
factors thought to affect establishment performance. Additionally, the random effects model is 
a way of further attributing for unobserved heterogeneity. The empirical work is conducted using 
both standard ordinary least square and the random effects models. Another potential problem 
is the issue of endogeneity or reverse causality. The issue is, do higher profits cause payment 
systems such as profit-sharing, or does profit-sharing cause higher profits? While ideally, one 
would like to identify suitable instruments and check for reverse causality, no suitable were 
identified. Another way in which to address this issue may be through the use of lag variables. 
This clearly separates the decision to use a particular form of remuneration with future 
profitability. Time lags are used in both the empirical Chapters to partially control of reverse 
causality.
The case study used is of a firm which is one of the first in the UK to put an All Employee Stock 
Option Programme in place, and which also uses an extensive amount of employee involvement 
or communication programmes. The case study is meant to complement the econometric work 
in order to explore the practical issues associated with the transferring of residual control and 
residual return rights to employees. In addition, there is an evaluation of how well this firm is 
performing in comparison to other firms in the same industry which do not offer stock options 
to all their employees.
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Chapter 4
A Case Study of an All Employee Stock Option Programme and Communication
Programmes at a UK Retail Firm
4.1 Introduction
Stock options1 are often associated with either executive compensation or remuneration in cash- 
strapped high technology start-ups. There has, however, been an increased use of stock option 
programmes outside of high technology firms and for employees other than executives. 
Participation in decision-making and employee communication programmes are also becoming 
more common. These include such practices as suggestion schemes, small group information 
sessions and autonomous work groups (Cotton, 1993). Additionally, there is increasing evidence 
that financial participation works better when used in combination with participation in decision­
making (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995; Blinder, 1990).
In this case study, I provide some insight into why a firm would choose to put a stock option 
programme in place and also evaluate the impact of the programme. The first part of my analysis 
is.associated with ‘why’ they would choose to put these programmes in place. Interviews with 
employees provided a basis to evaluate theoretical considerations. I had the opportunity to speak 
with a number of employees including the Share Scheme Manager, the Employee Relations
1 The Inland Revenue as:4 Employees (being) given the right ( ‘option’) to buy at a future date a certain 
number of shares at a price fixed when the option was granted’. In practice, if  the shares appreciate in value
over the required holding period the employee ‘purchase’ the shares and is allocated the difference between the 
previously fixed price and the current appreciated level. If the shares depreciate in value over the required 
holding period, the employee simply chooses not to exercise their right to purchase the shares so there is no cost 
to the employee.
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Manager and the Coordinator of the Employee Suggestion Scheme. I also had the opportunity 
to speak with a store Human Resource Manager, and a number of shopfloor hourly colleagues. 
In the second part of my analysis I evaluate and compare the changes in performance, both prior 
to and after the introduction of the broad-based stock option programmes and extensive 
communication programmes. The performance relative to competitors is also evaluated.
There is good reason to be interested in this type of financial participation and the extensive use 
of communication programmes. Firstly, at the case study firm, the grant proportion is 25 per cent 
of base salary. Employees are eligible to exercise 50 per cent of the shares after three years and 
the remaining 50 per cent after six years. Since the inception of the All Employee Stock Option 
Programme (AESOP) the stock has increased by more than 100 per cent. According to Bradley 
et al. (1990) profit-sharing bonuses for sales assistants rarely exceed a maximum of four per cent 
ofbasic salary.2 Given the potential bonus levels reached at the case study company the incentive 
effects and the corresponding impact on profit-maximizing behaviours could be substantial. 
Secondly, in the UK, the employee turnover rate within the retail sector is high. At the case study 
company there is a three- and six-year vesting period associated with the stock option 
programme. Basis Freeman’s (1976) argument, an ownership programme which has a required 
vesting period (three years for the case study company) such as a stock option programme may 
reduce turnover and encourage the formation of firm-specific human capital.3 Thirdly, following 
Weitzman’s (1984) argument, if profit-sharing reduces the marginal cost of labour and 
correspondingly promotes employment expansion, or reduces the need for firms to make
The one well documented exception to this in London is John Lewis Partnership which pays an 
annual profit-sharing bonus in the order of 20 per cent of base pay.
3 While Freeman’s argument was associated with unionization the principle would apply in the 
case of employee share ownership.
employees redundant in times of economic contraction, stock option programmes, which are a 
cost-efficient way to deliver compensation, may have potential for capturing these theorised 
employment effects.4 Fourthly, the gap between the highest and lowest paid is at its highest level 
since the start of the century (Machin, 1996). AESOPs may have potential for increasing 
employees’ overall earnings. Finally, the feedback effects associated with these types of 
communication programmes may also be substantial (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995). Those who 
have a stake in the company may be more likely to be involved in a communication programme, 
actively seeking ways in which to cut costs, serve the customers better and generally look for 
ways in which to increase efficiency. Communication programmes may also signal to employees 
that their input is valued and help develop the co-operative ‘corporate culture’ which Weitzman 
refers to as being needed to help eliminate the incentive diluting effects of the free-rider problem 
(Weitzman, 1995).
4.2 Case Study Company
4.2.1 Sector and Case Study Company Background
The case study company operates in the UK grocery trade which currently accounts for nearly 40 
per cent of all UK retail sales. The sector has also become considerably more concentrated with 
four firms (the case study company is one of the four) accounting for 65 per cent of an annual 
market valued in excess of £90 billion. There has also been growth in the number of superstores 
in the UK from 457 in 1986 to 1,102 in 1997, accompanied by a substantial decline in the overall
4 Given the high european unemployment for the low-skilled workers a company such as this which 
operates in this labour market is of special interest.
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number of grocery stores; 147,000 in 1961 to 29,000 in 1997. It is predicted that competition will 
remain intense with a focus on price and service. Profit margins will be under pressure and while 
there is continued scope for consolidation, this will occur mostly within the convenience end of 
the market. One of the four largest players in the market launched a free home delivery service, 
which, it is thought, may result in an escalation of price competition. It is speculated that in the 
near future home shopping via the internet will be focussed in dry goods rather than fresh foods.5
The case study company was founded by two brothers in a former Bingo Hall in the Yorkshire 
region of England, approximately 200 miles north of London. In 1965 the two brothers 
consolidated with another partner and formed the company as it is known today. The stores 
quickly established a reputation for branded goods, at low prices in very convenient ‘one-stop* 
shopping centres. While today the company is primarily associated with food sales, in 1970 only 
one third of their floor space was used for food. In 1977, the company opened its first store 
around London and started a new focus on making their stores both attractive and functional. By 
the mid-1980s the focus had become to develop ‘customer friendly* stores with increased level 
of customer service.
Two decisions in the mid-1980s set the stage for future financial difficulties including, an 
unsuccessful purchase of another retailer and an attempt to go upmarket, which resulted in 
alienation of its customer base. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the company found itself in a 
position of near bankruptcy. It was losing market share to competitors, its share price had dipped 
to a low of 22 pence per share and the company was deeply in debt. In 1991, a new Managing
5 The analysis provided here is largely provided by ‘Verdict Research Limited’ (1998) and the 
Financial Times Retail and Consumer Report, ‘European Retail Analyst’ (1998).
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Director and Group Chief Executive was appointed. In 1992, the company launched a three-year 
recovery programme with the objective of returning the company to profitability. The first year 
of the recovery programme was called ‘Establishing the Platform*, and consisted of establishing 
a good financial and organisational foundation on which to build. The recovery plan consisted 
of a re-focus on the core superstore business and on achieving financial stability. In order to 
accomplish this a rights issue took place, a number of non-core businesses were sold and more 
aggressive cash management was adopted. In addition to the structural and financial management 
changes a re-focus on winning back the traditional customer base was put in place which entailed 
a new focus on customer service and refurbishing stores. The second year was labelled ‘Evolving 
the Format’ and continued the focus on prudent fiscal management, restructuring and customer 
satisfaction. The final year of the three-year programme and the start of the next three-year 
emphasis was labelled ‘Breakout’ and was largely characterised by a focus on growth and 
capitalising on the changes which had been put in place during the previous three years.
4.2.2 Corporate Changes
In addition to substantive changes in fiscal management and restructuring, the company changed 
the corporate culture. According to the Chief Executive, by the late 1980s the company had, ‘too 
many layers o f management, narrow functional attitudes and a controlling bureaucratic head 
office culture
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A number of activities were put in place to institute these cultural changes. These included:
(i) a style o f management in the stores that was becoming less authoritarian 
and more respectful o f colleagues at all levels,
(ii) reduce management headcount,
(iii) improve communication at all levels.
There was the recognition that front-line employees were the key to much of the focus on 
customer service and customer satisfaction. The company moved towards a philosophy of 
harmonisation which included referring to all employees as ‘colleagues’ and eliminating barriers 
between salaried and hourly employees.
Two of the major changes associated with this corporate culture change included the adoption 
of extensive employee involvement and communication programmes and, in 1995, the adoption 
of a stock option programme for all employees.
4.2.2.1 Employee Relations Programmes
According to an interview with the Manager of Employee Relations, the principal reason for 
putting employee suggestion programmes and involvement programmes in place was. ‘ away 
from work our colleagues may be magistrates, council or scout leaders, they have all sorts skills, 
ideas and suggestions that could help the company succeed. '
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It was believed that employees who were in closest proximity to the customer would have 
valuable information on customers’ preferences. Not only was there recognition that information 
should flow from employees to management, but also that information should flow from 
management to employees. As a result both bottom-up and top-down communication 
mechanisms were put in place. Top-down communication programmes because it was felt 
employees should know how well the business is performing, and should be made aware of any 
changes which may affect them.
A number of different communication programmes were put in place, all with the intention of 
keeping employees informed and allowing management access to valuable information which 
employees may have (Table 4.1 details the various programmes). A ‘suggestion’ programme 
involving all employees has been in place since 1993. There is an average of 250 suggestions 
made each week. Each suggestion is reviewed in order to establish whether or not it is feasible 
to implement. Approximately 5 per cent of the suggestions are put in place. Employees obtain 
points for making suggestions which are implemented and they are then able to use the points for 
gifts. Each person who makes a suggestion receives a signed personal letter from the Chairman. 
The Human Resource Manager interviewed indicated that the company suggestion scheme was 
considered one of the best in the country and She believe the success of the programme was 
largely due to the support of the Chairman.
There are a number of information sessions with employees that are meant to promote free 
information flows between various levels in the organisation. At the beginning of each daily shift 
the employees and their supervisors gather for a short five minute ‘huddle’ where employees are
99
asked if they have any questions, or if there are any issues which need addressing. Employees 
are also given any information from their supervisor about the company which would be of 
interest to them. In addition to the daily ‘huddles’ there are monthly meetings for all colleagues. 
These meetings last between 20 and 30 minutes and are an opportunity for management to convey 
company financial and other information to employees and also for employees to give feedback 
to management. In addition, each store holds a monthly ‘colleague circle’ aimed at addressing 
store-specific issues raised by colleagues. While the intention of the monthly meetings is 
primarily to convey ‘top-down’ information, the intention of the ‘colleague circles’ is to convey 
information ‘bottom-up’ to management. There is also an annual survey called the ‘We’re 
Listening’ survey which is a morale survey covering employees.
The five hourly employees at the store I spoke to included one with ten years’ experience at the 
store, two with nine years’ experience, one with six years’ experience and one had only worked 
for four months. The longer term employees I spoke to confirmed that there had been 
considerable changes in the culture of the organisation since they had started working and, in 
particular, there had been a notable effort to push decisions down to lower levels in the 
organisation. For example, any colleague in the store had the authority to refund a purchase 
which a customer found to be unsatisfactory. While this level of trust was appreciated by the 
employees, they had mixed feelings about the greater responsibilities which they had. The hourly 
employees felt that along with this increased trust came greater stress because more and more 
duties were being added to their jobs. On the other hand, the hourly employees felt that their 
store managers were ‘in the same boat’, and were under as much pressure as they were.
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Management also had mixed feelings about the decentralization of decisions and the ‘flattening* 
of the organisation. In addition to greater pressure due to more responsibilities, middle level 
managers sometimes found it difficult to see a clearly defined career path. Turnover for the 
middle level managers was high; approximately 50 per cent of new middle managers level in the 
first 12 months. According to the manager I spoke to this was attributed to the relatively low 
base wage and the sometimes ill-defined career path.
In addition to an array of communication and involvement programmes, the company has a 
variety of other employee relation programmes. They offer considerable flexibility in work 
hours. Parents of school children are allowed to reduce their hours during school breaks and the 
firm allows university students to work during breaks. All the employees spoken to commented 
that the flexibility the company exhibited was highly valued by them. There is also a subsidised 
meals programme and a healthy living programme. The headquarters themselves are open- 
planned with no dividers between desks, which is meant to foster the free flow of information. 
The board room has glass walls and there is a meeting room which has no chairs and a chest-level 
table which is used for ‘standing’ meetings. The intention is to keep the meetings short and to 
the point.
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4.2.2.2 The Share Scheme
According to an interview with the Manager of Share Scheme the reason the AESOP was put 
in place was the following:
‘We put the stock option programme in place with an objective o f getting 65 per cent o f 
the colleagues to be holders o f stock and owners o f the firm. There is the belief that owners will 
identify more closely with thefirm and this in turn will result in greater loyalty, and also promote 
an environment o f customer service. Another reason for starting the programme is we were 
hoping it would help reduce employee turnover. ’
According to the Share Scheme Manager the primary intention of the stock option programme
•
was that it would provide an additional mechanism which ‘helps people think and act like 
owners’. Management at the company felt that having employees holding shares in the company 
would result in greater effort, greater loyalty and help ‘promote an environment of customer 
service’. Management considered there to be a concrete link between employees having shares 
in the company and the level of effort employees would put forth. Additionally, management 
believed there to be a connection between a stock option programme and the likelihood that 
employees would not quit. Finally, there was the belief that ‘owners’ would conduct themselves 
differently in respect to how they treated customers. These beliefs by management were all 
predicated on the assumption that employees would see a concrete link between their jobs and 
the success or profitability of the company. The Share Scheme Manager said the AESOP was 
also seen by management as a way of eliminating barriers between employees and management.
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There was the belief that if executive stock options helped motivate management, why would 
they not provide an incentive for all employees?
Since the early 1970s there has been an executive share scheme which included less than the top 
one per cent of the company’s employees and could issue up to four times base salary in company 
shares. In 1978 a Save As You Earn Share Option Scheme (SAYE) was put in place for all 
employees. While SAYE schemes are similar to AESOPs, in that they place shares in the hands 
of employees, AESOPs differ from SAYEs in that employees do not put up any of their own 
money. With SAYE schemes employees make monthly contributions of between £5 and £250 
which is held in a trust. At the end of the contract period they are allowed to buy shares at a pre­
determined value, or if the shares have depreciated in value they are given the amount they have 
put in the trust plus any interest. At the time the SAYE scheme was introduced, there was a 
profit-sharing plan in place which had not made a payment for a number of years. In 1995 a stock 
option programme was established for all employees at the same time as the profit-sharing plan 
was eliminated. Table 2 presents the details and conditions associated with Share Schemes.
Under the AESOP all employees with 12 months tenure are eligible to participate in the 
programme. Employees are also required to work a minimum of 15 hours per week. The 
rationale for this requirement is to get people to contract for more hours. Management thought 
one of the principal reasons why people quit was because they did not identify closely with the 
organisation. By getting people to work more hours it was hoped they would become more active 
members of the organisation and be less likely to quit. The hope was that this requirement would 
result in a reduction in head count (e.g. fewer employees working more hours).
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The employees interviewed supported this belief by management that the AESOP and SAYE 
programmes were likely to make employees pause when considering leaving the company. This 
was not the case for employees who had been employed less than one year, however, those with 
greater length of service felt tied to the company due to the possibility of losing the benefit 
associated with the share ownership. This was not necessarily viewed positively by the 
employees; some said they felt ‘trapped’ or ‘bound’ by the company due to the vesting 
requirements of the AESOP and SAYE programmes.
The SAYE programme has a three and five year vesting period and the non-executive stock 
option scheme has a vesting period of three and six years. While vesting periods are Inland 
Revenue determined, the company hoped that this requirement would help reduce employee 
turnover. The 25 per cent of base salary is calculated as 25 per cent of annual contracted 
earnings,6 and employees are eligible to exercise 50 per cent of the options after three years and 
the remaining 50 per cent after six years. The share price at the time the option is granted has to 
be the market rate. In the SAYE programme there is a 26 per cent involvement rate. In the stock 
option programme there are 52,000 colleagues enrolled in the programme out of a potential 
74,000. The reason there is not 100 per cent take-up in the all employee stock option programme 
is some of the employees have not been employed for 12 months or because they do not work the 
required 15 hours per week. While some companies attach specific individual, team or 
establishment performance targets to the allocation of options, this firm does not attach such 
targets to its AESOP. If an employee leaves the company due to ill-health, incapacity or
6 For example, a clerk in London earning £4.50 per hour who is contracted to work 20 hours per week 
would be granted £1,170 options (£4,680 x .25). This would mean that if the price of the option was set at 90 
pence per share and if  the shares doubled in price to £1.80 over the three year vesting period, the employee 
would be eligible to buy the shares at 90 pence and retain the 50 per cent difference.
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retirement he or she may be eligible for a reduced number of shares. If they leave for any other 
reason they lose the option to receive shares. If the employee dies the next of kin will be able to 
take up the option within 12 months of the death. If the company is taken over the new company 
may allow the option holder to ‘roll over’ their options from the old company to the new 
company. The value of the new options must have the same value as the old options, and original 
rules and conditions will apply to the new options.
According to management, the institution of an AESOP was seen as a way to keep labour costs 
low. The case study company does pay the lowest base rate when compared to its four rivals (see 
table 4.7). Graph 4.13 also shows that the case study company has the lowest annual salary per 
employee among four competitors. These figures do not include any earnings from an AESOP 
programme. All of the employees who were asked if they were satisfied with their base wages 
responded that they were not satisfied. They did not view any income from either the AESOP 
or the SAYE as part of their basic pay but rather as a ‘gift*. A typical comment was,
‘They (management) have to understand that we have to live on what we 
make. Our wages are not ‘extra' money. I f  there is extra money from 
something like the ‘AESOP' or the ‘SAYE’ we will useJtfor a holiday. '
However, when asked if a competitor were to open a store right next door paying 10 per cent 
more but not offering free shares, would they quit and go next door. The replies included:
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‘No, this place has become like an old pair of slippers over the years. ’
‘Yes, however, I  might come back i f  they (the competitor) made me call the supervisors 
Sir and Madam. '
One other stipulation which the case study company has with its AESOP is that after the three 
and six year required holding period there is an ‘auto-exercise* mechanism in place. The way in 
which this works is, after the three year holding period, if the stock has appreciated in value the 
options are exercised automatically for the employees and they are given the profit in the form 
of company shares. If the stock depreciates in value the shares are not given to the employees 
so there are no costs to them. While this mechanism automatically exercises the options for 
employees, any profits issued to the employees are in the form of free shares which they can 
choose to hold or sell. According to management, employees will be encouraged to remain share­
holders in the company. However, if employees choose to sell their shares the company will help 
them to do this through a discounted brokerage.
According to sources at the firm the rationale for putting an ‘auto-exercise’ mechanism in place 
is two-fold. Firstly, this mechanism will greatly simplify administration for both employees and 
for the company. From the company’s perspective it is much easier administratively if all 54,000 
employees choose to exercise their options at the same time. It was also thought that it would 
be much easier for the colleagues who may not be very familiar with how to approach the use of 
options to have them exercised automatically. Additionally, the company will be able to re-coup 
its investment at a predictable point in time. This ‘auto-exercise’ mechanism does not apply in
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the case of the ‘executive stock option’ programme.
The non-executive stock option programme differs from the executive option programme in 
several ways. In the executive plan there are no tenure requirements, and the cash-out periods 
are three and four years.7 More detail on the difference between the executive and broad based 
plan can be seen in table 6.2. According to sources at the firm, one of the principal reasons an 
AESOP was put in place was to help eliminate barriers between employees and upper 
management.
Hourly employee reaction to the stock option programme was very positive and they expressed 
gratitude at what they perceived as a free gift. They also said the reason they thought it was a 
good idea was because it made them feel appreciated. When asked if the work they did had any 
impact on the share price they said no, however, when asked if the job they did had an impact on 
the bottom-line, they all answered yes. However, they also said that the existence of a stock 
option programme and their owning stock did not have an impact on the way they carried out 
their jobs (e.g. effort level or level of customer service).
4.3 Background and Trends of Share Option Schemes 
and Employee Communication Programmes
4.3.1 Stock Option Programmes
7 The company determines who participates and at what level, subject to a maximum of 4x base salary.
107
4.3.1.1 Individual Tax Implications
The tax implications for discretionary share option schemes in the UK were changed in 1996. 
Prior to 1996 employees were given the right to buy options at a future date at a price fixed when 
the option was granted. The company could decide who was eligible to participate. The value 
of the options held by an individual was limited to a maximum of £100,000 or four times the 
person’s base salary. The option price could be set as low as 85 per cent of the market value of 
the shares at the time the option was granted. The employee did not pay income tax on any 
increase in the market value of the shares when the option was exercised. To qualify for this tax 
treatment the option could not be exercised less than three years, and not more than ten years, 
from when the option was granted. Capital gains tax may have applied when the options were 
exercised.
Discretionary share option plans were replaced by company share option plans in 1996. While 
the company is still free to decide who participates in these plans, a £30,000 ceiling was placed 
on the amount eligible for tax relief. Also, the value of the shares cannot be discounted below 
the market price.
4.3.1.2 Corporate Tax/Profit Implications
There are two ways in which an employer can issue shares to employees. Employers have the 
choice of either purchasing existing shares or issuing new shares. One criticism associated with 
stock options for all employees is that setting aside large numbers of shares will dilute earnings,
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negatively impacting current shareholders.8 However, it is argued that the number of options 
exercised at any one time is going to be small, thus limiting this dilution effect.
This form of remuneration delivery may be a very cost-efficient way for companies to deliver 
compensation. The company chooses to either issue new shares, subject to the 10 per cent limit 
over a ten year period, or to buy back existing shares. When the shares are appropriated to 
employees they are put in a trust and provided the shares appreciate, at the time employees 
exercise their options the company recovers its original investment. In addition, costs associated 
with option programmes are legitimate business costs which are fully tax deductable.
In the UK and the US the accounting practice associated with stock options has recently caused 
some controversy. This is due to corporate profits being ‘inflated* because accepted accounting 
practices allow stock options not to be charged against the profit and loss accounts (see table 6.3 
for example) . In addition, there are circumstances when expenses incurred from stock options 
can be used as a tax deduction, for instance, the interest payments on a loan taken to pay for stock 
options can be taken as a tax deduction and in turn seen as profit. This results in an overvaluation 
of individual companies. In the US, where stock option programmes are more widespread, it is 
also contended that because individual earnings from these programmes are not reported in 
national accounts, wage inflation may be 2 per cent to 3 per cent higher per annum.9 In the UK,
o
Guidelines for all employees shares are set by the Association of British Insurers and the National 
Association of Pension Funds. Over a ten year period newly issued shares cannot exceed 10 per cent of the 
company’s ordinary share capital.
9 A report by Smithers & Co. Ltd., ‘USA: The Impact of Employee Stock Options’ recalculates profits 
of 100 US firms when stock option costs are charged against profits. For example, Microsoft’s reported profit of 
$2.8 billion in 1996 changes to a $10.2 billion loss. More detail on company overvaluation and the impact this 
accounting practice may have on unreported wage inflation can be found in the report. Another report, by Bears 
Steams reported in the May 13, 1998, issue of The Wall Street Journal Europe, using a more conservative 
methodology, recalculates Microsoft’s 1997 operating income from $5.1 billion w/o option to $4.7 including
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where stock option programmes are not yet as widespread, it is doubtful there is any significant 
impact on wage inflation, although the individual company overvaluation may apply.10
4.3.2 Trends for All Employee Stock Option Programmes and 
Employee Communication Programmes
4.3.2.1 Stock Option Plans
Until recently, stock options were used largely for only executives and senior managers. This is 
changing in both Europe and the US. According to a survey conducted by the Association for 
Quality and Participation in 1995,13 per cent of Fortune 1,000 firms in the US offered stock 
options to 60 per cent or more of their employees. The trends are similar in the UK. Graph 4.1 
shows both the newly approved discretionary share option programmes in the UK between 1984 
and 1996 and a cumulative total. While the vast majority of these option schemes are associated 
with executives, AESOPs in the UK are also increasing. According to a recent survey by New 
Bridge Streets Consultants, the number of AESOPs in the UK has increased five-fold from 5 - 
25 between 1994 and 1997.
4.3.2.2 Employee Communication Programmes and Involvement Programmes
See Chapter 1.0, section 1.4.2 for a summary of the trends associated with employee involvement
options.
10 The case study company reports the costs associated with the AESOP in its company accounts.
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programmes in the UK.
4.4 Previous Research and Theoretical Considerations
4.4.1 Previous Research
I have not been able to find any case study or econometric research examining the economic 
impact of AESOPs. There has, however, been substantial work in the UK and US associated 
with the economic impact which various forms and levels of executive compensation have on the 
performance of the firm. While there is a fair amount of UK evidence (Conyon et al. 1995; 
Conyon and Gregg, 1994; Conyon and Leech, 1994; Gregg et al. 1993) associated with the impact 
of executive remuneration on the performance of companies, this has mostly been limited to 
examining the impact that salary and bonus have on performance. This may largely be due to the 
fact that until recently information has not been available which allows the evaluation of the 
impact of share options on performance.
In a comprehensive review of the literature on various forms of employee ownership Kruse and 
Blasi (1996) find ten studies on US ESOPs.11 They do not find there to be a strong positive 
relationship between ESOPs and company performance. This result is largely supported by 
further work by Blasi, Conte and Kruse (1996) who find only a small difference in the 
performance of firms which have more than five per cent employee ownership compared with
11 ESOPs, or Employee Stock Ownership Schemes, in the US are one form of employee ownership. 
They are often associated with ‘retirement savings’ programmes, which place shares in the hands o f employees. 
However, employees or their beneficiaries do not often have access to these shares until they retire or die.
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all other firms.
While the legal form differs and they use the traditional form of profit-sharing, research into the 
John Lewis Partnership may provide a useful insight into the potential effects of broad-based 
profit-sharing. In their book, Bradley and Taylor (1992) present a detailed case study at the John 
Lewis Partnership.12 Employees in the John Lewis organisations are considered formal partners 
with rights of ownership, including the right to decide if the chairman stays and the right to a 
portion of the profits. According to the authors, since the company’s early days, the Partnership 
has focussed on employee’s ‘enhanced financial remuneration, improved flow of information, 
and service as a key commercial goal. ’ While it could be argued employees are not full partners 
in the traditional definition as they share little risk (e.g. they are not liable if the concern is 
declared insolvent) they do have a greater remit than employees in traditional capitalist firms. 
The case study finds that the John Lewis Partnership ranks near the top of its competitors in 
performance indicators, such as profitability and productivity.
4.4.2 Theoretical Overview
Two issues addressed in this case study are, why would this company, which operates in a low- 
wage, low-skill labour market, offer stock options to all employees, and what is the impact of 
these programmes on economic outcomes? Previously discussed, from the perspective of the 
company, is why the firm chose to put these practices in place. This section will overview some 
of the theoretical issues regarding the determinants of the usage for these practices and what
12 Also, see the article by Bradley, Estrin and Taylor (1990) in Industrial Relations.
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theory would say about their potential impact on economic outcomes.
4.4.2.1 Determinants of Employee Involvement and Share Schemes
The first issue of interest is, why would a service sector firm hiring mostly low-skill, low-pay 
employees decide to put a stock option scheme in place and employee involvement practices in 
place? There is little work on why a firm would choose to put an all employee stock option 
programme in place, however, there is more work on why a firm would choose to use a group 
incentive scheme such as profit-sharing. A helpful framework associated with explaining why 
a firm would choose a particular set of human resource, or remuneration practices, is provided 
by the New Economics of Personnel13 (NEP). The NEP literature suggests the decision to use 
a group incentive scheme is part of a larger decision to put an entire set of practices into place. 
These practices include teams, job rotation, TQM and quality circles (Osterman, 1994). 
According to Osterman, there are company characteristics which make it more likely for an 
establishment to choose to put these practices into effect. These factors include being in an 
internationally competitive product market, having a technology that requires a high skill-level 
and following a strategy which emphasizes service, variety and quality, over low-cost. According 
to NEP, a firm’s choice to select a particular incentive scheme is also associated with the 
production technology and the make-up of the workforce. This view suggests that as the 
monitoring of the workforce becomes more expensive firms will choose to put group incentive 
schemes or profit-sharing into place. This is the view largely supported by Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992) who would support the use of variable pay in settings where it is difficult or costly to
13 For a comprehensive overview of the New Economics of Personnel see the October 1987 issue of 
the Journal o f Labor Economics.
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accurately measure effort. A somewhat contradictory position is held by Lazear (1995) who 
suggests when quality is difficult to observe it may be more efficient to pay basis input (time on 
the job) versus output (some measure of output), because quality may be sacrificed for quantity. 
However, Lazear* s position applies to piece rates where the measurement of output is relatively 
inexpensive.
Regarding the use of employee involvement programmes Lazear (1995) suggests that the decision 
to use these programmes is related to a number of factors including analytical ability of 
employees, complexity and value of information in their possession and the costs of 
communicating this information. If the tasks are complex, if employees have the necessary skills 
and abilities to make decisions and communication costs are high, employee involvement may 
be the most cost-effective option.
There are conflicting views from theory on why a firm such as the case study firm would use 
AESOPs and employee involvement programmes. The case study company hires primarily low- 
skilled workers which contrasts with the prediction of NEP which suggests profit-sharing and 
involvement are most appropriate for companies with high-skilled workers. However, there is 
a very clear focus on customer service,14 and given that it would be very expensive or impossible 
to monitor the customer service (e.g. helpfulness) of all hourly employees, using a group 
incentive system may help provide a substitute for monitoring.15 Regarding why this firm would
14 According to the store Human Resource Manager, the selection attributes for hourly colleagues, 
includes people who are ‘positive’, ‘customer oriented’, ‘and work well in a team’. While it may well be that 
profit-sharing promotes mutual monitoring, the ‘customer service’ of hourly colleagues may be partially due to 
personal attributes screened during the selection process.
15 Some support for this view may be found in recent work by Femie and Metcalf (1996) who found 
telephonists in call centres being paid partially perfoimance-related pay even though their work was extremely 
closely monitored. It may be that monitoring ‘service orientation’ is impossible or very costly.
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choose to use employee involvement practices, it may be that employee’s proximity to the 
customers may provide them with customer preference information which may be of value to 
management who are in less direct contact with customers.
4.4.2.2 Theoretical Overview of Performance Effects of
Employee Involvement and Group Incentives
Stock Option programmes, commonly used with executives, are normally established in order 
to counter one of the fundamental incentive problems of economic organisation: the principal- 
agent problem. The principal-agent problem recognizes that the best interests of the owners are 
not necessarily the same as their agents. One mechanism used to bring the interests of these two 
parties into closer alignment is the allocation of stock to agents. This should result in the efforts 
of these agents being directed towards maximizing shareholder returns. The use of AESOPs are 
meant to provide these same incentive effects, not only for executives, but for all employees.
In evaluating issues associated with the incentive effects of employee stock option programmes, 
one of the first major problems associated with the use of any group incentive programme is the 
free-rider problem. As the number of employees increase there will be a corresponding dilution 
of any incentive effect. It is clearly understood from motivational theory that for there to be an 
impact on productivity-enhancing behaviour there needs to be a transparent connection between 
a person’s behaviour and the rewards. The free-rider problem recognizes that in settings where 
profits are shared among many this connection may not be very apparent.
Conte and Svejnar (1990) argue that employee share schemes may be better at providing a clear
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link between effort and profits, thus capturing efficient market effects better than other forms of 
profit-sharing. For example, profits may be reduced due to depreciation charges associated with 
a large capital investment. In an efficient market the stock price may better reflect future profits, 
thus providing a clearer link between effort and profits.
The standard argument in economics used to address the incentive diluting effects of the free­
rider problem is taken from game theory. Game theory recognises that while a non-co-operative 
solution is possible, everyone is better off if all work hard so as the game is repeated over and 
over, eventually a co-operative solution may result.
The other means of addressing the free-rider problem is by adding more monitors. While the 
normal way in which this is accomplished is by hiring more supervisors, this is expensive. There 
is some evidence that there may be cheaper alternatives to adding formal monitors. This would 
essentially consist of employees monitoring themselves and others. Weitzman (1995) argues that 
developing a co-operative corporate culture may help in reducing the effects of the free-rider 
problem. In an employee-owned firm, the Spanish Mondragon communities, Bradley and Gelb 
(1980) found monitoring costs were reduced because workers tend to engage in ‘horizontal’ 
monitoring.
Other theoretical considerations include the lowering of information costs because managers* and 
employees’ interests are more closely aligned. This recognises that employees have access to 
information which maybe valuable to management. The presence of a group incentive scheme 
may result in employees having the necessary incentive to communicate, or act on their superior 
information. The majority of the research associated with information sharing has been
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evaluating top-down information sharing (Kleiner and Bouillon, 1988; Morishima, 1991). While 
Kleiner and Bouillon did not find a positive effect of information-sharing on performance 
measures, Morishima found that there was a positive association with information-sharing and 
profitability and productivity. Another issue, according to Conte and Svejnar (1990), is that more 
productive employees may sort to firms where more compensation is placed at risk. Additionally, 
the argument from efficiency wage theory may apply: due to the higher wage rate, employees 
who work for firms which pay above the market rate may be less likely to quit and more likely 
to exert maximum effort.
In addition to the possible impact of broad-based stock options on productivity, the same 
macroeconomic employment effects of profit-sharing may apply to stock option schemes. The 
essential argument put forth by Weitzman16 is that by including a variable pay component related 
to performance, marginal labour costs are reduced, resulting in less need to make people 
redundant in times of economic downturns and increasing the incentive for employers to expand 
employment in economic good times. Given a firm’s investment is returned when the options 
are exercised, provided the shares have appreciated, stock options are an inexpensive way to 
deliver compensation. The fact that stock options may be cost effective may mean this form of 
profit-sharing has scope for realizing Weitzman’s theorized employment effects.
These theoretical considerations do not give a clear prediction regarding the effect all employee 
stock options, combined with employee involvement, will have on company performance. 
However, all of the case study companies competitors detailed in table 4.6 use some form of
16 See Weitzman’s 1985 article in the American Economic Review for a thorough treatment o f the 
macroeconomic effects of profit-sharing.
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contingent, pay for their hourly employees. Additionally, one of the case study companies 
competitors have put an AESOP in place for all hourly employees.17 The fact that these 
contingent pay systems are this common may support the perception that there is a positive 
association with performance.
In the next section some of the broad trends and associations which these programmes may have 
on earnings will be evaluated along with the changes in performance at the case study company 
since the adoption of stock options and extensive employee involvement programmes. 
Additionally, how the company is performing in comparison to competitors which do not have 
an AESOP in place, employee turnover and employee attitudes are evaluated.
4.5 Analysis of Performance Indicators
4.5.1 An Example of Impact on Earnings
The hypothetical example in table 6.418 compares the earnings of an individual at an AESOP firm 
with a non-AESOP firm. The example assumes the person at both firms earns £4.00 per hour in 
year one, the hourly wage at the hypothetical non-AESOP firm one increases three per cent per 
year and the hypothetical AESOP firm two increases at two per cent. Employees at both firms 
are contracted to work 30 hours per week, and there is a 12 month eligibility requirement for the
17 Per a phone conversation with the manager of compensation and benefits at the second company, 
part of the reason they put a AESOP in place was because of the perceived success of the case firm’s 
programme. Additional reasons included the need to find ‘tax efficient’ ways o f delivering compensation and 
the hope this programme would reduce employee turnover. In addition, unlike the case study company, the 
second company ties the number of shares issued to the ‘customer service rating’ the store receives.
1 ft Given that employees are often given stock options again after three years, this example is very 
conservative.
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AESOP. In firm two, which has the AESOP plan, the following assumptions apply: the share 
price doubles in the first three years and increases by 50 per cent at the end of the next three; the 
vesting period is three and six years; employees are eligible to exercise 50 per cent of their 
options in the third year and 50 per cent in the sixth year and the grant amount is 25 per cent of 
contracted earnings. Table 6.4 shows that while the annual base salary earnings are higher at firm 
one, the AESOP firm, firm two, makes a payment of 12.5 per cent of base salary (based on base 
salary in year one) in year four and in year seven a full 25 per cent of base salary is paid. While 
a stock appreciation of 100 per cent during the first three years and an additional 50 per cent after 
six years may sound ambitious, given the phenomenal growth in the stock market in recent years, 
this rate is not unrealistic for some companies.
4.5.2 Outcome Measures
According to the annual morale survey (table 4.5) there is a high degree of affiliation with the 
establishment (Q1; 88 per cent). There is also a strong sense that the customers are the focus of 
the establishment (Q5; 94.8 per cent) and (Q6; 95.4 per cent). Also, the employees have a strong 
identification that the work they perform has a direct impact on the performance of the 
establishment (Q7; 85.7 per cent). The response to question seven is notable because the 
theorized incentive diluting effects of the free-rider problem may not be an issue at the case study 
company. However, while employees believe their actions effect the bottom line, this does not 
mean they necessarily act. Though they may be more likely to do their part in increasing profits 
now that they share in those profits.
While these responses taken by themselves are of interest, it is helpful to see how they compare
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to the satisfaction level of employees at competitors in the same labour market and industry. 
Some recent work by Brown and McIntosh (1998a) evaluates job satisfaction in the service 
sector. One of the firms participating in their study is a competitor of the case study company. 
While the scale differs,19 there is some similarity between the questionnaire items. For example, 
in the survey used for the job satisfaction survey, only 14.9 per cent of the employees responded 
with either a 1 or 2 when asked if; ‘All in all I am satisfied with the job*. Only 19.3 per cent 
responded with either a 1 or 2 when asked if; ‘The company is a good employer*. While these 
questions do not allow us to compare, ‘apples to apples’, apparently, the case study company has 
a well satisfied workforce.
Regarding the various performance measures, starting first with the changes within the company, 
there are upward trends in all the reported performance indicators. In graph 4.2, starting in 1988, 
there has been a steady improvement in real sales (discounted for inflation). The return to 
financial health is reflected in the earnings per share found in graph 4.5 and the overall increase 
in operating profits in graph 4.6. However, it is likely that some of this increase in total sales can 
be attributed in part to an increase in stores, seen in graph 4.3, and the increase in sales per square 
metre seen in graph 4.4.
While changes in performance within the company have been increasing after the introduction 
of the AESOP, relative to other companies in the retail food industry, the company has also been 
performing very well. During the time period analysed, the case study company was the only 
company which offered an AESOP. Looking initially at the labour productivity measure of sales
19 The questionnaire item for Brown and McIntosh’s work is a five point scale with ‘Strongly Agree’ 
being 1 and ‘Strongly Disagree’ being 5.
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per employee in graph 4.7, in 1993 the case study company was a distant fifth out of five.20 By 
1997 it was nearly tied for second place with the other three companies. Only one competitor 
clearly had a greater level of sales21 per employee. Commencing in 1994, the firm starts an 
upward trend in sales per employee and the trend seems to accelerate in 1995. In graph 4.8, 
which displays operating profit per employee, compared with competitors in 1993, the case study 
company was again a distant fifth. An acceleration in operating profit started in 1994 and 
continued until 1997. The same story applies to profit margins and value added, seen in graph 
4.9 and 4.10 respectively. The company moved from fifth place in 1993 to nearly a tie for second 
in 1997 for profit margins and made sizable increases in value added per employee over the same 
period.
Table 4.6 is the percentage change within the various companies and between the case study 
company and its competitors between 1994 and 1997 for sales per employee, operating profit per 
employee and value added per employee. The first column shows the ‘first difference’ or the 
change within the various companies between 1994 and 1,997. The second column labelled 
‘difference between differences’ is the change during these years between the case study company 
and the competitors. This exercise is an attempt to control for ‘fixed effects’, or any other factors 
which impact performance and are stable over time. Due to the small set of firms found in this 
analysis, testing for statistical significance is not possible, however, the table clearly shows the 
case study firm to be performing very well over these years in comparison to itself and relative 
to its competitors. Especially striking is the growth in value added per employee by 177 per cent
20 The data was obtained through Datastream Data Services.
21 It is necessary to note that if the company’s stated objective of increasing the hours of employees 
and reducing total employment was realized this would have the effect of increasing the sales to employee ratio.
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between 1994 and 1997 which is between 145 per cent and 157 per cent better than it’s 
competitors.
The results concerning the changes associated with wages and employment levels are also of 
interest. In Table 4.7, of the five companies, the firm’s basic rate is lower than two of the five 
competitors, approximately the same as the third (except the provincial rate) and clearly greater 
than one competitor. This is further supported in graph 4.13 which presents average annual 
earnings per employee. Annual earnings at the case study company is considerably less than its 
competitors. It appears that the case study company may be using the stock option programme 
in the way which Weitzman envisioned, as a way to keep ‘fixed’ compensation costs lower. 
From this type of analysis, we cannot say for certain, however, as shown in graph 4.11, there is 
an increase in the number of employees per store: this signals that a closer empirical look to 
evaluate Weitzman’s theorized employment effects may be warranted.22
The next objectives include reducing employee turnover and promoting employee 
communication. Using the annual morale survey there is an attempt to detail some of the 
associations between these effects and the initiation of the share option programme at the case 
study company. There is a reduction in employee turnover between the years 1995 and 1997 
(graph 4.12). Concerning the industrial relations outcome of the success of various 
communication programmes, (Q4; 88.3 per cent) of the employees believe they have the right to 
say something if they see something wrong. Also, (Q8; 33 per cent) of the workforce believe that 
management takes decisions which should be made at a lower level. Using the Brown and 
McIntosh survey data as a comparison, while not an identical question, 94 per cent replied either
99 As previously mentioned, a number of the stores were recently renovated which may influence the 
employment level at the stores.
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1 or 2 to the questionnaire item, ‘I get along well with my supervisor’. If employees have a good 
relationship with their supervisor they may be more likely to say something if they see a problem.
4.6 Conclusion
From this analysis it is apparent that the case study company is doing many things right, 
including the initiation of a stock option programme for all employees and extensive 
communication programmes. The answer to the question regarding why a firm operating in the 
low-wage sector would invest in an employee option programme and in employee 
communication programmes, the company believes that there will be a positive impact on 
reducing turnover, increasing productivity and profitability. From theory there is evidence of 
contradictory dynamics. On the one hand, the company uses low-skill employees which argues 
against the use of contingent pay arrangements. However, it may be more difficult monitoring 
the customer service orientation of the workforce, which may be an argument for some 
component of remuneration being variable.
Regarding productivity and profitability, all of the fundamental performance indicators have 
increased. This upward trend in performance measures applies both to changes within the firm 
after the introduction of the AESOP, and in relation to its primary competitors which do not offer 
an AESOP. There is also a reduction in employee turnover, a high level of employee morale and 
participation and involvement in company wide communication programmes. Also interesting 
is that 86 per cent of the workforce at the company believe their actions affect the bottom line. 
There are mixed feelings from employees regarding the AESOP. While they appreciate the free
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shares, they do not see how it affects their work behaviour. However, there seems to be a 
‘culture’ which promotes customer orientation, taking responsibility and affiliation with the 
organisation. It is difficult to say if the AESOP is ‘the’ mechanism which promotes this, but it 
seems to be a contributing factor.
Chapter 4 clearly shows us that group incentives and employee involvement programmes are 
worth a close empirical look. In the next chapter, using more rigorous econometric techniques, 
I will examine the impact which performance related pay, including group incentives, have on 
establishment performance. Chapter 6 will than directly address the question, is it employee 
involvement, group incentives, or the combination of the two, which elicits the greatest 
performance outcomes?
Table 4.1
Employee Communication and Involvement Programmes
Occurring Daily Weekly Monthly Annually
Suggestion Scheme Suggestion Scheme Suggestion Scheme Suggestion Scheme
Huddles Huddles Huddles Huddles
Monthly Meeting Monthly Meeting
Colleague Circles Colleague Circles
‘Were Listening
Survey’
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Table 4.2
Share Schemes
Save As You Earn All Employee Stock 
Option Programme
Executive Stock 
Option Scheme
Tenure:
12 months.
Tenure:
12 months.
Tenure:
Company determined.
Hours:
Minimum of 
14 hours per week.
Hours:
Minimum of 
15 hours per week.
Hours:
Company determined.
Cash-out:
3 and 5 year contract.
Cash-out:
3 and 6 year contract.
Cash-out:
3 and 4 year contract.
Contribution Level:
£5 to £250 per week.
Contribution Level:
25% of base salary.
Contribution Level:
Up to 4 times salary.
Share Purchase Price:
80%of market price.
Share Purchase Price:
Market price.
Share Purchase Price:
Market price.
Taxation: Taxation: Taxation:
Income Tax:
No income tax paid 
on shares.
Income Tax:
No income tax when option 
exercised as long as value 
of shares is less than 
£30,000.
Income Tax: 
Same as AESOP.
Capital Gains:
1997-1998 limit on 
capital gains tax is 
£6,500.
Capital Gains:
Same.
Capital Gains: 
Same.
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Table 4.3
Impact of Accounting Practice of Stock Options on Company Reported Profits
Company A Company B
Revenue from sales 100 100
Labour costs charged to P&L 80 100
Profits to employees from exercise of options 20 0
Total income to employees 100 100
Increase in net worth 0 0
Profit shown in P&L 20 0
Overstatement of Profit 20 0
Source: Smithers & Co. Company A pays EEs in part with options, Co. B does not.
Table 4.4
Hypothetical Example of 
Annual Earnings of Individual at AESOP Firm Compared to Non-AESOP Firm
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7
Firm 1 6240 6427 6620 6818 7023 7234 7450
(Non-AESOP Firm)
(3per cent annual base salary increase)
Firm 2 6240 6365 6492 6622 6754 6889 7027
(AESOP Firm)
(2per cent annual base salary increase)
AESOP Payment 780 1560
TOTAL: Firm 1 6240 6427 6620 6818 7023 7234 7450
Firm 2 6240 6365 6492 7402 6754 6889 8587
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Table 4.5
Results Associated with the Annual Morale Study for 1997
Per cent of EEs Agreeing or Disagreeing with Question. Agree Disagree
1. I enjoy working at this store. 88 5.9
3. I am encouraged to come up with new ideas in my job. 71.5 18.2
4. When I see something wrong I feel I have the right to 
mention it.
88.3 4.8
5. Customers are number one in this store. 94.8 2.9
6. I have a good understanding of the best way to serve 
customers.
95.4 1.6
7. The work I do impacts directly on the success of 
the store.
85.7 6.3
8. Managers take decisions that should be taken at a lower level. 33 36.6
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Table 4.6
Percentage Change Between 1994 & 1997
First Difference Difference between Differences
Sales per EE
Case Co.: 59% Difference with:
Comp. 1: 17% Comp. 1: 42%
Comp. 2: 39% Comp. 2: 20%
Comp. 3: 16% Comp. 3: 43%
Comp. 4: 20% Comp. 4: 39%
Case Co 
Comp. 1 
Comp. 2 
Comp. 3 
Comp. 4
Operating Profit per EE
.: 111% Differen
36% Comp. 1 
50% Comp. 2 
-17% Comp. 3 
03% Comp. 4
ce with:
147%
61%
128%
108%
Case Co 
Comp. 2 
Comp. 3 
Comp. 4
Value Added per EE
.: 177% Differen
30% Comp. 2 
32% Comp. 3 
20% Comp. 4
ce with:
147%
145%
157%
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Graph 4.1
Discretionary Share Option Schemes Approved by Year
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Graph 4.3
Total Number of Stores by Year
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Graph 4.4
Total Sales Area
9000
8800
8600
8400
8200
8000
7800
7600
Source: Case Study Company Annual Reports Scale: 000 Square Metres
8795
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
132
Graph 4.5
Earnings Per Share
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Source: Case Company Annual Reports Scale: Pence
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Graph 4.7
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Graph 4.8
Operating Profit Per Employee (FTE)
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Graph 4.10
Value Added Per Employee
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Graph 4.11
Average Number of Employees Per Store (FTE)
Source: Annual Reports
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Graph 4.12
Percentage Annual Employee Turnover Between 1995 - 1997
EE Turnover
Source: Case Study Company Annual Reports
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Graph 4.13
Average Annual Earnings Per Employee
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Table 4.7
Pay Rate and Annual Profit-Related Pay for Hourly Employees in Select Competitors for 1997
Comp. 1 Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Case Company Comp. 4
Pay per Hour:
London: 4.51 4.86 5.10 4.50 3.79
Outer London: 4.51 4.64 5.10 4.50 3.79
Provincial: 4.12 4.16 4.56 3.59 3.70
Pay Settlements: 2.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.0%
Contingent Pay: Profit-Sharing Profit-Sharing Profit-Sharing
All Employee 
Stock Options 
(Started in Oct. 1997)
All Employee 
Stock Options
Co. Bonus
SAYE SAYE SAYE SAYE
Source: Income Data Services Report 745.
Chapter 5
Fixed, Individual, Team and Group Pay in 
Team Production Settings
5.1 Introduction
A fundamental question faced by firms when designing their remuneration strategy is, which type 
of remuneration plan best promotes organisational efficiency? There are numerous forms of both 
fixed and variable forms of pay. Fixed forms include straight hourly pay or salary pay. Variable 
pay systems may include piece rate, merit pay, individual bonuses, team bonuses or group 
incentives such as profit-sharing or share schemes. The key question addressed in this chapter 
is, in a team production setting, where work areas are interdependent on the other, what is more 
efficient - to pay only a flat rate or to pay a flat rate plus some variable component, such as team 
based pay, individual bonuses or group-based pay such as profit-sharing? Also, of these various 
forms of variable pay which one is the most efficient?
Much of the manufacturing sector has undergone production changes from hierarchical 
specialized production control to decentralized control and much more flexible operations (Piore, 
1989). This change in the production processes in the US and Western Europe may be modelled 
on the manufacturing processes in Japan (Aoki, 1988). The Japanese manufacturing process is 
characterized by ‘ Just-in-Time’ manufacturing which allows for a quick adaptation to changes in 
market demands or the production of diverse products. According to Piore, the changes in the 
manufacturing process have resulted in a change from largely independent, ‘autonomous’ work 
areas, to workplaces where there is substantial interaction and interdependence between work
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areas.
While evidence exists that performance-related pay produces better performance outcomes in 
individual economic activity, there is less evidence regarding which incentive contracts produce 
better performance outcomes in team production settings where the outcome is the result of group 
effort. Regarding the use of performance-related pay in individual production settings, recent 
work by Ferine and Metcalf (1995) on the horse racing industry examines the incentive effects 
of non-contingent retainers and performance-related pay for jockeys. They found that better 
performance was more associated with performance-related pay systems than with non-contingent 
retainers. Earlier work by Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) examining the 1984 European Men’s 
GPA tournament found similar results. While these works support the theoretical notion that pay 
based on performance has a greater incentive effect than pay based on some observable behaviour, 
such as time on the job, their work does not address the question of the optimal compensation 
outcomes in a team production setting.
The Corporate Performance data-set gives detailed information on the type and form of 
remuneration programme at the shopfloor worker level. There are advantages associated with 
examining the impact of various remuneration programmes for this group of employees because 
at this level there may be the potential for having a substantial association with the performance 
of the organisation. Shopfloor workers are in direct contact with the production process so they 
may be more likely to have an impact on performance. The sample of establishments surveyed 
are primarily team production settings where the final product is interdependent on other
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production areas.1
Using two measures of establishment financial performance, the impact fixed and various 
variable pay forms including: individual level bonuses, team bonuses, merit pay and group pay, 
are evaluated to determine the impact they have on establishment performance in team production 
settings. A restricted sample of establishments which have only a high degree of interdependent 
work areas is examined in order to determine if there is any difference in the impact of 
compensation practices on these establishments.
5.2 Theoretical and Empirical Overview
Theoretical Overview - Individual Incentive Effects
According to Lazear (1995), in order to provide optimal incentives two factors need to be taken 
into consideration when choosing how to pay people. Firstly, the remuneration programme must 
attract the right type of worker, and secondly, it must create the right incentive so the worker puts 
forth maximum effort. Lazear derives the most efficient remuneration scheme for risk neutral 
workers which consists of making them full residual claimants. This would entail having 
workers pay rent for their jobs and being entitled to all the profits associated with their work. 
However, there is a fundamental problem with making workers fully entitled to residual profits 
because it is thought that workers are risk averse. This may especially be the case in situations 
where workers do not have control over all the factors which have an impact on performance.
1 96 per cent of the establishments have some degree of interdependence, 75 per cent have a moderate 
to high degree of interdependence. An example of interdependent work areas would be represented by the 
‘Toyota Production System’, as depicted by Levine (1994) in his case study of the GM - Toyota joint venture 
plant, NUMMI. These workplaces are characterized by having ‘Just-in-Time’ production inventory, Total 
Quality Management programmes, worker control over the production process.
145
Additionally, time-based pay is a pay system based on input rather than output, so there may be 
occasions when measurement costs are so high that paying basis input (e.g. time) may be more 
efficient. There are, however, problems with paying time- or a rate-based on input, rather than 
output. Remuneration programmes which cater to risk aversion are prone to moral hazard. Moral 
hazard being the tendency for an individual to shirk their duties in so far as monitoring will allow. 
In making a choice regarding which compensation programme to use firms need to strike a 
balance between catering to the risk level of the employees and attempting to control the incentive 
diluting effects of the moral hazard problem. Additionally, an issue associated with remuneration 
programmes which cater to worker’s risk aversion is the sorting issue.
Another reason performance-based remuneration is thought to elicit superior establishment 
performance outcomes, rather than non performance-based remuneration programmes, is that 
higher ability workers may sort to firms and occupations where pay is based on performance. In 
sorting to firms which offer remuneration which is placed at risk, their higher ability levels may 
be rewarded. If higher ability workers do sort to firms where performance is rewarded the inverse 
may also apply and less able workers may sort to firms where remuneration is not placed at risk. 
While it may be true that these lesser able workers will be paid less, and there will be savings 
associated with a reduced wage bill, there may also be reduced output and poorer product quality. 
Consequently, according to Lazear (1995), it is difficult to see how remuneration strategies that 
incorporate insurance qualities constitute an optimal incentive scheme.
Additionally, firms which offer pay based on performance may have higher levels of output 
because of the increased effort workers put forth due to the motivation effects associated with 
incentives. This dynamic is largely explained in the psychological literature in expectancy theory.
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Expectancy theory would predict that as productivity-enhancing behaviours are reinforced, these 
behaviours should be observed more frequently (Locke and Latham, 1990). According to Becker 
and Hueslid (1996) the advantage this has is that the firm is in the position of dictating the 
behaviours which it sees as being important. This has the effect of assisting to resolve a 
fundamental issue within economic organisation, the principal-agent problem. The principal- 
agent problem occurs when the principal or the owner’s objectives are at odds with that of the 
agent’s or the non-owner employee. In order to bring the interests of the agent in line with those 
of the principal, the principal needs to develop incentive contracts which align the best interests 
of the principal with those of the agent. In addition to agency theory and the corresponding 
mechanism found within expectancy theory there is the additional argument put forth by 
efficiency wage theory which suggests there are efficiency effects associated with paying a higher 
than market rate. Higher wages will attract higher quality workers and will reduce turnover of 
higher ability or skilled workers due to the fact that they will not receive this wage premium in 
alternative employment and thus be loath to lose the higher paying job (Levine, 1993; Pfeffer,
1994).
Theoretical Overview - Team Incentive Effects
What, however, does theory have to say about possible outcomes in team production settings? 
Work by Kochan, Katz and Mckersie (1986) suggests that in production settings where teamwork 
is important, group incentives are important because they may promote co-operative behaviours 
which are fundamental for efficiency in team settings. Theoretical work by Drago and Tumball 
(1988) examines individual versus group piece rates in team technologies. They determine that 
in team settings individual piece rates may promote inefficient under-co-operation, while group 
piece rates may cause inefficient over-co-operation. Drago and Tumball contend that the success
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of group incentives in team settings is dependent on the success of an establishment or firm in 
eliminating or reducing the effect of the free-rider problem. As long as firms can develop a 
culture which promotes ‘inter-worker co-operation’, ‘trust’ between workers, and where workers 
reciprocate assistance or share information, group-based incentives may promote greater 
performance or output.
Another reason group-based pay may be more efficient in team settings is because monitoring 
costs may increase where this form of production process is used. A high level of 
interdependence in the production process requires the workforce to be very adaptable and multi­
skilled (Piore, 1989). Monitoring costs may be high in situations where private or asymmetric 
information exists (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) so it maybe more efficient for managers to look 
for substitutes to formal monitors, which group incentive schemes may provide (Wietzman,
1995). Piore and Sable (1984) suggest that the new skill mix associated with new technologies 
increases monitoring difficulties, which, in turn, may make group incentives efficient. This is 
supported by Drago and Heywood (1995) who found profit-sharing to be more likely where 
monitoring was more difficult.
Empirical Overview
While there has been research into many of the various forms of variable remuneration including 
piece rates (Lincoln, 1945; Shearer, 1996), merit pay (Wood, 1997), team pay (Thompson, 1995), 
profit-sharing (Weitzman and Kruse, 1990), and share ownership (Blasi, Conte and Kruse, 1996), 
there have been few studies which examine a broad range of remuneration practices and also 
identify the production process. The research which closest matches the work here is the study 
undertaken by Mitchell, Lewin and Lawler (1990), however, they do not specify what type of
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production process is present in the settings they examine. In addition to a historical and 
theoretical overview of the types and forms of variable pay systems, they also conduct an 
empirical analysis of a variety of pay systems. Using an establishment level data-set which 
contains detailed information on human resource practices, including remuneration programmes 
and establishment outcomes, they evaluate the impact of the various remuneration programmes 
on performance. They concentrate on two groups of employees, including production and clerical 
workers. In their study three measures of performance are used including return on investment 
(ROI), return on assets (ROA), and a productivity measure of net sales per employee (PROD). 
These performance measures are evaluated using both cross-sectional analysis and also growth 
trend analysis between the years 1983 - 1986. Examined is the impact of profit-sharing, gain- 
sharing, stock option plans, employee stock ownership plans and team production bonuses. The 
results of this analysis show there to be a strong positive statistically significant association for 
all the performance measures and the growth trend for profit-sharing and share ownership in both 
clerical and production employees. The cross-sectional results show the same positive association 
between profit-sharing and both clerical and production workers for all the performance measures. 
While the coefficients were positive for stock ownership the only one which was statistically 
significant was productivity for production workers.
5.3 Data and Test Variable Measurement
5.3.1 Data-Set and Establishment Characteristics
Corporate Performance Project
The Corporate Performance Project is a longitudinal research project being carried out jointly by
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the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics and the Institute of 
Work Psychology at the University of Sheffield. One of the principal aims of the project is to 
research how management practices impact upon the performance of establishments. The proj ect 
obtains information from manufacturing establishments located in the United Kingdom. The data 
was gathered using on-site structured interviews with the establishment’s human resource 
manager, plant manager, or other production manager. The financial data was collected from 
company reports contained at company house or directly from the establishments. There was a 
5 per cent participation rate of those who were contacted. This low participation rate was largely 
due to the detail of information required for the research project. The project started in 1990 and 
will be completed in the year 2000. Currently two periods of data are available. The first period 
of data collection was conducted between 1992 and 1994. The second period of collection was 
between 1994 and 1996. The database contains information on 118 establishments gathered 
during the first period, 1992 through 1994. The second period of data available for the time 
period 1995 and 1996 contains information on 60 establishments. Forty-five of the establishments 
interviewed in the first round of interviews and in the second round, 15 new establishments were 
interviewed.
The data-set contains very detailed information on the types of management practices, the 
structure of the establishment, the market they operate in, work practices and organisational 
designs, establishment performance outcomes and human resource policies and practices. 
Establishment performance outcomes include sales turnover and profitability. The questionnaire 
was designed by both economists and organisational psychologists so measures of the 
management practices are included as are establishment performance indicators. Also included 
in the data-set is information on product market, technological sophistication and management
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practices which may influence outcomes.
Establishment Characteristics
The establishments have between 60 and 1,929 employees, with an average of238 employees per 
establishment. Total turnovers in the establishments are between £15,000 and £250 million with 
an average of £18.6 million and a standard deviation of £3.3 million. Relative to other 
establishments in the manufacturing sector these establishments would be considered small to 
medium sized. Seventy per cent of the establishments are owned by a parent or holding company, 
37 per cent are Pic and 63 per cent are Ltd. Seventy nine per cent of the establishments do not 
share facilities with the parent company or share facilities to only a small degree. The 
establishments are UK manufacturing establishments in the following sectors: engineering, 45 per 
cent; electronics, 9 per cent; plastics, 24 per cent; food & drink, 7 per cent; Misc. 15 per cent.
Production Technology and Work Design
The workforce uses a fairly high level of workplace technology. In 59 of the 118 establishments 
shopfloor workers used either computer numerical control (CNC), computer aided design (CAD) 
or computer aided engineering (CAE) ‘to a very great extent*. Also, 54 per cent of these 
establishments are associated with firms which have a research and development department. 
One feature that stands out in this set of manufacturing establishments is that in the production 
process, 75 per cent of the establishments have a moderate to high degree of ‘interdependent’ 
production processes, where each area is dependent on the others in order to complete their work. 
Twenty-four per cent of the establishments have also adopted a ‘Just-in-Time’ production 
procedure.
151
Work Practice Characteristics
Team work is used in 84 per cent of the establishments. Seventy-two per cent of the 
establishments use extensive use of job rotation, and 57 per cent use an extensive amount of 
variety on the job. Ninety-one per cent of the establishments have formalized quality programmes 
and 65 per cent use quality improvement teams. In the majority of establishments there is a 
movement towards having a much more decentralized, leaner organisation. Eighty-five per cent 
of the establishments report that there has been a recent change regarding decentralized decision­
making. In 56 per cent of the establishments the management of materials and components are 
becoming decentralized to work stations/groups. Eighty two per cent of those interviewed said 
they felt there had been significant changes in the establishment over the past two years. Of those 
establishments which underwent some changes, 78 per cent thought the changes resulted in a 
flatter organisation. Seventy-eight per cent also thought workers had increased responsibilities, 
75 per cent believed there to be an increased level of employee participation from lower levels.
5.3.2 Shopfloor Remuneration Programmes and ‘Interdependent9 Work Areas
The measures used for establishment remuneration programmes are the questionnaire items found 
in exhibit 5.1 located in the appendix. T able 5.1 is a listing of the various forms of pay which are 
examined in this chapter. The two ‘ fixed’ pay elements include standard hourly pay and a ‘ salary’ 
element. While paying shopfloor workers a salary is becoming increasingly common there is 
often a provision that they receive overtime pay if they work more than contracted hours. Piece 
rates consist of being paid per item produced. Irrespective of some very well publicised plans,2
Referring to the well-documented Lincoln Electric piece rate pay plan.
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piece rate systems are on the decline in the manufacturing sector. Individual bonus and individual 
merit pay systems are more common in non-integrated production settings and occupations where 
the final product or service is easily identified with the individual responsible. While individual 
performance is normally evaluated, in a team production setting the emphasis is normally placed 
on the output of the team or the group. T eam-based pay has recently drawn considerable attention 
as have group compensation practices such as profit-sharing, gain-sharing and share ownership. 
The data-set clearly identifies team-based compensation and both profit-sharing and company 
bonuses.
The questionnaire asks to identify whether the establishment pays either profit-sharing, company 
bonus or both. In the UK there is the possibility of considerable tax advantages associated with 
profit-sharing. While we cannot tell for certain if an establishment profit-sharing plan is used to 
take advantage of the tax breaks, if they have one in place it is most likely set-up to take 
advantage of tax breaks. While the questionnaire also asks if there are any other forms of 
incentive systems in place in the establishment, the replies include such a broad range of both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentive devices that it is impossible to offer much comment on 
this variable.
Regarding determining if an establishment has a high degree of ‘interdependent’ work areas,3 
question 6, (ii) under the Production Technology section of the survey was used to determine the 
degree of interdependence. The establishment was determined to have a high degree of 
interdependence in its work practices if the question was answered with either, ‘Quite a lot’ or ‘A
3 The variable definition (links2) can be found in table 5.4 and descriptive statistics in table 5.5. The 
questionnaire item used can be found in the appendix 5.1 exhibit 5.2.
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great deal’.
Table 5.1 
Pay System Descriptions
Pay System Description
Hourly Pay: Pay fixed at a hourly rate.
Salary: Annual payment. Often for shopfloor workers there is an 
overtime provision.
Piece Rate: Pay system tied to measure day’s output
Individual Bonus Pay: Bonus tied to individual performance criteria.
Merit Pay: Individual pay based on individual merit.
Team-Based Bonus: Bonus tied to team performance criteria.
Profit-Sharing: Accounting-based profit-sharing scheme.
Company Bonus: Accounting-based company wide bonus.
Other Incentives: Includes a broad range of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
incentives. Includes incentives such as stock options, free 
gifts, time off, and other group or individual based incentives.
Table 5.2 is the frequency with which the establishments use the various forms of pay systems. 
From this table it is apparent that most establishments pay a ‘flat-time’ rate. There are only a few 
(6 per cent) establishments which pay shopfloor workers from measured output traditionally 
known as piece rates. However, there are a number of establishments which are paying their 
shopfloor workers a salary (21 per cent). This type of compensation is relatively new to 
manufacturing establishments and is often used in situations where monitoring costs are high. 
As we would expect, the majority of establishments continue to pay a flat-time rate (73 per cent). 
These three taken together represent the establishment’s ‘basic’ pay element and when added 
together total 100 per cent of the establishments.
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In addition to these basic pay components many of these establishments also pay a contingent 
element. As mentioned, most of the establishments surveyed have a production process in which 
the various work areas are dependent on one another for the final product. In these types of 
settings we would expect to see a greater degree of team- or group-based incentive schemes than 
individual-based contingent pay. This is what does occur in practice. Only 9 per cent of the 
establishments offer individual level bonuses. There is a higher level of merit pay at 13 per cent, 
and while this may mostly be associated with individual performance, it is impossible to say this 
for certain because the survey does not specify whether merit pay applies to individual, team or 
group performance. Many of the establishments pay either a team-based bonus (11 per cent), 
profit-sharing (22 per cent) or a company-wide bonus (2 per cent). Additionally, a full 27 per 
cent use some other form of incentives. As already discussed, while this is interesting, we have 
no way of knowing which establishment uses what form of incentive pay.
Table 5.2
Frequency of Remuneration Type for Shopfloor Workers in Establishments
Compensation Type Percent - Yes
Flat-Time 73
Bonus - Ind. Base 09
Bonus -Team Base 11
Merit Pay 13
Piece Rate 06
Profit-Sharing 22
Company Bonus 22
Salary 21
Other Incentives 27
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Table 5.3 is the correlation between the various remuneration programmes. There is a strong 
negative correlation between salary and flat-time rates. A firm would not pay both a flat rate and 
a salary. However, a firm may pay either a flat rate or a salary and some combination of 
contingent pay. There is a negative correlation between all other forms of remuneration, except 
merit pay and flat-time payments. The same largely holds true for those paid a salary. While 
there is a negative relationship between ‘fixed’ forms of pay, and the other contingent pay 
arrangements, this does not mean there are no firms which offer a ‘fixed’ pay element coupled 
with one or more contingent elements.
Table 5.3
Correlation Matrix of Remuneration Programmes
Flat Own Team Merit Pay Pfsh CoBn Sal Inct
Flat 1.00
Own -.24 1.00
Team .00 .04 1.00
Merit .10 .07 -.12 1.00
Pay -.04 .10 .08 .04 1.00
Pfsh -.13 -.16 -.09 .08 -.03 1.00
CoBn -.24 -.04 -.11 .15 -.05 .09 1.00
Sal -.59 -.14 .02 -.15 -.12 .04 .17 1.00
Inct -.27 -.16 -.01 .00 -.03 .22 .09 .18 1.00
(n = 168)
All correlations = > .10 are significant at the .10 level, those > =.13 at the .05 level, those = > .17 at the .01 level, 
those = >.23 at the .OOOllevel.
Flat=Hourly Pay Team=Team Bonus Inct=Other Incentives
Pay=Piece Rate Own=Individual Bonus Merit=Merit Pay
CoBn=Company Bonus Pfsh=Profit-Sharing Sal=Paid a Salary
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5.3.3 Remuneration Variable Definition
For the purposes of this evaluation, an evaluation of fixed and variable pay systems, salary or an 
hourly base rate are considered fixed pay. Consequently, I have identified those establishments 
which pay either a straight hourly rate and those which pay a salary. I have then isolated the 
establishments which pay a salary or only an hourly rate and have separated these from 
establishments which pay some form of variable pay including any combination of individual, 
team, merit, company bonus, profit-share or another form of incentive programme.
The second category includes establishments which pay either a salary or an hourly rate and any 
of the contingent pay options. While this is a broad category, and it would be possible to build 
a rational associated with the incentive and effort effects of the differing contingent pay options, 
for example, the varying incentive effect of individual versus team remuneration programmes, the 
size of the data-set does not allow me to disaggregate to this level. I am, however, able to break 
down the remuneration programme by whether or not the establishment pays a company profit- 
sharing or a company bonus.
5.3.4 Dependent Variables
Two financial measures and one measure of labour productivity are used to determine the impact 
the variables of interest and control variables have on establishment performance. Establishment 
performance measures include ROS and ROA. ROS is defined as profit before tax divided by 
total establishment sales. ROA is defined as profit before tax divided by assets. Labour 
productivity is measured as the natural logarithm of total sales adjusted for inflation and
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normalized by the number of employees.
The measure of profits before tax is: sales revenue minus cost of sales (materials, wages & 
salaries, depreciation, rent, interest payments, any exceptional/extraordinary costs (e.g. 
reorganisation costs)). In order to standardise total sales, profits and assets they have been 
deflated to base year 1990 using a deflator taken from the International Monetary Fund 
International Financial Statistics CD-Rom for UK manufacturing in 1997. Total sales profits 
and assets were deflated at the 2-digit level.
In examining the control and independent variables there is no variation in the pay practices 
between these two periods. The fact that there is no change in these practices disallows for first 
difference or change over time analysis in the panel data-set of 45. Given that there is no change 
in the practices during the two periods, it is possible to extend the data-set to include information 
on the presence of the control and independent variables in future years. That is, if the 
remuneration practice was in place during the first round of interviews in 1993 and was also in 
place in the second round of interviews in, say, 1995, I presume the practices were not 
discontinued and restarted during the one year in between, therefore, there is information on 1993 
through 1995 for that establishment. Given that in 45 of the 118 establishments there was no 
change in these practices, I also assume that the same holds true for the other establishments and 
hold constant the status of the practices in future periods (MacDuffie, 1995; Maddala, 1977). 
However, I also evaluate the impact of the pay practices without using the extended data-set.
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5.3.5 Control Variables
The quality of the workforce and skill level is controlled for by including whether the blue collar 
workforce is given multi-skill training (Multi-skill). Multi-skilling of the workforce is 
increasingly being used in establishments which are subject to product market competition and 
need considerable flexibility in the workforce. This variable may not only capture the effects of 
skill-levels but also the macro-level product market condition which the firm operates within. In 
order to control for economies and diseconomies of scale on performance I include the log of 
number of employees at the establishment (LogEstSize). In order to control for the effects of 
unionization on establishment profitability a dummy variable is included if an establishment has 
a union (Union). In order to control for the additional efficiency effects associated with a high 
level of two-way employee - management communication I include a dummy variable for those 
establishments which have a high level of two-way communication (InfoShare). To capture the 
effects of management quality, I have included a measure of whether the establishment uses a 
functionally integrated strategic planning process (Strategy). The use of the strategy variable is 
meant to directly control for one of the primary factors which the use of panel data will attribute 
for. It is not unreasonable to think that the test variables are picking up some element of 
management quality which may well attribute for some of the superior performance. That is, if 
these establishments have chosen the correct human resource practice they may well have also 
chosen the correct market, finance, and strategic planning process. The strategy variable is 
attempting to pickup the existence of other correctly chosen management practices.
In the case of the productivity measure an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function is used. 
In addition to controlling for changes in labour, and capital, industry and year effects, also
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evaluated is the impact which product market competition has on performance. According to 
Nickell et. al. (1996) product market competition is often associated with increased productivity. 
In order to control for the impact of competition on productivity a dummy variable measuring 
presence of an increasing degree of product market competition is included in regressions 
evaluating labour productivity (Industcomp).
The interviews were conducted over a five year period between 1992 and 1996. In order to 
control for any variations year dummy variables are included. To control for the effects by 
industry, sector dummies at the 2 digit level are included. The definition of the variables are 
found in table 5.5.
5.3.6 Interdependent Work Areas
This project sets out to evaluate the impact these various pay systems have on performance when 
the product produced is a result of a group or team effort. The survey questionnaire item used to 
identify if a particular establishment had a high degree of interdependence between work areas 
can be found in the appendix, exhibit 5.2.
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5.3.7 Estimation Model and Analysis Technique
The two specifications used for the Cobb-Douglas production function include the following:
(1) Perf=a + bi * PP + b2 * Competition + b3 * ln(L) + b4 * ln(K) + b5 *(industry 
dummies) + b6 * (year dummies) + e
Where Perf = ln(sales/employee)
PP = dummy variable for presence of a pay practice 
Competition = dummy variable if there is a ‘high’ degree of 
product market competition 
ln(L) = ln(number of employees) 
ln(K) = ln(assets)
e = error term assumed normally distributed i.i.d. 
a, bi = coefficients
Also evaluated is the change in performance in time (t-1). In the absence of the identification of 
a suitable instrument in order to directly control for endogeneity, an evaluation of the performance 
in an earlier time period is evaluated in order to partially control for simultaneous bias. The 
specification is the following:
(2) Perft-i = a + bi * PPt-i + b2 * Competitiont-i + b3 * ln(L)t-i + b4 * ln(K)t-i + bs 
*(industry dummies) + b6 * (year dummies) + et-i
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The fact that there is no variation in the independent variables over time rules out first difference 
which would control for fixed effects. However, in order to directly control for omitted variable 
bias, included are as broad a range of control variables as possible. The use of the OLS estimator 
will result in understated standard errors. The random effects estimator will avoid the problems 
imposed by OLS and, in addition, the use of the random effects model should control for any 
remaining unobserved heterogeneity.
In order to test for endogeneity between the independent variables and the performance measures 
one would ideally like to instrument the variables and check for reverse causality. A suitable 
instrument would be an identifiable exogenous event which would precipitate the use of the 
particular pay practice, but would have no relationship with the dependent variable. A legislative 
or tax law change influencing a firm’s or establishment’s choice of pay practice may be an 
example of a possible instrument. Unfortunately, the data-set does not contain any suitable 
instruments. Endogeneity will bias the coefficients when there is a simultaneous relationship 
between the test variable and the dependent variable. That is, more profitable establishments may 
be better able to use programmes such as profit-sharing, therefore, it will be difficult to determine 
which direction the arrow of causality is pointing. Becker and Hueslid (1996), argue that the 
alternative could also be true and firms which have lower than normal profits may also use 
contingent pay systems. In addition, prior research which has attempted to control for 
endogeneity has not found evidence of simultaneity bias (Bartel, 1994; Ichniowski, 1990). 
However, in order to partially mitigate the impact of simultaneity bias, I evaluate the dependent 
variable in time t and regress against the independent variables and controls in time t-1. If 
endogeneity poses a problem the use of lag variables may not entirely control for it, however, 
regressing the dependent variable on the independent variable from a previous time period clearly
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counters the problem of current profitability influencing the decision to use a particular set of 
practices.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics Analysis
Starting with the descriptive statistics found in table 5.6 the means for ROA and ROS are. 12 and 
.06 respectively. Multi-skilling of the workforce is quite common with 46 per cent of the 
establishments using this form of training. Multi-skilling is still relatively new and may indicate 
the skill levels of the workers are high. Sixty per cent of the workplaces are unionized but only 
21 per cent of the establishments have a ‘two-way* top - down, bottom - up communication 
system in place. There may be some relationship between the relative high level of multi-skilling 
and this lower level of two-way communication. According to Lazear (1995), in establishments 
which invest in the multi-skilling of its workforce it is less necessary for them to invest in 
communication programmes because employees have already been trained in the information they 
need making information exchange less necessary. A full 70 per cent of the workplaces engage 
in a functionally integrated strategic planning process. Apparently, a formal strategic planning 
process has become an accepted part of managing an establishment. While the incidence of the 
various forms of pay taken individually has already been discussed, the three combinations have 
not. These include PRP (establishment uses either/or ownout, teamout, merit, pfshare, co-bonus 
but does not pay daypay), Timerate (paid either a salary or a flat rate but no PRP) and Grouppay 
(uses either profit-sharing or company bonus but not daypay). We see that only about one-third 
of the establishments use some form of performance-related pay. Fifty per cent of the
163
establishments paid only a flat rate or a salary. However, it was possible to evaluate the impact 
which group incentives (excluding establishments which pay a piece rate) had on performance 
given that 23 per cent of the establishments used this form of pay.
Among the correlations between the various variables, there are strong positive and negative 
relationships. As expected, there is a strong positive relationship between ROA and ROS (.85). 
There is a negative relationship between both team- and individual-based bonuses. There is also 
a negative relationship between daypay and flat rate pay, while there is a positive relationship 
between salary and the two financial measures. There is also a strong positive relationship with 
ROA and ROS for the multi-skilling variable, and as we would expect, a negative relationship 
with unionization. These relationships between the remuneration programmes and the other 
control variables and the performance measures will be further evaluated in the regression results.
Concerning the multi-skilling variable, there is a strong negative relationship with flat rate and 
merit pay, but a positive relationship with profit-sharing. This is expected, because in a 
workplace which multi-skills its workforce you would expect to see more group rather than 
individual remuneration programmes. There is a high relationship between multi-skilling and the 
measure of a high degree of production process interdependence.
The infoshare variable attempts to measure the existence of two-way communication systems in 
the establishment. There is a relationship between the communication variable and the size of the 
establishment, which you would expect to see. That is, larger establishments may be more likely 
to have communication mechanisms in place to facilitate information flow. There is also a 
positive correlation between team-based bonuses and communication and a negative one with
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individual -based bonuses and two-way communication programmes. This may indicate the fact 
that you would expect to see a group-based pay system in a team production setting and you 
would also expect to see a greater level of communication in these team based settings.
Regarding the strategic planning variable, the larger the establishment the more likely it is to have 
a strategic planning process and a team-based incentive scheme. Also, the larger the 
establishment the greater the propensity to pay a salary and a reduced likelihood of paying a flat 
rate. There is also a relationship between team output and a company bonus. Asset size of the 
establishment is positively related to the existence of some performance related pay schemes, 
group incentive schemes and team based bonuses. There is a negative relationship with piece 
rates and flat rate pay. Finally, we see the expected relationships between the combined 
remuneration practice categories (e.g. PRP, timerate, grouppay) and the individual practices these 
categories are based on.
5.4.2 Regression Analysis
The results from the regressions are generally supportive of the premise that in team production 
settings we would expect to see higher levels of performance in organisations where there is some 
element of PRP. However, it does seem to matter what form of PRP is used; within this sample 
not all the contingent pay systems have the same effect. Considered first are return on assets in 
table 5.7: the first column (1) is a regression with test variables which include various 
combinations of the remuneration programmes; column (2) is the regression run with all the 
remuneration programmes included; column (3) is each of the remuneration programmes run 
individually in conjunction with the various control variables (given the differences in the
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coefficients and standard errors associated with each of the regressions, they are not reported in 
this column); column (4) is a restricted sample of establishments which have ‘interdependent’ 
work areas; finally, column (5) is the results of the analysis using the unextended data-set, and 
the restricted sample of ‘interdependent’ work areas.
Starting with column (1) in table 5.7 we see that there is a positive coefficient associated with 
timerate (for detailed definition of this variable see table 5.5), however, it is not statistically 
significant. Next, looking at the PRP variable, while the variable is not statistically significant 
the coefficient is negative. The reason for this will become clearer when column (2) and (3) are 
discussed. Continuing to evaluate table 5.7 column (1), in the case of the group incentives they 
are associated with 12 per cent higher return on assets. This variable includes both 
establishments which pay profit-sharing or company bonuses. Some control variables in column 
(1) are significant including the unionization variable which is negative and significant at the 05 
per cent level. This finding is in line with the results associated with unionization having a 
negative impact on profitability. We also see that the presence of multi-skilling has a positive 
significant effect on ROA and is significant at the .05 level. This result signals that there are 
efficiency effects associated with training the workforce in a variety of tasks, rather than relying 
on specialized job functions.
Column (2) is separated into various remuneration programmes in order to determine the impact 
each individual programme has on performance. It is through this exercise that it becomes 
apparent that, while pay for performance or sharing residual profits has a greater impact on 
performance, the form of PRP offered matters. With ROA there is a significant positive 
relationship associated with paying a flat rate, which is paying a straight hourly rate, as opposed
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to paying a salary or paying a piece rate. In column (3) associated with paying a piece rate 
(Daypay), the coefficient is negative. In column (2) we see paying some form of incentive 
(Incent) is associated with a 9 per cent higher return on assets. While this is of interest, there is 
no way of knowing if these incentives are pecuniary or non-pecuniary making it is impossible to 
comment on association with performance. While none are statistically significant, both ownout 
and teamout have negative coefficients. While it is not advisable to read too much into this, 
given that the coefficients are not statistical significance, the fact that all three are negative is 
somewhat telling. This may reflect the fact that either individual or small group incentive 
schemes are counter-productive in a team production setting.
Looking firstly at the profit-sharing variable there is a small positive effect associated with profit- 
sharing but it is not statistically significant. While in the case of a company-wide bonus 
(CoBonus) we see that it is statistically significant at the .05 level. The multi-skilling variable is 
again significant at the .10 level. In column (3) where each of the pay practices are run 
independently with the controls, the same results are similar to column (2), however, individual- 
based incentives are negatively and statistically significant at the .10 level and CoBonus is 
significant at the .05 level. The restricted sample of highly interdependent work areas in column 
(4) shows essentially the same result as the other columns, which is expected given almost 75 per 
cent of the establishments have a medium to high degree of interdependence in their work areas. 
The only slightly notable difference between column (4) and the other columns is that in (4) 
incentive payments have a higher coefficient and individual level incentives have a slightly higher 
negative coefficient. In column (5) we see that the results are the same as in the other regressions 
using the extended data-set, both company bonus and other incentives have a positive significant 
effect on establishment performance. This specification also uses the restricted sample of
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establishments with a moderate to high degree o f interdependence.
Looking next at table 5.8 the dependent variables in time t are regressed against independent 
variables and control variables in time t-1, in order to partially mitigate the impact of endogeneity. 
The results are essentially the same found in table 5.7. However, due to sample size (n = 50) the 
unextended data-set was not evaluated. In general, the same results are found in table 5.9 ROS 
using time t and table 5.10 using time t-1. One difference in table 5.9 compared to table 5.7 is that 
the profit-sharing variable has a greater performance effect than does the CoBonus variable. Also, 
in the unextended data-set evaluated in column (5) in table 5.9, both the Incent and CoBonus 
variables are statistically significant at .01 and .10 respectively. In table 5.9 and table 5.10 using 
ROS there is also a significant statistical association with the fixed pay system of salary. This 
form of fixed pay system may reflect an establishment’s attempt towards harmonization or an 
elimination of barriers between management and employees.
Finally, in table 5.11 the association with labour productivity is evaluated. Calculating the anti­
log it is apparent that only the incentive variable is associated with higher levels of productivity. 
We see in column one the log-point is 0.06 (5.8%) in time t for the full data-set and a log point 
of 0.13 (12.2 %) for the restricted sample of establishments where task interdependence is high. 
The coefficients are the same for the sample in which t-1 is used.
Table 5.4 is an example of two establishments, one which has chosen to put ‘progressive’ pay 
practices into place, the second has rather chosen to use a more ‘traditional’ form of pay practices. 
In establishment 1 the choice of payment systems include paying shopfloor workers a salary, team- 
based pay, a company bonus and a mix of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. Establishment
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2 has chosen to pay a flat rate, an individual-based output bonus and profit-sharing. Establishment 
1 has a 21 per cent better return on assets than does establishment 2.
While the intercept was not reported in column 5 because each reported coefficient and standard 
error is derived from independently run regressions, the approximate level was between 11 and 
12 percent. These results suggest that the establishments which do not use these payment systems 
have between 11 and 12 percent return on assets. The gains associated with the use of these 
payment systems, as detailed in this analysis, are in addition to these average levels. For example, 
comparing establishment 1 and establishment 2 to the average establishment which does not use 
these payment systems (establishment 3) would result in the following return on asset level: 
establishment 3,12%, establishment 2,7% (12% - 5%) and establishment 1,28% (12% + 16%) 
Are these levels believable? In light of the current research in the area, yes. Huselid (1995) finds 
firms which use ‘progressive* human resource practices, which include goal aligning incentive 
systems such as profit-sharing have annual sales as high as USD 100,000 per employee. 
Ichniowski et. al., (1995) finds production lines to be 7% more productive resulting in increased 
revenues of 2.5 million. The gains found in this empirical work are not out of line with the 
findings of these other researchers.
169
Table 5.4
Example of ‘Progressive’ Pay Plans versus ‘Traditional’ Pay Plans 
(Using column 5 in Table 5.7 - Return on Assets)
Establishment 1 
(Progressive Remuneration Practices)
Establishment 2 
(Traditional Remuneration Practices)
Salary
Teamout
CoBonus
Incentives
.02
-.11
.11
.14
Flat rate 
Ownout 
Pfshare
.01
-.08
.02
TOTAL .16 -.05
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has evaluated the impact which various individual and group variable pay systems 
in team production settings have on establishment performance. While there is some theoretical 
and empirical support that performance-based pay has greater performance effects than fixed pay 
in individual productions settings, there is little empirical evidence evaluating these effects in team 
settings where the work areas are ‘interdependent’ on one another.
Specifically evaluated is the impact which time-based pay schemes, individual and team incentive 
schemes and group incentive schemes have on establishment performance. The results show that 
group incentive schemes produce the greatest performance outcomes. These results remain robust
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in both time t and in time t-1 which is used to help control of the effects of endogeneity. In the 
restricted sample of only establishments which have a high degree of ‘interdependent’ work areas, 
the results remain the same. In addition, the findings indicate that individual- and team-based 
incentive programmes result in negative performance outcomes.
The findings of this work is that in work environments where the production process consists of 
‘interdependent’ work areas, group-based incentives are associated with better financial 
performance than either team, individual or merit payment systems. Also, incentives are 
associated with higher levels of productivity in these same establishments.
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Table 5.5
Variable
ROA
ROS
Salary
Flat rate
Daypay
Ownout
Teamout
Merit 
Pfsh are
CoBonus
Incent
PRP
Timerate
Grouppay
Union
Multi-skill
Variable Definition 
_______ Definition____________________________________
Pre-tax profit divided by assets.
Pre-tax profit divided by total establishment sales.
1 if the shopfloor workers are paid basis a salary, 0 otherwise.
1 if the shopfloor workers are paid basis an hourly rate, 0 
otherwise.
1 if the shopfloor workers are paid basis a piece rate programme,
0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment has an individual output based incentive 
programme, 0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment has a team based incentive programme, 0 
otherwise.
1 if the establishment has a merit based pay system, 0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment has a company profit-sharing programme,
0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment has a company bonus programme, 0 
otherwise.
1 if the establishment has another incentive programme, 0 
otherwise.
1 if the establishment has either/or ownout, teamout, merit, 
pfshare, cobonus, however, does not pay daypay, 0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment pays shopfloor workers via either a salary or 
a flatrate, however, does not use daypay or PRP, 0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment has either profit-sharing or company bonus, 
however does not pay daypay, 0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment has a union, 0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment uses multi-skill training, 0 otherwise.
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Variable Definitions cont’d
Links2
Infoshare
Strategy
IndustComp
LogEstSize
LogAssets
1 if the establishment has a high level of ‘interdependent* 
work areas, 0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment has a high level of Mgmt>Employee 
Employee>Mgmt communication, 0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment has a functionally integrated 
strategic planning process.
1 if the level of competition in the industry has increased in the 
last 5 years.
Log of the average number of employees in the given year.
Log of gross book value of depreciable assets.
Year in which interview took place and sector dummies also included in regressions.
Table 5.6
Variable Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
(Does not include correlations between remuneration practices which were reported in Table 5.3)
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. ROA .12 .14
2. ROS .06 .09 .85
3. Multi-skill .46 .50 .19 .26
4. Union .60 .46 -.15 -.15 .02
5. Infoshare .21 .41 -.02 .11 .08 .07
6. Strategy .70 .46 .01 .06 .14 -.20 -.02
7. LogEstSize 5.34 .83 .08 .08 .03 .05 .18 .05
8. LogAssets 8.77 1.8 .07 .08 .14 .02 .00 .22 .45
9. PRP .35 .47 .11 .21 .08 .02 .04 .07 .16 .21
lO.Timerate .57 .50 .09 .13 -.05 .01 .21 .05 -.02 .08 -.07
11. Grouppay .22 .41 .24 .34 .08 -.12 .00 .05 .11 .21 .75 -.02
12. Links2 .75 .44 .07 .04 .25 -.18 .02 .23 -.07 -.02 -.03 .03 .06
13. Salary .21 .41 .12 .32 .18 -.12 .12 .10 .39 .22 .16 .21 .11 .02
14. Flat rate .73 .44 -.02 -.16 -.20 .04 .05 -.06 -.33 -.18 -.20 .62 -.15 -.05
15. Daypay .06 .23 -.08 -.15 -.06 -.08 -.13 -.07 -.05 -.18 -.27 -.18 -.11 .03
16. Merit .13 .34 .03 .05 -.34 .01 -.17 -.16 -.03 -.10 .23 -.04 .22 -.19
17. Incent .27 .45 .33 .30 .12 -.16 -.03 .08 .17 .03 .07 -.10 -.05 .05
18. Teamout .11 .31 -.11 -.15 -.03 .07 .21 .21 .26 .24 .24 -.03 -.03 .05
19. Ownout .09 .28 -.17 -.19 -.07 .16 -.17 -.09 -.04 -.09 .22 -.47 .05 .18
20. CoBonus .22 .41 .24 .24 .01 -.28 -.07 -.02 .17 .10 .46 -.27 .49 .01
21. Pfshare .22 .41 .15 .22 .19 .03 -.05 -.09 .10 .25 .49 -.12 .14 .07
(n= 168)
All correlations = > .10 are significant at the .10 level, those > =13 at the .05 level, those = > .17 at the .01 level, those = >.23 at the .0001level.
174
Table 5.7
Random Effects Estimates (Return on Assets - ROA) for UK Manufacturing Establishments Shopfloor
Worker Remuneration Schemes. (Standard Errors in Parentheses.)
Variables 1 2
(t) (t)
Salary .04
Flat rate
(.05)
.08*
Daypay
Incent
(.05)
.09***
Ownout
(.04)
-.05
Teamout
(.06)
-.03
Merit
(.05)
.00
Pfshare
(.07)
.01
CoBonus
(.04)
.08*
Timerate .02
(.04)
PRP
(.04)
-.04
Grouppay
(.04)
.12***
Union
(.05)
-.06** -.02
(.03) (.03)
Multi-skill .07** .07**
(.03) (.03)
Strategy -.03 -.01
(.04) (.04)
Infoshare -.003 -.001
(.04) (.04)
LogEstSize .02 .01
(.02) (.02)
Intercept .12 .08
(.12) (.14)
R2 .22 3 2
N 166 166
3 4 5
(t) (t) (t)
.04 .03 .02
(.04) (.05) (.05)
.03 .01 .01
(.05) (.04) (.04)
-.07 -.11 -.10
(.07) (.08) (.08)
j j * * * .16*** ^14* * *
(.04) (-04) 004)
-.10* -.10 -.08
(.06) (.05) (.06)
-.05 -.07 -.11
(.05) (.06) (06)
.02 -.02 .05
(.06) (.08) (.08)
.05 .05 .02
(.04) (.05) (.05)
.10** .12** .11**
(.03) (.06) (.05)
166 132 98
Column (1), Regression includes combined pay practices + control variables.
Column (2), Regression includes all pay practices + control variables.
Column (3), Regression includes single practices + controls (controls not reported - NR).
Column (4), Restricted sample with interdependent work areas and single pay practices + controls (NR). 
Column (5), Regression uses unimputed data. Includes restricted sample of est. with interdependent 
work areas and single pay practices + controls (controls not reported).
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.
Note: Sector and year in which interview conducted dummies included in regression but not reported.
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Table 5.8
Random Effects Estimates (Return on Assets - ROA) for UK Manufacturing Establishments Shopfloor
Worker Remuneration Schemes. (Standard Errors in Parentheses.)
Variables
Salary 
Flat rate 
Daypay 
Incent 
Ownout 
Teamout 
Merit 
Pfshare 
CoBonus 
Timerate 
PRP
Grouppay 
Union 
Multi-skill 
Strategy 
Infoshare 
LogEstSize 
Intercept
R2
N
1 2 3 4
(t-1) (t-1) (t-1) (t-1)
.04 .03 .03
(.05) (.05) (.06)
.09* .01 .02
(.05) (.04) (.05)
-.07 -.09
(.03) (.09)
.10*** .12*** ^17***
(.04) (.04) (.05)
-.01 -.05 -.11
- (.06) (.06) (.07)
-.06 -.08 -.09
(.05) (.05) (.07)
-.00 .01 .02
(.07) (.06) (.09)
.01 .05 .07
(.04) (.04) (.05)
.09** .08* .14**
(.05) (.05) (.07)
.04*
(.04)
-.04
(.04)
14***
(.04)
-.06* -.02
(.03) (.03)
Qg*** .07**
(.03) (.03)
-.04 -.03
(.03) (.04)
.02 .02
(.04) (.04)
.02 .02
(.02) (.03)
.01 -.01
(.12) (.15)
.28 .33
134 134 134 106
Column (1), Regression includes combined pay practice + control variables.
Column (2), Regression includes all pay practices + control variables.
Column (3), Regression includes single pay practices + controls (controls not reported).
Column (4), Regression includes restricted sample of establishments with interdependent 
work areas and single pay practices + controls (controls not reported).
^Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.
Note: Sector and year in which interview conducted dummies included in regression but not reported.
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Table 5.9
Random Effects Estimates (Return on Sales - ROS) in UK Manufacturing Establishments for Shopfloor
Worker Remuneration Schemes. (Standard Errors in Parentheses.)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5
(t) (t) (t) (t) (t)
Salary .04** .04*** .05** .04**
(.02) (.02) (.02) (02)
Flat rate .02 -.02 -.01 .02
(.02) (.01) (.00) (.02)
Daypay -.03 -.05 -.04
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Incent .03* .03** .06*** .06***
(.02) (.01) (.02) (.02)
Ownout -.01 -.04* -.05 -.03
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03)
Teamout -.02 -.03 -.04 -.05
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03)
Merit -.02 .03 .05 .05
(.03) (.02) (.04) (.03)
Pfshare ------- .02 .03** .05** .03
(.01) (.02) (.02) ( 02)
CoBonus .02 .04** .03 .04*
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Timerate .01
(.02)
PRP -.01
(.02)
Grouppay .04**
(.02)
Union -.02 -.01
(.01) (.01)
Multi-skill .03** .03**
(.01) (.01)
Strategy -.01 -.001
(.01) (.01)
Infoshare .01 -.01
(.01) (.02)
LogEstSize .01 .00
(.01) (.01)
Intercept .03 .05
(.05) (.06)
R2 .28 .33
N 166 166 166 132 98
Column (1), Regression includes combined pay practice + control variables.
Column (2), Regression includes all pay practices + control variables.
Column (3), Regression includes single pay practices + controls (controls not reported).
Column (4), Restricted sample of est. with interdep. areas and single pay practices + controls.
Column (5), Regression uses ‘ unimputed’ data (controls not reported).
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.
Note: Sector and year in which interview conducted dummies included in regression but not reported.
177
Table 5.10
Random Effects Estimates (Return on Sales - ROS) in UK Manufacturing Establishments for Shopfloor
Worker Remuneration Schemes. (Standard Errors in Parentheses.)
Variables 1 2 3 4
(t-1) (t-1) (t-1) (t-1)
Salary .05** .04*** .04
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Flat rate .02 .00 -.00
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Daypay -.04 -.05
(.03) (.03)
Incent .03* .03*** .06***
(.02) (.01) (.02)
Ownout -.01 -.04* -.02
(.03) (.02) (.03)
Teamout -.02 -.03* -.04
(.02) (.02) (.03)
Merit .02 .03 .04
(.03) (.02) (.04)
Pfshare .02 .03* .04**
(.02) (.01) (.02)
CoBonus .02 .02* .03
(.02) (.02) (.02)
Timerate .03*
(.01)
PRP -.01
(.02)
Grouppay .05** -------
(.02)
Union -.01 .00
(.01) (.01)
Multi-skill .03*** .03**
(.01) (.01)
Strategy -.01 .00 -------
(.01) (.02)
Infoshare .01 -.01
(.02) (.02)
LogEstSize .00 -.01
(.01) (.01)
Intercept .02 .05
(.05) (.06)
R2 .28 3 4
N 134 134 134 106
Column (1), Regression includes combined pay practice + control variables.
Column (2), Regression includes all pay practices + control variables.
Column (3), Regression includes single pay practices + controls (controls not reported).
Column (4), Regression includes restricted sample of establishments with highly interdependent 
work areas and single pay practices + controls (controls not reported).
^Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.
Note: Sector and year in which interview conducted dummies included in regression but not reported.
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Table 5.11
Random Effects Estimates for Labour Productivity (LogSales/EE) in UK Manufacturing Establishments
for Shopfloor Worker Remuneration Schemes.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses.)
Variables 1 2 3 4
(t) (t) (t-1) (t-1)
Salary .06 .06 .06 .05
(.04) (.06) (.05) (06)
Flatrate .07 .11 .06 .11
Daypay
(.04) (.05) (.05) (.06)
Incent .06* .13*** .06 .13**
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.06)
Ownout .09 .11* .08 .11
(.06) (.07) (.06) (.07)
Teamout -.08 -.06 -.09 -.08
(.05) (.07) (.06) (.07)
Merit -.05 -.02 -.05 -.04
(.05) (.07) (.05) (.09)
Pfshare .02 .00 .02 .00
(.03) (.05) (.04) (.05)
CoBonus .04 -.04 .05 -.03
(.03) (.06) (.04) (.06)
LogAsstEE .05 .02 .05 .02
(.03) (.03) (.05) (.05)
LogEstSize _ 24*** -.15*** -.15*** -.15***
(.02) (.03) (.02) (.03)
IndustComp .02 .05 .02 .04
(.03) ‘ * (.05) (.04) (.05)
Intercept 2.36*** 2.43*** 236*** 2.43***
(.15) (.17) (.18) (.21)
R2 .59 .53 .55 .51
N 181 132 139 103
Column (1), Regression in time t.
Column (2), Regression in time t for restricted sample of ‘team production’ settings.
Column (3 ),Regression in time t - 1 .
Column (4), Regression in time t -1  for restricted sample of ‘team production’ settings.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.
Note: Sector and year in which interview conducted dummies included in regression but not reported.
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5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Questionnaire Items
Exhibit 5.1 
Pay Systems Questionnaire Item
J. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
8. Reward
(ii) On what basis are shopfloor workers paid? (tick all those that apply)
a. Flat time rate
b. Output incentive/bonus (individual)
c. Output incentive/bonus (team)
d. Merit rating
e. Measured day work
f. Company profit share
g- Company bonus
h. Salaried
(iv) Are there any other incentive schemes in the company?
Yes [ ]
No [ ]
Exhibit 5.2
Work Area Interdependence Questionnaire Item
F. PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY
6. Interdependence
(ii) For your principal product group, to what extent are different parts of the 
process interdependent?
Not at all A little A moderate amount Quite a lot A great deal
1 2 3 4 5
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5.6.2 Control Variables
Exhibit 5.3 
Control Variable Questionnaire Items
InfoShare:
Est_Size:
Definition and Measurement Means:
Infoshare: (Infoshare) Defined as the presence of two-way
communication within the Establishment.
Measurement: Establishment is considered to have an element of 
two-way information sharing if it has a 
suggestion plan in place and also meets at least 
monthly with Shopfloor workers.
Questionnaire Items: N. Research and Development
7. Communication
How often are there:
(ii) written/verbal briefing on company 
performance or other company issues to 
management?
never/daily/weekly(bi)/monthly(bi)/quart/6mos
/annual
10. Does the company have any schemes for 
promoting 
innovation (eg a suggestion scheme)?
(i) Yes [ ]
(ii) No [ j
Definition and Measurement Means:
Est_Size: (Est Size) Total number of employees in the
Establishment.
Measurement: Number of employees in the year of the 
interview.
Questionnaire Item: B. Organisational Overview
5. Organisational Details (Business Unit)
(ii) Current number of employees
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Assets: Definition and Measurement Means:
Union:
Multi-Skill:
Asset/EE: (Asset/EE) Measure of Capital
Intensity.
Measurement: Gross book value of depreciable assets/
# of employees.
Definition and Measurement Means:
Union: (Union) Whether or not the
Establishment is Unionized.
Measurement: Dummy variable if the Establishment
has a Union.
Questionnaire Item: K. Industrial Relations
1. Is the company unionized?
Yes [ ]
No [ ]
Definition and Measurement Means:
Multi-Skill: (MultiSkill) Whether shopfloor workers 
are multi-skilled.
Measurement: Dummy variable if the establishment has a
considerable multi-skilling or is fully 
multi-skilled.
Questionnaire Item: G. Work design
4. Are they (blue collar workers) predominantly 
single or multi-skilled?
[ ] Considerable multi-skilling
[ ] Fully multi-skilled
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Industry: Definition and Measurement Means:
Year:
Strategy:
Industry: (Industry) The principal business activity
of the Establishment.
Measurement: SIC code
Questionnaire Item: B. Organisational Overview 
3. Business of Unit
In this business unit, what are the main product 
groups?
SIC
Definition and Measurement Means:
Year: (Year) The year the establishment was founded.
Questionnaire Item: B. Organisational Overview
5. Organisational Details (Business Unit) 
(i) When founded (year)
Definition and Measurement Means
Strategy: (Strategy) Defined as the presence of a business
planning process which is integrated with the 
firm’s various functional departments.
Measurement: Establishment is considered to have an 
integrated strategic planning process if 
the establishment has a formal plan and 
at least most of the functions are covered 
in the plan.
Questionnaire Items: E. Competitive Strategies
7. Strategic Planning
(i) Do you have a strategic plan?
(iii) Which of the functions are covered
by these plans?
Some [ ]
Most [ ]
All [ ]
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Incompet: Definition and Measurement Means
Incompet:
Measurement:
Questionnaire Items:
(Incompet)
Establishment is considered to have a high level 
of competition in the industry if the competition 
has increased in the last 5 years.
D. Market Environment
2. Competitors
(vi) In the last 5 years, has the level of
competition in the industry
increased [ ]
stayed the same [ ]
decreased [ ]
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Chapter 6
Independent and Interactive Effects of Shopfloor Worker Decentralized Decision-
Making and Group Incentive Schemes
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we saw that ‘co-operative’ incentives systems were more effective in team 
production settings than ‘competitive’ or tournament pay systems. There is, however, still a 
problem with ‘group’ incentive schemes which is the ‘free-rider’ or 1/n problem. As the number 
of employees or the size of n increases it becomes increasingly difficult to see how any one 
individual’s effort affects share price or profitability. As mentioned in the theoretical section and 
again in the case study in Chapter 4, Weitzman (1995) suggests that in order to help address the 
effects of the free-rider problem, a ‘co-operative’ culture needs to be developed. This is further 
supported by Drago and Turnbull (1988), as mentioned in Chapter 5, who contend that group 
incentives are more likely to be effective in settings where an organisational culture which 
promotes trust and co-operation. In this chapter, the impact which group incentives have on 
establishments when used independently, establishments which use practices which may help 
develop a ‘co-operative culture’ which places a high degree of ‘trust’ in employees, and those 
establishments which have both group incentives and a co-operative or ‘trusting’ culture are 
evaluated.
Organisations are increasingly using employee involvement programmes and financial 
participation programmes which share a firm’s profits in the form of dispersing shares or profit- 
sharing. There is also increasing research into which of these types of financial participation are
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associated with the greatest performance outcomes (Cooke, 1994; Femie and Metcalf, 1995). 
Researching the impact of these practices in combination is well warranted because economic and 
psychological theory support the fact that much of the gains associated with the use of these 
combined practices are due to those with the greatest job knowledge having the incentive and 
authority to act on their superior knowledge (Levine and Tyson, 1990). The questions evaluated 
in this chapter include: is it advantageous for firms to use participation programmes such as 
participation in decision-making, two-way information sharing and financial participation such 
as profit-sharing? If so, where do the performance effects actually lie?; are they associated with 
participation in decisions, financial participation or the combination of the two?
I start with an overview of some of the theoretical considerations and previous empirical work on 
employee involvement and group incentives used independently and interactively. Following this 
is the evaluation of the impact that employee involvement, (focussing on information sharing and 
decentralized decision-making), has on firm performance. Next, an evaluation of the impact of 
the independent and interactive effects of a high level of shopfloor worker decentralized decision­
making and group incentives, on establishment performance, is conducted. In addition, while the 
majority of the establishments have an ‘interdependent’ team production process, a restricted 
sample of establishments which have a high degree of work area interdependence is examined.
6.2 Theoretical and Empirical Overview
6.2.1 Control and Return Rights: Incentive Contracts, Asymmetric Information
and Rights of Ownership
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Incentive contract theory asks the fundamental questions which are addressed in this chapter. 
Why do employees work hard when their work can not be perfectly monitored, and how can they 
be motivated to provide productivity enhancing ideas when they have knowledge of the production 
process which management does not have (Lazear, 1986)? There are an infinite number of 
different forms and types of incentive contracts which employers can choose from and some have 
more efficient outcomes than others. One of the primary reasons these incentive contracts are 
necessary is because employees have access to productivity-enhancing information. These 
questions of how to most effectively monitor and motivate employees are especially pertinent now 
because of the greater levels of private information which reside with employees (Levine and 
Tyson, 1990). It has long been recognized that information asymmetries exist in organisations and 
employees have private information from which management could benefit. Given the increasing 
educational attainment, more company training and information technology, greater amounts of 
private information may reside with employees, so it maybe advantageous for firms to gain access 
to this information.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) indicate that the concept of ownership, combined with statutory 
property rights are the fundamental means to provide an incentive to create and develop an asset. 
The two fundamental aspects of ownership include: firstly, the rights of ‘residual rights of 
control’, which is the right to make decisions concerning the use of an asset; secondly, the right 
to ‘residual returns’ which is the right to revenues left over after all obligations have been met. 
According to Milgrom and Roberts it is the combination of these two rights which provides the 
individual incentive effects of ownership. The combination is seen to be the most powerful 
incentive due to the fact that the person making the decision bears the financial results of their 
decision. Milgrom and Roberts also state that these effects are most efficient when these property
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rights are ‘transferable’, or are able to be assigned to the person who is best suited to be in charge. 
Further developing the notion of sharing the rights of ownership are Ben-Ner and Jones (1995). 
Ben-Ner and Jones develop a theoretical framework which combines these two aspects of 
ownership, control and return, and suggest possible firm performance outcomes associated with 
transferring these rights from owners to non-owner employees.1 They contend that the greatest 
efficiency outcomes exist when both these rights are transferred from owners to non-owners.
6.2.2 Control Rights - Employee Involvement: Two-way Communication and
Decentralization of Job Tasks
Employers are increasingly attempting to access potentially productivity-enhancing information 
which resides with employees. There has been a broad variety of different employee participation 
and involvement programmes put in place by employers primarily to obtain this information. The 
intent of quality circles, information-sharing meetings, teams, employee involvement and 
participation programmes has, at least partially, been to access the information which exists with 
employees (Wagner, 1994). Two practices in particular which attempt to gain access to the 
information to which employees have access to are the decentralization of decisions and 
mechanisms such as meetings or information-sharing sessions, designed to either convey 
information about the state of the business or to access useful information which employees may 
possess. In particular, there has recently been a focus on pushing decisions down to lower levels 
in the organisation. These efforts are associated with the belief that there are decisions and tasks 
which employees are in a better position to make than those further up in the organisation.
1 For a more complete explanation regarding the hypothesised productivity effects of control and return 
rights see Ben-Ner and Jones, IR (1995).
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In both economic and psychological theory there is some support for the use of employee 
involvement, especially in situations of asymmetric or private information. One of the primary 
benefits associated with the use of employee involvement programmes is that employees have 
access to information and knowledge from which management could benefit (Levine and Tyson, 
1990). Psychological theory describes another mechanism associated with the productivity effects 
of participation; the impact of participation and involvement on individual motivation and, 
correspondingly, on individual effort. The theoretical view is associated with the psychological 
theory - affective theory. Affective theory states that being able to participate in the work process 
would appeal to an individual’s higher order needs, which in turn will lead to greater work 
satisfaction. In so far as work satisfaction has a positive impact on effort, greater satisfaction may 
translate into greater productivity (Miller and Monge, 1986). A further reason why it is thought 
that employee involvement has an impact on establishment performance is that there are 
organisational structural changes which occur in a participatory environment which promote cost 
savings to the establishment. Participation is thought to promote mutual monitoring (Bradley and 
Gleb, 1981) which may result in reduced direct costs associated with less need for supervisors to 
act as monitors.
However, it is thought that there may be problems associated with using a high degree of 
employee involvement without any incentives. In situations where employees have a high degree 
of control over their work or involvement in, for example, how their work is carried out, without 
incentives, there is the opportunity for moral hazard. Moral hazard or self-interested misbehaviour 
is the potential to shirk duties or responsibilities in so far as monitoring will allow (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). In a situation where employees have either control over the job task or are highly 
involved in the work process, they may be in a position where they can reduce effort, thus not
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achieving optimal performance.
The majority of research into worker participation has been within the very broad area of 
‘ employee participation*. This concept encompasses practices ranging from ornamental employee 
advisory committees, with employees only able to make suggestions, to initiatives which give 
employees primary control over the work process and many of the decisions which are made 
regarding how the work is carried out. In previous research, the typical means of measuring 
whether a firm or establishment does have employee participation programmes or processes is to 
ask whether quality circles, advisory committees or employee involvement initiatives exist. At 
the firm level this type of question tells us very little, and depending on measures used, could tell 
us very little at the establishment level.
While some of the empirical evidence is mixed in relation to the performance effects of employee 
involvement, the majority of the evidence shows there is a positive association between employee 
involvement and company performance. Berman and Berman (1989) found there was a significant 
negative relationship between employee involvement and their measure of productivity. Levine 
and Tyson (1990) found there to be mixed effects associated with employee involvement, largely 
dependent on the form of employee involvement used. They found participation to be more 
effective in settings where incentives were included, and the type of participation was substantive. 
In a meta-study of 43 research articles Doucouliagos (1995) found that participation was overall 
associated with greater performance in all cases except co-determination, where there was a 
negative association with performance.
190
6.2.3 Return Rights - Group Incentives
The overall theoretical argument associated with an increase in productivity linked to profit- 
sharing is largely due to increased efficiency associated with the use of labour (Bhargava, 1994; 
Fitzroy and Kraft, 1986, 1987; Wietzman and Kruse, 1990). The rationale used to support the 
potential productivity effects of profit-sharing is that the increase in effort, including greater 
opportunity to act on asymmetric information, increased co-operation among workers, and that 
more peer monitoring may result in a greater level of productivity in profit-sharing firms.
Much of the theorised increased productivity effects associated with group incentive schemes 
concerns the fact that employees in profit-sharing firms have a greater level of motivation and 
exhibit a higher level of effort (Bhargava, 1993,1994; Cable and Wilson, 1990; Wadhawani and 
Wall, 1990). Group incentives are here meant to include practices such as profit-sharing or 
company-wide bonuses. Regarding the positive effects of these incentives, the work of Weitzman 
(1988, 1990) and Kruse (1988, 1993) has drawn substantial attention to the productivity and 
employment effects of group incentive schemes or profit-sharing. The positive productivity 
effects associated with these group incentive schemes are primarily due to employees aligning 
their efforts2 in a direction which maximizes profits. Other positive influences include the fact 
that there should be a higher degree of mutual monitoring which will reduce the need for 
supervisory control and associated costs.
There are, however, arguments against any productivity effects associated with group incentive
See Lazear (1995) for support of the contention that making employees full residual claimants is the most 
efficient incentive contract.
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schemes such as profit-sharing and company bonuses. One of the strongest charges against the 
productivity-enhancing effects of group-based incentive scheme is the free-rider or 1/n problem. 
In addition to the free-rider problem there is also the fact that many employees may be averse to 
increasing the amount of compensation which they have at risk. The firm may be in a better 
positionto absorb any risk associated with outside factors affecting remuneration.3 The free-rider 
problem has been dealt with largely by relying on arguments taken from game theory (Weitzman 
and Kruse, 1990). The argument states that there is a co-operative and non-co-operative solution 
associated with group interactions. As people engage in a repeated game they have a choice to 
‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others or to work together. In the matter of profit-sharing it is the case 
that when everyone works together everyone will be better off. Consequently, as the game is 
repeated those involved may eventually move towards a co-operative solution.
Weitzman (1995) points out that for profit-sharing to work there needs to be something else 
present. He states that there needs to be something akin to ‘company spirit’; this is needed to 
reduce the negative effects associated with the free-rider problem. In their theoretical work Drago 
and Turnbull (1988) determine that group incentives are more efficient than individual incentives 
in team production settings, provided a climate of ‘trust’ and co-operation is developed. It may 
be that a high degree of employee involvement and decentralization is a signal to workers which 
promotes an environment of trust and a co-operative culture. This view is supported by a number 
of theorists including: Kandal and Lazear (1992); Weitzman and Kruse (1990); Drago and 
Turnbull (1988). The rationale being that in settings where it is difficult to monitor effort or
While the free-rider problem recognizes the fact that there is a reduction in the incentive effects as 
you increase n, this also implies that as n increases the aversion associated with risk bearing is also diluted. 
However, in either case there is a recognition that there is an incentive effect associated with some compensation 
being at risk. The incentive effects of compensation at risk are supported by Femie and Metcalf (1996).
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output, workers need to feel sufficiently guilty about letting down their peers so that this will 
prevent them from shirking their duties. According to Lazear (1995), those firms which invest 
in developing bonds between workers are those which should have profit-sharing.
There are, however, problems when return rights are used in isolation. According to Ben-Ner and 
Jones (1995), in the case of only return rights, economic theory states that if residual returns are 
going to employees there maybe less incentive for owners and their agents to direct and control 
employees in a way which positively impacts establishment performance. While employees 
motivated by financial incentives may exert more effort, productivity depends on how well 
management can direct these efforts. Return rights in themselves may have a positive impact on 
structural variables, which may in turn positively impact co-operation among individuals and 
various parts of the organisation. This would take place because there is a greater alignment of 
objectives which could, therefore, generate an incentive to maximize firm performance. There 
is, however, the issue that as profits are shared more generally with employees there will be less 
incentive for owners and their agents to direct and monitor the work of employees.
The empirical evidence in the UK on the effects of group incentives on firm profitability is small. 
Bhargava (1994) using a panel data-set which allows a robust control for firm fixed effects and 
allows an examination of the introduction of a profit-sharing plan on profitability, finds there to 
be a positive effect of profit-sharing on the profitability of the firm. The result remains robust 
even after controlling for potential endogeneity. Estrin and Wilson (1986) and Cable and Wilson 
(1989) find that the average rate of return on capital is higher in profit-sharing firms than non­
profit sharing firms. Using share price as a proxy for profitability, Richardson and Nejad (1986) 
find there to be a positive association with profit-sharing.
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6.2.4 Combination of Work Task Control and Group Incentive Schemes
In a situation where control and return rights are combined the interests of the principal and their 
agents may be more closely aligned. Combining the claim to residual profits with control over 
work processes creates an environment in which employees have the authority to use their superior 
job knowledge to enhance efficiency, as well as the incentive to ensure they align their efforts with 
the best interests of the establishment. Through combining group incentive schemes and worker 
control over the work process both the moral hazard and, to a degree, the free-rider problem are 
addressed. By combining both of these practices, those with the greatest job information and who 
are in the best position to make efficiency-enhancing job changes, are provided with the incentive 
necessary to improve establishment performance. The combination of these practices reduces the 
moral hazard problem due to the fact that people now have the incentive necessary to minimize 
employee shirking.
There is additional support for the combined use of these two practices taken from psychological 
theory. While there may be some effect on effort associated with workers increasing their 
involvement and participating, without any incentives, these effects may not be as pronounced. 
Incentives would serve to align the interests of owners and employees so employees* efforts 
would be in a direction which would maximize the profits of the firm. If these incentives are 
absent, employees would be more likely to engage in shirking, especially in a situation where they 
have considerable control or involvement in the work process. The missing link is found in the 
psychological theory - expectancy theory. Expectancy theory asks the question "what’s in it for 
me? ” and gives a psychological framework for ensuring that employees are presented with 
incentives to perform their jobs in a way which aligns their interests with those of the firm.
There are a number of studies which explore the relationship between combining control and 
return rights and the impact they have on organisational outcomes. Conte and Svejnar (1988) find 
that employee participation (EP) and profit-sharing had significant effects both independently and 
combined. Mitchell et al. (1990) found that employee participation and group-based incentives 
were significant independently but not combined. Kruse (1993) found positive effects of profit- 
sharing but no combined effects or independent effects of EP. Cooke (1994) found that the 
combination of EP and group-based compensation schemes had fairly substantial effects on firm 
performance. These effects were also considerably amplified in unionized firms. Femie and 
Metcalf (1995) found that workplaces with employee involvement characteristics, such as 
employee-management communication channels and the presence of incentive schemes, had 
higher productivity than other types of workplaces.
6.3 Data and Test Variable Measurement
6.3.1 Data-Set and Establishment Characteristics (See Chapter 5 - 5.3.1)
6.3.2 Test Variables
6.3.2.1 Task Control and Two-Way Information Sharing
By looking at the frequency of replies to question 4, Centralization, it is possible to identify one 
high employee control variable, question 14. Exhibit 6.1, found in the appendix, is the question 
used to determine whether, and to what extent, shopfloor workers have control over job tasks. The 
frequencies are determined using the first round of interviews conducted between 1992 and 1994.
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The establishment is considered to have a high degree of two-way communication if it has a 
suggestion plan in place and also if management meet a minimum of once per week with 
shopfloor workers (exhibit 6.2 in the appendix).
Table 6.1 is the frequency distribution in which operators have control or authority to act on their 
own information without having to wait for authorization from above. Initially checking to verify 
that all the establishments do actually have operators, which they do, we see that only in question 
14, relating to quality, do a reasonable amount of establishments allow shopfloor workers the 
authority to act without having to wait for authorization. As covered in Chapter 5,85 per cent of 
those interviewed believed their establishment had undergone a change towards greater 
decentralization of decision-making. It is clear from table 6.1 that they still have some way to go. 
There may be a number of reasons for this, including the possibility that additional training costs 
may make it costly to efficiently transfer these decisions to front-line employees. It may also be 
that managers have greater analytical abilities which allow them to make better decisions or that 
some decisions are most efficiently made by management and others by line workers. The data 
allows us to test to see who is in a better position to make decisions regarding product quality.
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Table 6.1
Frequency Distribution for Operator having 
Authority to take Action without Waiting for Authorization from Above
Question Percent
Centrll - Operator 0
Centrl2 - Operator 2
Centrl3 - Operator 1
Centrl4 - Operator 1.1
Centrl5 - Operator 2.1
CentrI6 - Operator 5.5
Centrl7 - Operator 0
Centrl8 - Operator 1.8
Centrl9 - Operator 2
CentrllO - Operator 0
Centrll 1 > Operator .90
Centrll2 - Operator 0
Centrll 3 - Operator 72
Centrll4 - Operator 53.5
6.3.2.2 Measurement of Task Involvement/Responsibility and Group Incentives
According to Levine and Tyson (1990), there are three predominate types of participation 
including: Representative, Consultative and Substantive. Representative participation would 
include participation which consists of employees serving on boards or some other formal 
representation in which employees are able to express their views. The second type of 
participation is consultative, which is similar to representative in that employees are given the 
opportunity to give input into the work process, though not through formal means such as boards. 
The final type of participation is substantive, which is similar to consultative, however, there is 
a difference in degree. In substantive participation, employees are more likely to have control over
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the work process and able to have a direct impact on their work life. Decentralizing control over 
tasks associated with quality, may be a good example of ‘substantive’ participation.
Given that there is limited actual control given to front-line employees, a second questionnaire 
question is used to evaluate the level of involvement employees have in various tasks. The 
question used is found in section G, Work Design (exhibit 6.3 in the appendix). Three types of 
involvement and responsibility are identified: these are labelled after their fundamental emphasis - 
type 1 is labelled {Quality), type 2 is labelled (Set-Up), type 3 is called (Maintenance).5
In order to further strengthen the legitimacy of this measure of employee involvement I evaluate 
how well the quality ‘involvement* measure is correlated with the more concrete measure of 
employee quality ‘control*. There is a .82 correlation between the establishments which allow 
shopfloor worker’s control over quality issues and those who have a high degree of employee 
involvement in quality related issues. This fact strengthens the validity of both measures of 
involvement and also gives support to the legitimacy of the other measures of employee 
involvement. The questionnaire item used for group incentive schemes is found in the appendix, 
exhibit 6.4. If the establishment pays a profit-sharing or company bonus payment (question f. or 
g.) the establishment is considered to have a group incentive scheme.
5 More detail on the definition and development of this variable is found in exhibit 6.5 in the appendix.
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6.3.2.3 Dependent Variables, Estimation Model and Analysis Technique and Control
Variables (See Chapter 5 - 5.3.4, 5.3.5, 5.3.6)
The two specifications used for the Cobb-Douglas production function include the following:
(1) Perf=a + bi * HR + b2 * Competition + b3 * ln(L) + b4 * ln(K) + bs *(industry 
dummies) + b6 * (year dummies) + e
Where Perf = ln(sales/employee)
HR = dummy variable for employee involvement or group incentives . 
or the interaction of the two
Competition = dummy variable if there is a ‘high’ degree of 
product market competition 
ln(L) = ln(number of employees) 
ln(K) = ln(assets)
e = error term assumed normally distributed i.i.d. 
a, bi = coefficients
Also evaluated is the change in performance in time (t-1). The specification is the following:
(2) Perft-i = a + bi * HRt-i + b2 * Competitiont-i + b3 * ln(L)t-i + b4 * ln(K)t-i + bs 
*(industry dummies) + b6 * (year dummies) + et-i
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6.4 Results
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistic and Correlation Analysis
6.4.1.1 Decentralized Decision-Making and Employee Involvement - Correlations
Variable definitions can be found in table 6.3. In table 6.2, a number of statistically significant 
correlations are identified. The financial measures will be more thoroughly dealt with when 
discussing the regression analysis. Starting firstly with the multi-skilling variable, we see that 
there is a negative relationship with unionization and a strong positive relationship with the two- 
way communication variable. Given union bias towards specialization and formalized job 
structures this is not unexpected. It is also not surprising that we would find (.23) a strong 
relationship between multi-skilling and two-way communication. Firms which invest in training 
that gives its workforce a high level of discretion over the work process would be expected to have 
communication mechanisms in place either to monitor or direct the work of employees. With 
unionization there is a strong negative relationship (-.16) with the existence of an integrated 
strategic planning process.
There is a strong positive effect associated with unionization and the size of the establishment 
(. 17) and the presence of a union and the involvement of employees in the work process associated 
with machine set-up (.18). It is well documented that larger establishments tend to be unionized 
and we would expect more vertical integration of tasks in a unionized establishment. It is not 
surprising to find a relationship between a strategic planning process and a formal communication 
process (.12). There is also a strong relationship between a formal communication process and
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control over quality issues (.19). This may reflect the fact that both are associated with the 
existence of, for example, a formal quality initiative such as TQM. There is a strong result 
associated with the strategy variable, including a positive relationship with both the size of the 
establishment (.11) and asset per employee (.21). The conclusion drawn from this is that larger 
facilities are more prone to use a formal planning process.
There are somewhat contradictory findings associated with the various task involvement and a 
formal planning process. There is a significant negative relationship for task control for quality 
(-.15), involvement in quality (-.11) and involvement in the order of tasks (-.16). There is, 
however, a positive relationship with involvement in maintaining machines (.16) and for those 
establishments which have an overall high degree of employee task involvement (.12). 
Apparently, there is a relationship between establishments that have strategic planning processes 
and overall involvement but not certain specific tasks. Regarding the relationship to the size of 
the establishment, there is a strong positive relationship with assets (.42), which we would expect, 
however, a strong negative association with all the task control and involvement variables. We 
see an identical relationship with the size of the assets and the establishment. Apparently, smaller 
establishments are more likely to use various types of involvement and employee control over the 
work process. Finally, as we expect, we see a strong positive relationships between the various 
types of involvement with one another.
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Table 6.2
Correlations Matrix
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. ROA
2. ROS .55
3. MultSkill .16 -.02
4. Union .17 -.12 -.10
5. InfoShare .01 .00 .23 -.06
6. Strategy .02 .09 .07 .16 .12
7. LogEstSize .03 .04 -.13 .17 .07 .11
8. LogAssts .04 .01 .04 .05 -.01 .21 .42
9. QrtlQual -.02 .10 .06 .08 .19 .15 -.17 -.13
10. InvQual -.03 -.10 .05 .04 .09 .11 -.19 -.18 .60
11. InvMain
r-©r -.06 .12 .07 .00 .16 -.15 -.16 .06 .12
12. InvSetup -.06 -.14 .11 .18 .04 -.16 -.23 -.26 .20 .20 .33
(n = 181)
All correlations = > .10 are significant at the .10 level, those > =.12 at the .05 level, those = 
> .16 at the .01 level, those = >.23 at the .0001 level.
6.4.1.2 Means - Employee Involvement
In table 6.4 we see that the descriptive statistics reveal that, nearly all the establishments which
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have a high level of decision-making and involvement, but do not include incentives, also have 
less than average ROA and ROS. With the exception of those establishments that have a high 
degree of employee involvement in maintenance issues, which may reflect the smaller sample size, 
the high involvement, but no incentive establishments, have less strategic planning going on than 
the average establishment. Researchers often assume that involvement practices are normally part 
of a larger set of ‘progressive* practices which would normally include a strategic planning 
process. It appears from this sample that is not necessarily the case.
These establishments use a greater amount of formal two-way communication devices than the 
average establishment. This is expected, given that we would expect management to want to keep 
informed about the types of actions which employees are taking. In general, these establishments 
are also more likely to be unionized. This higher level of unionization in high involvement 
establishments may reflect the greater level of representation found in unionized firms. As we 
would expect, establishments which have a greater degree of participation also conduct more 
multi-skilling than the average establishment. If employees are going to be given an increased 
level of responsibility and involvement in work tasks we would expect them to receive a greater 
level of multi-skilled training. These establishments are slightly smaller than the average 
establishment and on average have a smaller amount of assets. Finally, it appears engineering 
firms are more likely to use these types of programmes than the average establishment. 
Engineering may use form of technology, hire high-skilled workers and use the work practices 
which have the scope necessary to most greatly benefit from high levels of worker involvement.
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6.4.1.3 Variable Means and Standard Deviations for the Combined Practices
In table 6.5 we see that establishments with profit-sharing programmes, and profit-sharing 
combined with task control, are less unionized. The fact that these practices are found in 
establishments which tend not to be unionized may be because they provide a substitute for 
unionization. We know that one of the principal benefits of unionization is the information- 
sharing mechanism which facilitates exchange of information between labour and management. 
Sharing in residual control and returns may well provide both the vehicle and the incentive to 
communicate the efficiency-enhancing information which labour is privy to. Some further support 
for this is the low level of two-way communication (InfoShare) found in establishments which 
have group incentives (.11). We see that, with the exception of the control establishments, most 
of the establishments use a strategic planning process to a similar degree. As we would expect 
to see, those establishments which have higher levels of task control also are more likely to use 
multi-skilling (Contrlgi, .70; Control, .51).
In terms of the types of organisations which use high levels of worker process control and group 
incentives, engineering and electronic manufacturing use them to a greater degree, on average. 
Plastic manufacturers use group incentives to a reduced degree, however, they use shopfloor 
worker process control approximately the same on average as other establishments. Food and 
drink manufacturers use group incentives slightly more on average, however, they use little 
shopfloor worker control. Food and drink manufactures typically have lower skill level workers 
which may indicate that these establishments have less to gain from giving employees control over 
some aspect of the work process. Work process control would only benefit organisations where 
there is latitude for individual judgement and action in the work process, and where shopfloor
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workers are in a better position to make work-related task decisions than supervisors or managers. 
If the work process is highly standardized, a high level of employee discretion may be 
unnecessary.
6.4.2 Regression Analysis
6.4.2.1 Analysis for Employee Involvement Programmes
Starting first with the regressions in table 6.6 we see the impact which employee involvement, 
including financial incentives, has on establishment performance. In column (1) we see the impact 
which employee involvement, including two-way communication programmes, has on return on 
assets (ROA) when each of the independent variables are run individually. In the case of 
involvement in quality issues there is a significant impact on establishment performance at the 10 
per cent level. In the case of involvement in both maintenance and the order of the work process 
there are negative coefficients and, again, a positive coefficient with control over quality tasks. 
There is, however, no effect associated with the two-way communication variable. In column (2) 
all the independent variables are included in the regression, but while the results are broadly the 
same the involvement in quality issues in no longer significant. In column (2) we see that the 
results of the other control variables are largely as we would expect.
The presence of a union results in reduced return on assets significant at the 5 per cent level. We 
also see that multi-skilling has a positive impact on performance at the 10 per cent level. The 
union result is expected and consistent with previous findings associated with the impact of 
unionization on firm financial performance. I am not aware of any previous work having been
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done on the impact of multi-skilling on establishment performance and this result indicates that 
there are gains associated with firms investing in this type of work process and training. Finally, 
neither strategic planning nor two-way communication has any impact on establishment 
performance. Column (3) examines the individual effects of the various independent variables 
on return on sales (ROS). We see that involvement in quality matters and control over quality 
tasks are significant at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels respectively, and again no effect 
associated with two-way communication programmes. Running all the independent variables 
together in column (4) results, again, in similar results, without statistical significance. Looking 
next at table 6.7, we see that in the case of columns (1-4) there are no significant results in any of 
the independent variables for either ROA .or ROS when establishments which include group- 
based incentives are removed from the analysis. This may indicate that previous studies which 
evaluate the impact of ‘employee involvement’, without controlling for the effects of financial 
participation, such as profit-sharing or company wide bonuses, may have biassed results.
6.4.2.2 Combined Practices - Regression Results
Tables 6.8 presents the results of a regression using OLS which evaluates the impact on 
performance of shopfloor worker control over quality issues in the production process and group 
incentive schemes independently and combined. Reviewing the results associated with return on 
assets in column (1), in time (t) and column (2) the independent and control variables in time (t-1) 
and return on sales in time t column (3) and (t-1) in column (4) as a measure of establishment 
performance, we see that the combination of the practices results in a positive significant effect 
at the one per cent level in both time (t) and (t-1). We see the results are the same in column (5) 
which is the restricted sample of establishments in time (t-1) where there is a ‘very high’ degree
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of interdependence between work areas. This result remains the same in column (6) which uses 
the ‘unextended’ data-set. This result supports the hypothesis that the interaction effect of the 
practices elicits strong performance outcomes.
We see that group incentive schemes in isolation are significant at the one per cent level for ROA. 
As detailed in the theoretical overview there are conflicting dynamics at work when profit-sharing 
is used in isolation, however, there seems to be some evidence that there are positive performance 
outcomes. Also noted is that while the coefficients are positive, where control rights are used in 
isolation, they are not statistically significant. The fact that there is no significant effect associated 
with a high degree of task involvement, when used in isolation, also supports the theory that moral 
hazard will have the dominate effect when employee involvement is used without any incentives. 
We see that multi-skilling is significant at the five percent level for ROA. This result signals that 
there are performance effects associated with training the workforce in a variety of tasks rather 
than relying on specialized job functions. The presence of a union has a negative impact on 
financial performance and is significant at the one per cent level for ROA. This result on unions 
is in line with much of the other research which shows a negative association with unions and 
financial performance. In table 6.9, which uses the more efficient random effects model, and 
controls for the remaining unobserved heterogeneity not controlled for by the control variables, 
we see that group incentives on their own are no longer significant. However, for both ROA and 
ROS in times (t) and (t-1) the interaction variable is significant mostly at the 1 per cent level.
Taking the results from table 6.9, column (1) we see that establishments which use both 
decentralized decision-making and group incentives have 11 per cent higher return on assets and 
a 4 per cent higher return on sales than those establishments which use neither practice. The
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results in column (5) indicate establishments which have a high degree of interdependence 
between work areas have a 13 per cent greater return on assets if they use the combined practices. 
Once again, this result does not change when using the ‘unextended’ data used to generate the 
coefficients in column (6).
Table 6.10 presents the results associated with the labour productivity analysis. The higher levels 
of productivity are associated with the use of group incentives rather than either the use of 
employee involvement or the combination of the two. Column one, which is the entire data-set, 
in time t we see establishments with some form of group incentive have labour productivity which 
is 0.09 (8.6 %) log-points higher than those without. We see roughly the same result when we 
evaluate the performance effects in time t - 1 (0.10 log-points; 9.5 %).
An example of two establishments, one using both decentralized decision making and group 
incentives and the other uses just decentralized decision making. Using Table 6.9 column 1, 
Establishment 1 uses control and return rights in combination and Establishment 2 uses only 
decentralized decision making. Establishment 1 has a6%(ll%-5%) better return on assets than 
does establishment 2. When we factor in the intercept (11% in column 1, table 6.9) those 
establishments which use control and return rights in combination have 22% (11% +11%) return 
on assets, and those who use only control rights have 16% return on assets (5% + 11%).
While the intercept was not reported in column 5 because each reported coefficient and standard 
error is derived from independently run regressions, the approximate level was between 11 and 
12 percent. These results suggest that the establishments which do not use these payment systems 
have between 11 and 12 percent return on assets. The gains associated with the use of these
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payment systems, as detailed in this analysis, are in addition to these average levels. For example, 
comparing establishment 1 and establishment 2 to the average establishment which does not use 
these payment systems (establishment 3) would result in the following return on asset level: 
establishment 3,12%, establishment 2, 7% (12% - 5%) and establishment 1,28% (12% + 16%)
6.5 Conclusion
Evaluated in this chapter is the independent and interactive effects of group incentives and 
decentralized decision-making. Decentralized decision-making is seen as a practice which may 
signal to employees that their input is valued. This type of practice may help promote the type of 
‘co-operative* culture thought to be needed in order to counter the incentive diluting effects of the 
free-rider problem.
The work process was primarily an ‘interdependent* production process (75 per cent) where one 
area was dependent on the others in order to carry out its work. A team approach was used in 84 
per cent of the establishments and the majority of those interviewed believed their establishment 
was moving towards greater decentralization (85 per cent).
This chapter firstly evaluates the impact employee involvement practices, with and without 
incentives, have on the financial performance of the establishment. Secondly, it looks at the 
impact a high degree of decentralized task responsibility interacted with group incentive 
programmes has on establishment performance outcomes.
We see that in the case where incentives are included with employee involvement programmes, 
including two-way communication programmes and decentralized decision-making, there maybe
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a significant impact on the financial performance of the establishment. When a further evaluation 
is conducted, which does not include incentives, we see that the significant impact on the 
performance of the establishment no longer applies.
Also evaluated is the impact that a high degree of employee control over a specific job task and 
group incentives, both independently and interactively, have on the financial performance of the 
establishment. We see that, when used in isolation, a high degree decentralized decision-making 
does not have a significant impact on performance. Group incentives do have a significant 
positive impact on financial performance and labour productivity, but the strongest impact on 
financial performance is associated with the combination of these practices.
These findings provide some evidence that transferring residual control and residual return rights 
lead to greater profitability when used in combination. These results also hold-up in a restricted 
sample of establishments which have a ‘high’ degree of work area interdependence. Using two 
identifiable practices we see that the two practices used in combination result in superior outcomes 
than if taken in isolation. These results remain robust after both attributing for unobserved 
heterogeneity, through the use of the random effects estimator, and attempts to mitigate the 
potential for endogeneity through the use of lag variables. The evidence provided in this chapter 
suggests that decentralizing decision-making is not enough, group incentives also need to be 
provided.
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Variable
ROA
ROS
InvQual
InvMain
InvOrder
CrtlQual
InvQual2
InvMain2
InvOrder2
CrtlQual2
ContrlGI
Grouppay
Control
Table 6.3 
Variable Definition 
Definition_____________
Pre-tax profit divided by assets.
Pre-tax profit divided by total establishment sales.
1 if the shopfloor workers are very involved in quality 
matters and may include incentives, 0 otherwise.
1 if the shopfloor workers are very involved in maintenance 
issues and may include incentives, 0 otherwise.
1 if the shopfloor workers are very involved in the order in 
which the work is carried out and may have incentives, 0 
otherwise.
1 if the shopfloor workers have control over quality tasks and 
may include incentives, 0 otherwise.
1 if the shopfloor workers are very involved in quality 
matters excluding any incentives, 0 otherwise.
1 if the shopfloor workers are very involved in maintenance 
issues excluding any incentives, 0 otherwise.
1 if the shopfloor workers are very involved in the order in 
which the work is carried out excluding any incentives, 0 
otherwise.
1 if the shopfloor workers have control over quality tasks 
excluding any incentives, 0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment has a combination of worker quality task 
control and group incentive schemes, 0 otherwise.
1 if the establishment has no shopfloor worker quality task 
control and a group incentive scheme, 0 otherwise.
if the establishment has shopfloor worker quality task control 
and no group incentive schemes, 0 otherwise.
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Variable Definitions cont’d
InfoShare 1 if the establishment has a high level of Mgmt>Employee 
Employee>Mgmt communication, 0 otherwise.
Union 1 if the establishment has a union, 0 otherwise.
Multi-Skill 1 if the establishment uses multi-skill training, 0 otherwise.
IndustComp 1 if the level of competition in the industry has increased in the 
last 5 years.
Strategy 1 if the establishment has a functionally integrated 
strategic planning process.
EstSize Average number of employees in year t.
LogEstSize Log of the average number of employees in year t.
Assets Gross book value of depreciable assets.
LogAssets Log of gross book value of depreciable assets.
Year in which interview took place and sector dummies also included in regressions.
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Table 6.4
Variable Means and Standard Deviations by Task Control/Task Employee Involvement
(Variable Information for Pooled Data)
Variable InvQual
(103)
InvMain
(24)
InvOrder
(101)
CrtlQual
(107)
Total
(397)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
ROA .11 .12 .09 .08 .10 .10 .12 .13 .12 .14
ROS .04 .04 .03 .03 .03 .04 .06 .11 .06 .09
Strategy .61 .49 .96 .20 .57 .50 .59 .50 .70 .46
Union .63 .48 .75 .44 .75 .43 .66 .48 .60 .49
InfoShare .27 .45 .21 .42 .24 .43 .34 .48 .21 .41
MuItiSkill .50 .50 .71 .46 .55 .50 .51 .50 .46 .50
EstSize 264 270 196 197 260 267 238 252 325 467
LogEstSize 5.0 .72 4.9 .75 4.9 .63 5.2 .73 5.3 .83
Assets (000) 70 357 81 245 47 232 75 383 60 321
LogAssets 8.1 1.6 7.7 1.2 7.9 .9 8.7 1.8 8.8 1.8
Eng .61 .49 .92 .28 .56 .50 .53 .50 .45 .50
Ele .07 .25 .08 .28 .01 .10 .07 .25 .08 .27
Plast .22 .42 0 0 .17 .38 .28 .45 .23 .41
FandD .0*4 .19 0 0 .15 .36 .04 .19 .10 .30
Misc .07 .25 0 0 .11 .31 .08 .28 .17 .37
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Table 6.5
Variable Means and Standard Deviations by Task Control/Group Incentive Schemes
(Variable Information for Pooled Data)
Variable ContrlGI
(81)
Grouppay
(72)
Control
(107)
NoCtrlNoGi
(137)
Total
(397)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
ROA .14 .17 .13 .11 .12 .13 .10 .12 .12 .14
ROS .06 .06 .06 .07 .06 .11 .04 .05 .06 .09
Est Size 294 305 256 268 238 252 367 585 325 467
LogEstSize 5.3 .77 5.4 .76 5.2 .73 5.4 .91 5.3 .83
Union .52 .50 .53 .50 .66
00TT• .63 .48 .60 .49
InfoShare .26 .44 .11 .32 .34 • ■U 00 .13 .34 .21 .41
MuItiSkill .70 .46 .25 .44 .51 .50 .38 .49 .46 .50
Assets (000) 57 214 47 197 75 383 68 316 60 321
LogAssets 8.8 1.7 9.2 1.9 8.7 1.8 8.6 1.7 8.8 1.8
Eng .50 .50 .28 .45 .53 .50 .42 .50 .45 .50
Ele .12 .33 .18 .39 .07 .25 0 0 .08 .27
Plast .21 .41 .08 .28 .28 .45 .25 .43 .23 .41
FandD 0 0 .19 .40 .04 .19 .15 .36 .10 .30
Misc .17 .38 .26 .44 .08 .28 .19 .39 .17 .37
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Table 6.6
Random Effects Estimates of (Return on Assets and Return on Sales) for UK
Manufacturing Establishments Shopfloor Worker Employee Involvement Programmes including
incentives. (Standard Errors in Parentheses.)
Variables 1 2 3 4
InvQual .05* .04 .03** .03
(.03) (.06) (.01) (.03)
InvMain -.06 -.07 -.03 -.03
(.05) (.05) (.02) (.02)
InvOrder -.004 -.01 .004 .004
(.03) (.04) (.01) (.02)
CrtlQual .05 .03 .02* .003
(.03) (.07) (.01) (.03)
InfoShare -.004 -.03 .01 .00
(.04) (.04) (.02) (.02)
Union -.06** -.02
(.03) (.01)
MuItiSkill .06* .02*
(.03) (.01)
Strategy -.03 .002
(.04) (.01)
LogEstSize .02 .004
(.02) (.01)
LogAssets .004
(.01)
Intercept .13 .02
(.12) (.05)
R2 --------  .22   .19
N --------  183   181
Column (1), Regression includes various task involvement + controls (controls not reported) using ROA. 
Column (2), Regression includes all task involvement + controls using ROA.
Column (3), Regression includes various task involvement + controls (controls not reported) using ROS. 
Column (4), Regression includes all task involvement + controls using ROS.
^Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
Note: Sector and year in which interview conducted dummies included in the regression but not reported.
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Table 6.7
Random Effects Estimates of (Return on Assets and Return on Sales) for UK
Manufacturing Establishments Shopfloor Worker Employee Involvement Programmes absent incentives.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses.)
Variables 1 2 3 4
InvQual2 .01 .04 .00 .01
(.04) (.06) (.02) (.02)
InvMain2 -.02 -.01 -.02 -.001
(.08) (.09) (.03) (.04)
InvOrder2 -.02 -.03 -.02 -.03
(.04) (.05) (.02) (.02)
CrtlQual2 -.01 -.03 -.001 -.003
(.04) (.05) (.01) (.02)
InfoShare -.004 -.003 .01 .01
(.04) (.04) (.02) (.02)
Union -.06** -.02
(.03) (.01)
MuItiSkill .08** .03**
(.03) (.01)
Strategy -.03 -.01
(.04) (.01)
LogEstSize .02 .003
(.02) (.01)
LogAssets .00
(.01)
Intercept .17 .06
(.13) (.05)
R2   .17   .13
N   183   181
Column (1), Regression includes various task involvement + controls (controls not reported) using ROA. 
Column (2), Regression includes all task involvement + controls using ROA.
Column (3), Regression includes various task involvement + controls (controls not reported) using ROS. 
Column (4), Regression includes all task involvement + controls using ROS.
^Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
Note: Sector and year in which interview conducted dummies included in the regression but not reported.
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Table 6.8
OLS Estimates of Return on Assets and Return on Sales for UK Manufacturing Establishments. Shopfloor
Worker Task Control (Quality), Group Incentive Schemes, Independently and Combined.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses.)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
(t) (t-1) (t) (t-1) (t-1) (t)
Control .04* .03 .02* .02* .04 .06
(.02) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.05)
Grouppay ^07*** .07*** .03* .03** .07* .05
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.06)
ContrlGI .10*** JQ*** Q4*** .04*** j4*** .09**
(.03) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.04) (.04)
InfoShare -.02 -.004 .01 .01 -.01 -.02
(.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04) (.04)
Union -.06*** -.05** -.01* -.01 -.05 -.05
(.02) (.03) (.008) (.01) (.02) (.03)
MuItiSkill .05** .05** .02** .02** .06** .07**
(.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.03)
Strategy -.01 -.03 -.0003 -.0001 -.03 -.01
(.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.04)
LogEstSize .01 .02 .004 .01 .01 .01
(.03) (.01) (.004) (.006) (.01) (.02)
LogAssets ------- -.0001 -.006** -------
(.004) (.003)
Intercept .12 .07 .03 .03 .14 .17
(.09) (.10) (.03) (.04) (.11) (.12)
R2 .15 .13 .10 .10 .12 .12
N 178 141 178 141 114 103
Column (1), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROA in time t.
Column (2), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROA in time t -1.
Column (3), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROS in time t.
Column (4), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROS in time t -1.
Column (5), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROA in time t - 1 for 
‘restricted* sample.
Column (6), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROA in time t - 1 for 
‘restricted* sample using ‘unextended* data-set.
^Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
Note: Sector and year in which interview conducted dummies included in the regression but not reported.
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Table 6.9
Random Effect Estimates of Return on Assets and Return on Sales for UK Manufacturing Establishments.
Shopfloor Worker Task Control (Quality), Group Incentive Schemes, Independently and Combined.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses.)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
(t) (t-1) (t) (t-1) (t-1) (t)
Control .05 .03 .02 .02 .04 .06
(.04) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.05) (.05)
Grouppay .09* .06 .03 .03 .07 .07
(.05) (.06) (.02) (.02) (.08) (.08)
ContrlGI jj*** .10** .04*** .05*** .13** .11**
(.04) (.05) (.02) (.02) (.06) (.05)
InfoShare -.02 -.004 .01 .01 -.01 -.03
(.04) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.05) (.05)
Union -.06** -.06* -.02 -.01 -.05 -.06*
(.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04) (.04)
MuItiSkill .06* .06* .02 .02* .06 .08**
(.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04) (.04)
Strategy -.01 -.03 .0004 .001 -.03 -.03
(.03) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.05) (.04)
LogEstSize .02 .02 .004 .01 .01 .01
(.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02)
LogAssets ------- -.0003 -.008 -------
(.003) (004)
Intercept .11 .07 .03 .04 .12 .08
(.12) (.13) (.05) (.05) (.16) (.08)
R2 .22 .21 .17 .19 .23 .24
N 178 141 178 141 114 103
Column (1), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROA in time t.
Column (2), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROA in time t -1.
Column (3), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROS in time t.
Column (4), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROS in time t -1.
Column (5), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROA in time t - 1  for 
‘restricted’ sample.
Column (6), Regression includes independent variables + controls using ROA in time t -1  for 
‘restricted’ sample using ‘unextended’ data-set.
^Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
Note: Sector and year in which interview conducted dummies included in the regression but not reported.
Table 6.10
Random Effect Estimates for Labour Productivity (LogSalesEE) for UK Manufacturing Establishments.
Shopfloor Worker Task Control (Quality), Group Incentive Schemes, Independently and Combined.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses.)
Variables 1 2 3 4
(t) (t) (t-1) (t-1)
Control .01 .01 .00 .00
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.04)
Grouppay .09** .09 .10** .10**
(.05) (.07) (.05) (.05)
ContrlGI .01 -.03 .01 .01
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.04)
IncComp .02 .04 .02 .02
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.03)
LogEstSize -.16*** -.16*** -.16*** -.16***
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
LogAsstEE .01 -.01 .02 .02
(.03) (.03) (04) (.02)
Intercept 2.66*** 2.70*** 2.63*** 2.63***
(.13) (.15) (.15) (.15)
R2 .57 .59 .55 .56
N 204 144 155 111
Column (1), Regression in time t.
Column (2), Regression in time t for restricted sample of ‘team production’ settings.
Column (3 ),Regression in time t - 1 .
Column (4), Regression in time t - 1 for restricted sample of ‘team production’ settings.
**Statistically significant at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
Note: Sector and year in which interview conducted dummies included in the regression but not reported.
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6.6 Appendix
Exhibit 6.1
Questionnaire Items for Independent Variables
4. Centralization
Which is the lowest level in the firm which has the authority to make decisions?
(action can be taken without waiting for confirmation from above)
(i) Spend unbudgeted money on capital expenditure items
(ii) Spend unbudgeted money on current revenue items
(iii) Create a new job
(iv) Determine a new product
(v) Determine the pricing of a product
(vi) Determine the size o f the labour force
(vii) Dismiss an operator
(viii) Decide which production plans are to be given preference
(ix) Which suppliers are to be used (including changes)
(x) Whether to promote an operator
(xi) Selection of an applicant
(xii) When overtime should be worked
(xiii) Allocation o f work amongst available operators
(xiv) Stopping production because o f quality problems
(xv) Which of these 6 levels exists (Y)
(N)
Mgr
Super- Reporting Above
Operator visor Mgr to MD MD MD
1 2 3 4 5 6
Exhibit 6.2
Two-Way Communication Variable Questionnaire Item
N. Research and Development 7. Communication
How often are there:
(ii) written/verbal briefing on company 
performance or other company issues to 
management?
never/daily/weekly(bi)/monthly(bi)/quart/6mos
/annual
10. Does the company have any schemes for 
promoting innovation (e.g. a suggestion scheme)?
(i) Yes [ ]
(ii) No [ ]
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Exhibit 6.3
Task Responsibility Questionnaire Item
G. WORK DESIGN
11. To what extent are operators responsible for/involved in the following:
Not at Moderate Very
all A little Amount Much
(i) A significant quality problem. 1 2 3 4
(ii) Material supply problem. 1 2 3 4
(iii) Machine repair following 
minor breakdown.
1 2 3 4
(iv) Routine maintenance of 
machine.
1 2 3 4
(v) Setting up machine for 
changeover of product.
1 2 3 4
(Vi) Setting up the machine 
for a new product.
1 2 3 4
(vii) When to take breaks. 1 2 3 4
(viii) The order in which to 
do their work.
1 2 3 4
Exhibit 6.4 
Pay System Questionnaire Item
8. Reward
(ii) On what basis are shopfloor workers paid? (tick all those that apply)
a. Flat time rate
b. Output incentive/bonus (individual)
c. Output incentive/bonus (team)
d. Merit rating
e. Measured day work
f. Company profit share
g- Company bonus
h. Salaried
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Exhibit 6.5
Frequency Distribution for Involvement/Participation Definition
Using a frequency distribution establishments with the factors are represented depending 
on frequency of the various factors. Table 6.10 through 6.12 represents the first two questions 
which comprise type 1 (Quality), (Table 6.10). Using question (i) and (ii) found in exhibit 6.2 an 
establishment is considered to have a high degree of shopfloor worker involvement/responsibility 
if the response to either question (i) or question (ii) is “Very much”. The same determination is 
made for type 2 (Set-up) if the reply to either (v) or (vi) is very much (Table 6.10), and Factor 3 
(Maintenance) if the reply to either question (iii) or (vi) is very much (Table 13.0).
Type 1 (Quality)
Table 6.10
Frequency Distribution for Question from diagram 3 (i) and (ii).
Question 
Extent operators 
involved/responsible 
for following: 
“Very much”
Frequency Percent
(i) Roqual 32 28.83
(ii) Romat 11 9.91
Type 2 (Set-Up)
Table 6.11
Frequency Distribution for Question from diagram 3 (v) and (vi).
Question 
Extent operators 
involved/responsible 
for following: 
“Very much”
Frequency Percent
(v) Roset 50 46.30
(vi) Ronew 34 32.08
Type 3 (Maintenance)
Table 6.12
Frequency Distribution for Question from Diagram 3 (iii) and (iv).
Question 
Extent operators 
involved/responsible 
for following: 
“Very much”
Frequency Percent
(iii) Rorep 7 6.54
(iv) Romaint 11 10.19
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Questionnaire Items Used for Control Variables (See Chapter 5 - 5.6.2)
Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 7 ,1 will summarize the chapters, respond to the questions addressed and also discuss
the conclusions which can be drawn from this thesis.
The questions evaluated include the following:
(i) From the perspective of the company, why would it choose to use group incentives 
and employee involvement programmes? What would it hope to gain and
does the firms performance change after the introduction of these programmes? How
well is it performing in relation to firms which do not use such these programmes?
(ii) What form of pay system promotes optimal establishment outcomes? In team 
production settings, are individual, team or group incentives most efficient?
(iii) In settings where the product produced or the service given is dependent on team 
production or interdependent work processes, is it efficient for establishments to invest 
in decentralized decision-making and communication programmes? Is it efficient to use 
employee involvement and performance-related pay independently, or rather in 
combination?
Initially, in Chapter 7 ,1 will summarize the findings in each chapter. This will be followed by
an evaluation of the conclusions which can be drawn regarding these test questions.
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7.2 Summary
7.2.1 Chapter 1 - Introduction
Chapter 1 introduces the questions which will be evaluated and tested in this thesis. A number 
of concepts and trends are also introduced and discussed. Increased education levels, training, 
and increased access to information from information technology are all having the effect of 
giving employees access to private information. In addition, there is an increased trend in the 
use of both employee involvement programmes and incentive systems, which may be used as 
substitutes for formal monitors. These trends may signal that employers are finding it 
increasingly advantageous to involve employees, and that it may be getting more difficult to 
formally monitor their work.
7.2.2 Chapter 2 - Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Review
In the second chapter, theoretical considerations are evaluated and a review of the pertinent 
empirical literature is conducted. Additional theoretical issues and the related empirical work 
are discussed in the Chapters 4, 5 and 6 where the test questions are evaluated. The theoretical 
review starts with the principal-agent framework; the notion that owners and their agents may 
have differing objectives. In order to achieve ‘goal convergence’ employers develop incentive 
contracts. Incentive contracts focus on rewarding performance rather than observable behaviours 
such as time spent on the job. While there is both theoretical and empirical evidence that rewards 
based on performance illicit greater individual performance outcomes, there is little or no 
empirical evidence on which payment system is the most efficient in team production settings.
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There is some theoretical evidence that group-based compensation systems maybe more efficient 
in settings where there is a high degree of interdependence between work areas or work tasks. 
Evaluated in Chapter 2 are the incentive effects associated with both employee involvement and 
group incentives. One of the principal reasons employee involvement programmes are thought 
to be efficient is because employees have access to information which may be productivity- 
enhancing. Employee involvement programmes may allow ‘owners’ to gain access to this 
information. However, one problem with employee involvement is that unless incentives are 
provided, moral hazard and an increased opportunity to shirk may be present. Group incentives 
are thought to provide increased incentive effects, and these results may be particularly prevalent 
in settings where there is a high degree of work area ‘interdependence’. The principal problem 
with group incentives is the 1/n or free-rider problem. Either adding monitors or finding 
substitutes for monitors is one means of resolving the free-rider problem. Consequently, there 
is some theoretical support for the position that employee involvement and group incentives may 
work better in combination. Incentives may resolve the moral hazard problem and employee 
involvement may promote the type of environment which encourages mutual monitoring and co­
operation. There is some prior empirical support for greater efficiency when employee 
involvement and group incentives are used in combination.
7.2.3 Chapter 3 - Methodological Issues
In order to evaluate the questions raised in this thesis, both case study and econometric analysis 
is used. The case study allows for a broad analysis which provides insight into why a company 
would choose to put in place group incentives and employee involvement programmes. The case 
study is also able to provide information on broad performance trends associated with the use of
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these programmes. Performance of the firm prior to, and after, the introduction of the all­
employee stock option programme was evaluated, as was an examination of the performance of 
firms which do not have the same programmes. While it is not possible to infer these practices 
are causing changes in performance, the case study allowed us to see why, from the perspective 
of a single firm, it chose to put these practices in place.
In order to examine more rigorously the impact of pay systems and employee involvement, 
econometric analysis was used. To examine more closely the impact the practices of interest 
have on performance both heterogeneity and endogeneity is controlled for. In order to control for 
heterogeneity, or omitted variable bias, a broad range of control variables is also included. In 
addition, the random effects estimator is used. Endogeneity, or reverse causality, is partially 
mitigated through the use of lag variables.
7.2.4 Chapter 4 - AESOP and Communication Programmes in UK Retail Firm
A case study is conducted in Chapter 4 in order to broadly examine why a firm would chose to 
implement an all-employee stock option programme (AESOP) and extensive employee 
communication programmes. From the perspective of those at the retail firm, the reason the 
stock option programme was instituted was due to the belief that ‘owners’ would work harder, 
server the customer better, and be less likely to resign. Extensive communication programmes 
were instituted in order to gain access to information which employees may have.
Since the introduction of these programmes there has been an increase in performance measures, 
such as productivity and profitability, both within the firm and in comparison with competitors
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who do not offer an AESOP. There is also a reduction in employee turnover, a high level of 
employee morale and extensive involvement by employees in involvement programmes.
These results clearly signal that a close look at both group incentive schemes and employee 
involvement programmes is warranted. In order to examine more closely the effects of these 
practices on performance, in Chapter 5 an econometric analysis is conducted on the effect of 
fixed and variable pay systems, including group incentives, on the performance of 
establishments. Chapter 6 is an econometric analysis of the independent and interactive effects 
of employee involvement and group incentives on establishment performance.
7.2.5 Chapter 5 - Fixed, Individual, Team and Group Pay in Team Production Settings
Examined in Chapter 5 is the impact on establishment financial performance of piece rates, 
individual merit pay, individual and team bonuses and group incentives. These pay systems are 
evaluated in UK manufacturing settings which have largely ‘interdependent’ work areas. There 
is some theoretical support that group-based pay systems may promote optimal performance 
outcomes in team production settings.
These pay systems are tested in both the entire sample of establishments which mostly have some 
degree of task ‘interdependence’ (96 per cent of the establishments) and a restricted sample of 
establishments which have a higher level of task interdependence (75 per cent of the 
establishments). The results clearly show that in work settings where there is task or work area 
interdependence, group incentives are more efficient than fixed pay, piece rates, individual or 
team level bonuses. This holds for the sample as a whole but is especially true in the restricted
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sample o f more highly task interdependent establishments.
7.2.6 Chapter 6 - Independent and Combined Employee Involvement Programme
with Group Incentives
Chapter 6 examines both the independent and interactive effects of employee involvement and 
group incentives. A restricted sample is also used to evaluate these practices in settings where 
there is a high degree of task interdependence.
Initially examined is the impact which the use of employee involvement has on establishment 
performance. Both involvement in job tasks and the use of two-way information-sharing 
programmes are evaluated. Involvement associated with quality-related tasks are shown to be 
associated with superior performance. However, when establishments which include financial 
incentives are excluded from those which use employee involvement these results disappear.
Evaluated next in this chapter are performance effects in establishments which use only employee 
decentralized decision-making in quality related tasks and establishments which use only group- 
based incentives. By evaluating the use of these programmes independently I was better able to 
determine if the incentive effects are associated with employee involvement or group incentives. 
Additionally, the interactive effects of these two practices are also evaluated by evaluating the 
impact of these two practices in establishments which only use the combination.
The results clearly show that superior performance outcomes are found when these two practices 
are used in combination. The results remain robust in the restricted sample of establishments
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with more highly interdependent work areas.
7.3 Test Questions Revisited
7.3.1 Test Question (i)
From the perspective ofthe company, why would it choose to use group incentives and employee 
involvement programmes? What would it hope to gain and does thefirm s performance change 
after the introduction ofthese programmes? How well is it performing in relation tofirms which 
do not use such programmes?
From the perspective of the case study company, the use of an all-employee stock option 
programme could result in employees thinking and acting like owners. This, it is envisaged, 
should translate into greater customer service, higher productivity and greater loyalty. The use 
of extensive employee involvement programmes is meant to tap the substantial expertise and 
information to which the employees have access.
The theoretical literature does not provide a clear prediction on the use of these practices. Group- 
based incentives are normally found in settings were it is difficult to monitor employees, and the 
decision to use employee involvement programmes are dependent on whether employees have 
access to useful information, the cost of communicating that information and the analytical 
expertise of employees. The theoretical literature would predict that if group incentives can 
overcome the incentive diluting effects of the free-rider problem, this form of payment system 
may result in greater output. Employee involvement programmes which tap into useful 
information, which employees have access, may also increase productivity.
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The choice of a group-based incentive system in the ‘low-wage, low-skill’ service sector is 
interesting. Group-based incentives are typically associated with ‘high-paid’, ‘high-skilled’ 
employees, where monitoring output is considered to be costly. Monitoring costs for service 
sector workers may actually be high given the information which they have access to on customer 
preference and the difficulty in monitoring ‘good customer service’ or ‘helpfulness’.
While it is difficult to establish causality from the case study used in Chapter 4, in all 
performance measures, the company is performing very well. Profits and productivity are 
increasing, there is a decrease in employee turnover and an apparently high level of employee 
morale. This increasing performance is taking place both within the case study firm and in 
comparison with its competitors which do not offer the same financial participation programmes.
7.3.2 Test Question (ii)
What form o f pay system promotes optimal establishment outcomes? In team production 
settings, are individual, team or group incentives more efficient?
There has recently been a transition from manufacturing establishments in which the production 
process is primarily specialized and rigid, to workplaces which are characterized by flexibility. 
Associated with these changes in the production process, there have been some changes in 
payment systems from individual to team- or group-based. However, only approximately one- 
third of the establishments in our data-set are using these practices.
There is some theoretical support that group-based incentive systems might be more efficient in 
settings where output is a function of group effort or information-sharing between groups is 
valuable. In these settings, individual performance-based incentive systems may not promote the 
types of ‘co-operative’ behaviours and information sharing which are needed.
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Using methods which attribute for both unobserved heterogeneity or omitted variable bias and 
endogeneity we find evidence in Chapter 5 that in team production settings group-based 
incentives are more efficient than incentive systems which reward either team or individual 
effort. The coefficients for both individual and team-based incentive systems are largely 
negative. When a restricted sample of establishments which have a ‘high’ degree of 
interdependence between work areas the same result is found.
7.3.3 Test Question (iii)
In settings where the product produced or the service given is dependent on team production or 
interdependent work processes, is it efficient for establishments to invest in decentralized 
decision-making and communication programmes? Is it efficient to use employee involvement 
and group incentives on their own, or rather in combination?
We have seen in Chapter 5 there is evidence that in production settings which have a high degree 
of interdependence between work areas, group-based incentive schemes are more efficient than 
individual or team-based approaches. However, there is still the free-rider or 1/n problem. There 
is speculation that the development of a ‘co-operative’ or ‘trusting’ corporate culture may be 
necessary for profit-sharing to have a maximum effect. This is tested in Chapter 6 by evaluating 
the performance of establishments which use profit-sharing and use practices which may help 
develop a ‘co-operative’ work culture.
There is also some theoretical support for the use of these two practices in combination. Given 
the impossibility of complete contracting, the use of ‘implicit’ contracts, which consist of an 
employer’s effort to develop loyalty and co-operative behaviours in their workforce, may 
promote the trust necessary to take up where explicit contracts leave off. While theory may
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support the use of practices which promote trust in the workplace to mitigate the free-rider 
problem, programmes which promote trust without incentives may be prone to moral hazard. 
For example, a high degree of decentralized decision-making may result in a reduction of output 
if incentives are not included. This may take place because employees may have the authority 
to act on their private information, but if they do not ‘share in the returns’, the incentive may be 
to shirk or reduce effort.
The empirical evidence in Chapter 6, indicates that previous research into employee involvement 
which has not separated out ‘decision-making’ from ‘financial participation’, may have biassed 
results. The empirical results in Chapter 6 shows that establishments which have financial 
participation and employee involvement may lead to inflated and biassed coefficients when 
evaluating the impact of employee involvement on performance.
Evidence in Chapter 6 shows that it is not decentralized decision-making or group incentive 
taken independently which result in superior performance, but rather the use of the two practices 
in combination. This same result applies in settings where there is a high degree of 
interdependence in the work areas.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
This thesis allows us to conclude that in today’s workplace, it is most efficient for companies 
to share both residual control and residual return rights with their employees. It further allows 
us to conclude that while it is efficient to share these rights, it is most efficient if the rights are 
shared together.
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As we saw in Chapter 1, private information exists with employees due to increased education 
levels, greater training information technology and emergence of the service economy. In chapter 
4, the case study, this increase in private information may not only be limited to the highly- 
skilled, but given their proximity to customers, low-skilled employees may have access to useful 
information on customer preferences. Changes in the manufacturing sector are also increasing 
the skill levels of employees and the production process is changing from rigid to flexible 
methods which include a high degree of interdependence between work areas. These changes 
may be making it increasingly difficult and expensive for companies to monitor the work of 
employees so employers are looking for cost-efficient ways in which to monitor.
There is support in the theoretical literature that the two practices may work best when used in 
combination. Employee involvement on its own allows for the possibility of moral hazard and 
group incentives taken independently are subj ect to the free-rider problem. However, when taken 
together, group incentives may provide the incentive necessary to overcome the moral hazard 
problem, and the use of employee involvement programmes may help create the type of 
workplace culture which promotes horizontal monitoring, reducing the free-rider problem.
The case study provides evidence, from the perspective of the company, regarding what it hopes 
to gain through the use of group-based financial participation and extensive employee 
involvement programmes. While these programmes were clearly associated with better 
performance at the case study firm this notion is more rigorously tested in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Chapter 5 provides clear empirical evidence that in settings where work areas are 
‘interdependent* on one another, group-based incentives are more efficient than individual-level 
incentives. In Chapter 6, we see additional clear empirical evidence that it is the combination
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o f employee involvement and group incentives which promotes optimal performance outcomes.
Overall, this thesis provides strong evidence that it is efficient to involve employees in decisions. 
It further concludes that in settings where the tasks performed are interdependent, group-based 
incentives are the most effective. Furthermore, in these same settings, the most efficient way of 
designing the employment relationship is to both involve employees and reward them on the 
basis of group output. This combination maybe efficient in both the manufacturing and service 
sector, and for both high-skill level and low skill-level employees who may have potentially 
profitability-enhancing information.
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